652 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ceivable security benefit these forces provided was worth the enormous long-term eco- nomic costs,in terms of both direct outlays and opportunity costs,that were associated with propping up the Soviet empire.This is,in fact,a principal reason why the Soviets decided to give up their East European empire during the late 1980s (Wohlforth 1994-95). In the end,Liberman's (1996)argument is simply not sufficient to reject the con- ventional wisdom that the Soviet empire was a huge economic albatross.This is a con- clusion that has only become stronger over time as evidence from Soviet sources has increased.3 Of course,the Soviet case is only one of five that Liberman examines.But the fact that this is his only case from the post-World War II period and is by far the weakest one for his thesis is very significant given that there are reasons to expect that the benefits of conquest might have declined during the post-World War II era. Despite these concerns,Liberman(1996)nevertheless has provided a very useful and compelling corrective to the quagmire view.Too many scholars have simply assumed that significant popular resistance will emerge following occupation in all modern states and,therefore,that conquest of such states by definition cannot be very profitable.Liberman clearly shows that whether popular resistance emerges and,in turn,whether it serves to constrain the gains from conquest are empirical questions that cannot simply be assumed away.In turn,he provides significant explanatory lev- erage in terms of understanding variation in the level of popular resistance.This is,in itself,an important contribution to the literature on resistance and collaboration. Where do we go from here?Liberman(1996)has effectively shown that the previ- ous conventional quagmire view is wanting.Does this mean that we should conclude that the conquest of a highly advanced state still can produce significant economic rewards?In Liberman's study,the degree to which the conquered population resists or collaborates is the essential determinant of the profitability of conquest (p.30).His focus on the level of popular resistance makes sense given the predominance of the quagmire perspective up to now in the literature.But increased nationalism is not the only change that has occurred in modern societies over the 20th century that might sig- nificantly reduce the benefits of conquest.In particular,might it be possible that the economies of the most advanced states have changed so much since World War II that conquest will not produce significant gains even if the vanquished country's populace does not engage in active popular resistance? Attention has so far been deflected away from this question because of the prevail- ing view that modern nationalism on its own greatly reduces the benefits of conquest. As a result,scholars so far have failed to pay much attention to how post-World War II economic transformations in the most advanced countries might lower the benefits of conquest.The principal arguments that have been advanced to this effect are so under- developed that Liberman (1996)not only is able to quickly reject most of them but actually ends up turning them on their heads.His other principal argument is that eco- nomic modernization during the post-World War II period has made it easier for con- 3.It should be noted that Liberman(1996,126)is very forthright that his conclusions about the prof- itability of the Soviet empire"can hardly be considered definitive since newly opened archives in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe promise to shed further light."652 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ceivable security benefit these forces provided was worth the enormous long-term eco￾nomic costs, in terms of both direct outlays and opportunity costs, that were associated with propping up the Soviet empire. This is, in fact, a principal reason why the Soviets decided to give up their East European empire during the late 1980s (Wohlforth 1994-95). In the end, Liberman's (1996) argument is simply not sufficient to reject the con￾ventional wisdom that the Soviet empire was a huge economic albatross. This is a con￾clusion that has only become stronger over time as evidence from Soviet sources has increased.3 Of course, the Soviet case is only one of five that Liberman examines. But the fact that this is his only case from the post-World War II period and is by far the weakest one for his thesis is very significant given that there are reasons to expect that the benefits of conquest might have declined during the post-World War II era. Despite these concerns, Liberman (1996) nevertheless has provided a very useful and compelling corrective to the quagmire view. Too many scholars have simply assumed that significant popular resistance will emerge following occupation in all modern states and, therefore, that conquest of such states by definition cannot be very profitable. Liberman clearly shows that whether popular resistance emerges and, in turn, whether it serves to constrain the gains from conquest are empirical questions that cannot simply be assumed away. In turn, he provides significant explanatory lev￾erage in terms of understanding variation in the level of popular resistance. This is, in itself, an important contribution to the literature on resistance and collaboration. Where do we go from here? Liberman (1996) has effectively shown that the previ￾ous conventional quagmire view is wanting. Does this mean that we should conclude that the conquest of a highly advanced state still can produce significant economic rewards? In Liberman's study, the degree to which the conquered population resists or collaborates is the essential determinant of the profitability of conquest (p. 30). His focus on the level of popular resistance makes sense given the predominance of the quagmire perspective up to now in the literature. But increased nationalism is not the only change that has occurred in modern societies over the 20th century that might sig￾nificantly reduce the benefits of conquest. In particular, might it be possible that the economies of the most advanced states have changed so much since World War II that conquest will not produce significant gains even if the vanquished country's populace does not engage in active popular resistance? Attention has so far been deflected away from this question because of the prevail￾ing view that modern nationalism on its own greatly reduces the benefits of conquest. As a result, scholars so far have failed to pay much attention to how post-World War II economic transformations in the most advanced countries might lower the benefits of conquest. The principal arguments that have been advanced to this effect are so under￾developed that Liberman (1996) not only is able to quickly reject most of them but actually ends up turning them on their heads. His other principal argument is that eco￾nomic modernization during the post-World War II period has made it easier for con- 3. It should be noted that Liberman (1996, 126) is very forthrighthat his conclusions about the prof￾itability of the Soviet empire "can hardly be considered definitive since newly opened archives in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe promise to shed further light