Brooks/CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 653 querors to successfully reap economic gains in the most advanced countries.This argument is perhaps the most provocative in his book. A much more detailed analysis of how recent economic changes in the most advanced states affect the benefits of conquest is now required.Although many eco- nomic transformations are worthy of investigation in this regard,I focus on the globali- zation of production.I describe four recent changes in the structure of global produc- tion and outline why each of these economic transformations appears to have reduced the benefits of conquest within the most advanced countries.Although none of the deductive arguments presented necessarily has a decisive influence,their combined impact strongly indicates that the benefits of conquest have significantly declined within the most economically advanced countries.In this view,it likely is no accident that concerns about territorial revisionism have essentially vanished among the most economically advanced countries and that the only case of conquest of any moderately modern country during the post-World War II period,the Soviet empire,is by far the weakest case in Liberman's (1996)book. COMPARISON WITH LIBERAL AND TRANSNATIONALIST PERSPECTIVES Before proceeding with my argument,I should note briefly its distinction from two related literatures.First,liberal theorists have long stressed how increased trade link- ages make conquest less profitable.In the liberal view,engaging in conquest with a trading partner makes no sense because doing so destroys markets for the conqueror's exports and thereby reduces the conqueror's economic wealth (Rosecrance 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997;Angell 1910).Although my argument ultimately can be seen as complementary to the liberal perspective,it is important to recognize that my focus is on a different independent variable-changes in the structure of global production, not trade.My argument also does not focus on how conquest reduces consumer and firm welfare,as liberal arguments typically do;rather,it is concerned with the extent to which conquest has the capacity to increase the conqueror's relative power. It is interesting to speculate why liberal theory traditionally has focused on trade linkages while ignoring global production issues.The likely key reason is that there was very little FDI between the most economically advanced countries during the "golden age"of capitalism(1870-1914).5 Hence,the theorists writing at the time (e.g., Angell,Cobden)who developed the key liberal arguments about how international economic factors affect war and conflict had little reason to pay attention to global pro- duction issues. 4.Angell(1910,52-62)did not focus solely on trade interdependence;he also emphasized how capi- tal market interdependence reduces the benefits of conquest. 5.In 1914,76%of the foreign direct investment(FDI)stock was based outside of North America and Europe,with a scant 8%based in Western Europe itself (Jones 1996,31).By comparison,the geo- graphic distribution of FDI dramatically reversed itselfby 1993.The vast majority of FDI now is based in the developed world,with 43%of the total in Western Europe and 27%in North America (Jones 1996,54).Brooks / CHANGING BENEFITS OF CONQUEST 653 querors to successfully reap economic gains in the most advanced countries. This argument is perhaps the most provocative in his book. A much more detailed analysis of how recent economic changes in the most advanced states affect the benefits of conquest is now required. Although many eco￾nomic transformations are worthy of investigation in this regard, I focus on the globali￾zation of production. I describe four recent changes in the structure of global produc￾tion and outline why each of these economic transformations appears to have reduced the benefits of conquest within the most advanced countries. Although none of the deductive arguments presented necessarily has a decisive influence, their combined impact strongly indicates that the benefits of conquest have significantly declined within the most economically advanced countries. In this view, it likely is no accident that concerns about territorial revisionism have essentially vanished among the most economically advanced countries and that the only case of conquest of any moderately modern country during the post-World War II period, the Soviet empire, is by far the weakest case in Liberman's (1996) book. COMPARISON WITH LIBERAL AND TRANSNATIONALIST PERSPECTIVES Before proceeding with my argument, I should note briefly its distinction from two related literatures. First, liberal theorists have long stressed how increased trade link￾ages make conquest less profitable. In the liberal view, engaging in conquest with a trading partner makes no sense because doing so destroys markets for the conqueror's exports and thereby reduces the conqueror's economic wealth (Rosecrance 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997; Angell 1910). Although my argument ultimately can be seen as complementary to the liberal perspective, it is important to recognize that my focus is on a different independent variable-changes in the structure of global production, not trade. My argument also does not focus on how conquest reduces consumer and firm welfare, as liberal arguments typically do; rather, it is concerned with the extent to which conquest has the capacity to increase the conqueror's relative power. It is interesting to speculate why liberal theory traditionally has focused on trade linkages while ignoring global production issues.4 The likely key reason is that there was very little FDI between the most economically advanced countries during the "golden age" of capitalism (1870-1914).5 Hence, the theorists writing at the time (e.g., Angell, Cobden) who developed the key liberal arguments about how international economic factors affect war and conflict had little reason to pay attention to global pro￾duction issues. 4. Angell (1910,52-62) did not focus solely on trade interdependence; he also emphasized how capi￾tal market interdependence reduces the benefits of conquest. 5. In 1914, 76% of the foreign direct investment (FDI) stock was based outside of North America and Europe, with a scant 8% based in Western Europe itself (Jones 1996, 31). By comparison, the geo￾graphic distribution of FDI dramatically reversed itself by 1993. The vast majority of FDI now is based in the developed world, with 43% of the total in Western Europe and 27% in North America (Jones 1996, 54)