The production and sale of hate propaganda and violent pornography is wrong and should not be permitted attitudes), the question still remains whether the state of affairs described is good or right or appropriafe dividual In other words, given a factual description of some state of affairs(including descriptions of social and ind It is helpful now to introduce a distinction between normative ethics and metaethics. Normative ethics is an inquiry into questions(i)and(ii it attempts to tell us what is morally right or wrong and why. Metaethics, however, steps back from the various answers to these questions to ask about the nature of ethical claims and moral theories more generally Metaethics asks, for example, whether moral claims can be true or false, and if so, on what grounds it also asks on what grounds we could be justified in holding a particular normative moral theory as opposed to another Let,'s call a moral theory cognitivist if it holds that moral claims are like ordinary assertions in being truth-apt, i.e., they are the sorts of claims that can be true or false. All the views we've considered so far, although they have disagreed on a number of key points, have been cognitivist. The relativist, egoist, utilitarian, Kantian, and particularist all agree that It is al ways right to keep one's promises is either true or false(though, for different reasons, most of them would claim it to be false). A non-cognitivist moral theory denies that moral claims are truth-apt, i. e, non-cognitivists claim that moral utterances are neither true nor false because they aren 't ordinary assertions. ( Note that Shafer-Landau uses the term"meta-ethical subjectivism" for the view I'm calling"n on-Co vIsm To see their point, note that we do a lot of things with language besides assert truths(and falsehoods ); we ask questions make commands, express shock or pain, etc Where is my glove?(question) Shut the door!(command/imperative) Ouch!(exclamation Non-cognitivists understand moral utterances on the model of these other forms of speech. So, for example, an emotivist take a moral utterance to be nothing more than the expression of an emotional response towards the kind of act in question, e.g., Death penalty, BOO!, or Giving to the needy, YEAH! Another form of non-cognitivism, prescriptivism, takes moral utterances to express commands: Don' t steal! Keep your promises! In each of these cases the utterance is not an assertion and so shouldn t be considered true or false First it is worth noting that non-cognitivism addresses the worry that moral claims are not mere statements of fact; it attempts to capture the normativity of moral discourse by locating it in the attitudes we express through our utterances E. g, non-cognitivisits interpret moral claims not as describing our attitudes but as expressing them Don' t permit the production and sale of hate propaganda and violent pornography!(command)The production and sale of hate propaganda and violent pornography is wrong and should not be permitted. In other words, given a factual description of some state of affairs (including descriptions of social and individual attitudes), the question still remains whether the state of affairs described is good or right or appropriate. It is helpful now to introduce a distinction between normative ethics and metaethics. Normative ethics is an inquiry into questions (i) and (ii): it attempts to tell us what is morally right or wrong and why. Metaethics, however, steps back from the various answers to these questions to ask about the nature of ethical claims and moral theories more generally. Metaethics asks, for example, whether moral claims can be true or false, and if so, on what grounds; it also asks on what grounds we could be justified in holding a particular normative moral theory as opposed to another. Let's call a moral theory cognitivist if it holds that moral claims are like ordinary assertions in being truth-apt, i.e., they are the sorts of claims that can be true or false. All the views we've considered so far, although they have disagreed on a number of key points, have been cognitivist. The relativist, egoist, utilitarian, Kantian, and particularist all agree that claims such as: It is always right to keep one's promises. is either true or false (though, for different reasons, most of them would claim it to be false). A non-cognitivist moral theory denies that moral claims are truth-apt, i.e., non-cognitivists claim that moral utterances are neither true nor false because they aren't ordinary assertions. (Note that Shafer-Landau uses the term "meta-ethical subjectivism" for the view I'm calling "non-cognitivism". To see their point, note that we do a lot of things with language besides assert truths (and falsehoods); we ask questions, make commands, express shock or pain, etc: Where is my glove? (question) Shut the door! (command/imperative) Ouch! (exclamation) Non-cognitivists understand moral utterances on the model of these other forms of speech. So, for example, an emotivist take a moral utterance to be nothing more than the expression of an emotional response towards the kind of act in question, e.g., Death penalty, BOO!, or Giving to the needy, YEAH! Another form of non-cognitivism, prescriptivism, takes moral utterances to express commands: Don't steal! Keep your promises! In each of these cases the utterance is not an assertion and so shouldn't be considered true or false. First it is worth noting that non-cognitivism addresses the worry that moral claims are not mere statements of fact; it attempts to capture the normativity of moral discourse by locating it in the attitudes we express through our utterances. E.g., non-cognitivisits interpret moral claims not as describing our attitudes but as expressing them: Don't permit the production and sale of hate propaganda and violent pornography! (command) Or: