Brooks CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 651 conclude that the Soviet empire was profitable.For one thing,the East Europeans might have been fairly quiescent only because of the large Soviet troop presence in the region.The degree to which the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were designed for external security rather than to preserve internal order (and hence should count as occupation costs)is very difficult to assess.Liberman cites the fact that large-scale Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe was required only three times in support of the view that Soviet troops in the region were not significantly oriented toward pre- serving internal order(p.133).Looking at the same evidence,one can easily reach the opposite conclusion.Beyond total troop levels,Liberman states that"the number of administrators and spies remains uncertain but represented at most a small fraction of Soviet troops"(p.133).Why we should believe Liberman's assessment of the number of spies and administrators despite an admitted lack of data is unclear.Moreover,man- power figures only partially reflect total expenditures on monitoring and administra- tion.In the end,Liberman might be right that Soviet costs of control in Eastern Europe were"not great,"(p.126)but we cannot reach this conclusion on the basis of the avail- able evidence that he presents. Furthermore,the East Europeans might have been fairly complacent only due to the large inflow of subsidies,both explicit and implicit,from the Soviet Union(Bunce 1985).Although difficult to estimate with exactitude,the size of these subsidies remained stubbornly high even after the Soviets strove to reduce them during the 1980s.Stone (1996,45)reveals that"the Soviet premier,Nikolai Ryzhkov,had been shocked as late as 1988 by a report which estimated the Soviet subsidy to the East European allies at $17 billion per year."Liberman(1996,132)does recognize that Soviet subsidies were very significant in size,but he argues that"the subsidies did not represent a net imperial deficit for the Soviet Union"because they were significantly lower than the money spent on military expenditures by the East European countries. Whether these military expenditures by East European countries should fall under Liberman's restrictive definition of the "economic"benefits of conquest,however,is not entirely clear.Moreover,by Liberman's own earlier admission,the "reliability of these [East European]forces,and thus their contribution to Soviet power,is hard to judge"(pp.130-31).Past Soviet military interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hun- gary hardly ensured high levels of loyalty by these countries'military forces,and the same can be said about Polish military forces following the Soviet imposition of mar- tial law in 1981.Not only was the loyalty of these three countries highly suspect,but also the military capacity of East European military forces generally was relatively low.Within Eastern Europe,only the East German military might have been capable of effectively matching up against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)forces. But if a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional war had ever occurred,it is unclear whether East German forces would have possessed sufficient loyalty to attack and kill their West German brethren. Ultimately,the East European armies might have contributed to Soviet security to some degree(although once the Soviets had an ensured"second strike"capability and mutual nuclear deterrence had developed,one certainly can question exactly how much of a contribution this might have entailed).But,it is hard to fathom that any con-Brooks / CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 651 conclude that the Soviet empire was profitable. For one thing, the East Europeans might have been fairly quiescent only because of the large Soviet troop presence in the region. The degree to which the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were designed for external security rather than to preserve internal order (and hence should count as occupation costs) is very difficult to assess. Liberman cites the fact that large-scale Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe was required only three times in support of the view that Soviet troops in the region were not significantly oriented toward pre￾serving internal order (p. 133). Looking at the same evidence, one can easily reach the opposite conclusion. Beyond total troop levels, Liberman states that "the number of administrators and spies remains uncertain but represented at most a small fraction of Soviet troops" (p. 133). Why we should believe Liberman's assessment of the number of spies and administrators despite an admitted lack of data is unclear. Moreover, man￾power figures only partially reflect total expenditures on monitoring and administra￾tion. In the end, Liberman might be right that Soviet costs of control in Eastern Europe were "not great;' (p. 126) but we cannot reach this conclusion on the basis of the avail￾able evidence that he presents. Furthermore, the East Europeans might have been fairly complacent only due to the large inflow of subsidies, both explicit and implicit, from the Soviet Union (Bunce 1985). Although difficult to estimate with exactitude, the size of these subsidies remained stubbornly high even after the Soviets strove to reduce them during the 1980s. Stone (1996, 45) reveals that "the Soviet premier, Nikolai Ryzhkov, had been shocked as late as 1988 by a report which estimated the Soviet subsidy to the East European allies at $17 billion per year." Liberman (1996, 132) does recognize that Soviet subsidies were very significant in size, but he argues that "the subsidies did not represent a net imperial deficit for the Soviet Union" because they were significantly lower than the money spent on military expenditures by the East European countries. Whether these military expenditures by East European countries should fall under Liberman's restrictive definition of the "economic" benefits of conquest, however, is not entirely clear. Moreover, by Liberman's own earlier admission, the "reliability of these [East European] forces, and thus their contribution to Soviet power, is hard to judge" (pp. 130-31). Past Soviet military interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hun￾gary hardly ensured high levels of loyalty by these countries' military forces, and the same can be said about Polish military forces following the Soviet imposition of mar￾tial law in 1981. Not only was the loyalty of these three countries highly suspect, but also the military capacity of East European military forces generally was relatively low. Within Eastern Europe, only the East German military might have been capable of effectively matching up against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. But if a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional war had ever occurred, it is unclear whether East German forces would have possessed sufficient loyalty to attack and kill their West German brethren. Ultimately, the East European armies might have contributed to Soviet security to some degree (although once the Soviets had an ensured "second strike" capability and mutual nuclear deterrence had developed, one certainly can question exactly how much of a contribution this might have entailed). But, it is hard to fathom that any con-