Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 127 A central problem for Western analyses of the Korean War has been that arguments about American coercive diplomacy rest on speculation about Chinese leaders'risk analysis and war goals.Scholars have long noted that without solid evidence about Chinese strategy we cannot accurately assess the value of the various prescriptive conclusions drawn by leaders and aca- demics.11 In recent years,the declassification of American documents has spawned excellent new work on the Korean conflict.12 But no matter how voluminous and well-interpreted,American documents cannot tell us what the Chinese side was thinking in 1950.Because of the continuing restrictions on Chinese archival materials,Western analysts have been forced to deduce Chinese strategy from behavior. Mao's Korean War cables offer the first documentary evidence of Chinese strategy in 1950 available to the West.Three of the telegrams are translated in their entirety in the appendix of this article.The cables help answer three crucial questions:Why did China enter the Korean conflict?What were Mao's military and political strategies once he entered?Given Mao's strategies, to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and to settle for peace.For a skeptical discussion of the buffer proposals in mid-November,see Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations:The British Buffer Plan of November,1950."Like Kalicki,Farrar suggests that British proposals for a buffer might have been more effective if they had been implemented before the late October and early November clashes north of the neck. For the most assertive argument for the potential utility of additional deterrent threats against the Chinese Mainland,see Halperin,Limited War,pp.50-53.Jacek Kugler also argues that increased bombing threats could have coerced Chinese withdrawal from Korea;Kugler,"As- sessing Stable Deterrence,"in Kugler and Frank C.Zagare,Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Boulder,Colo.:Lynne Rienner,1987),p.53;see also General Nathan F.Twining,Neither Liberty Nor Safety:A Hard Look at U.S.Military Policy and Strategy (New York:Holt,Rinehart and Winston, 1966),pp.53-54.Discussing deterrent threats without making such extensive claims are Zelman, "Chinese Entrance,"pp.27-28;and George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp.220-221.Without making prescriptions for American policy,various other authors have suggested that China might have discounted the possibility of American conventional or atomic strategic bombing.See,for example,Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations,"p.77;and Richard K. Betts,Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington:Brookings,1987),pp.34-36. 11.See,for example,Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,p.172;Osgood,Limited War,pp.179 and 184;and Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations,"p.77. 12.Prominent examples include Bruce Cumings,ed.,Child of Conflict:The Korean-American Relationship,1943-53(Seattle:University of Washington Press,1983);Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War:American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953 (Ithaca,N.Y.:Cornell University Press,1985);Stueck,Road To Confrontation;and Burton I.Kaufman,The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis,Credibility and Command (New York:Knopf,1986).For an extensive histo- riography of this literature,see Rosemary Foot,"Making Known the Unknown War:Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade,Diplomatic History,Vol.15,No.3 (Summer 1991),Pp.411-431. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThreats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 127 A central problem for Western analyses of the Korean War has been that arguments about American coercive diplomacy rest on speculation about Chinese leaders' risk analysis and war goals. Scholars have long noted that without solid evidence about Chinese strategy we cannot accurately assess the value of the various prescriptive conclusions drawn by leaders and aca￾demics.11 In recent years, the declassification of American documents has spawned excellent new work on the Korean conflict.12 But no matter how voluminous and well-interpreted, American documents cannot tell us what the Chinese side was thinking in 1950. Because of the continuing restrictions on Chinese archival materials, Western analysts have been forced to deduce Chinese strategy from behavior. Mao's Korean War cables offer the first documentary evidence of Chinese strategy in 1950 available to the West. Three of the telegrams are translated in their entirety in the appendix of this article. The cables help answer three crucial questions: Why did China enter the Korean conflict? What were Mao's military and political strategies once he entered? Given Mao's strategies, to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and to settle for peace. For a skeptical discussion of the buffer proposals in mid-November, see Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations: The British Buffer Plan of November, 1950." Like Kalicki, Farrar suggests that British proposals for a buffer might have been more effective if they had been implemented before the late October and early November clashes north of the neck. For the most assertive argument for the potential utility of additional deterrent threats against the Chinese Mainland, see Halperin, Limited War, pp. 50-53. Jacek Kugler also argues that increased bombing threats could have coerced Chinese withdrawal from Korea; Kugler, "As￾sessing Stable Deterrence," in Kugler and Frank C. Zagare, Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1987), p. 53; see also General Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety: AHard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 53-54. Discussing deterrent threats without making such extensive claims are Zelman, "Chinese Entrance," pp. 27-28; and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 220-221. Without making prescriptions for American policy, various other authors have suggested that China might have discounted the possibility of American conventional or atomic strategic bombing. See, for example, Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations," p. 77; and Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington: Brookings, 1987), pp. 34-36. 11. See, for example, Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 172; Osgood, Limited War, pp. 179 and 184; and Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations," p. 77. 12. Prominent examples include Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-53 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Stueck, Road To Confrontation; and Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command (New York: Knopf, 1986). For an extensive histo￾riography of this literature, see Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 411-431. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions