Permitting the production and sale of hate propaganda and violent pornography, BOO!(exclamation) So non-cognitivism avoids this(among other)objections to relativism. Moreover, non-cognitivism appears to have what many view as advantages over the other cognitivist(objectivist)accounts i Non-cognitivism explains why moral judgement is intrinsically motivating, i.e., why making a moral judgement motivates one to act in accordance with it BUT i Is moral judgement intrinsically motivating? Isn't it possible to judge that keeping promises is right and still not be motivated to do it? i In what sense do non-cognitivists make room for moral judgement? ii)Cognitivism postulates unnecessary"entities", viz., moral facts, beyond what we have any evidence for or need for. It is possible to explain everything that happens without reference to moral facts. Because non-cognitivism does not postulate moral facts, it is to be preferred BUT i Can we explain everything without reference to moral facts? iii)Cognitivism is committed to"weird"or"odd"entities: what are moral facts supposed to be any way? Non-cognitivism avoids this BUT i Ethical naturalism provides a cognitivist account on which moral facts are kind of natural or physical fact, e.g., to say that x is right iff it maximizes pleasure plausibly treats the moral fact as a natural fact that can be verified. ( But can ethical naturalism account for normativity?) i Ethical non-naturalism denies that moral facts can be viewed as a kind of natural or physical fact--moral facts are rreducible--but can suggest different sources of knowledge than empirical observation or scientific inquiry. E.g,some ethical non-naturalists believe that we have a faculty of moral intuition that enables us to know what is right and wrong iv)Non-cognitivism explains ethical disagreement in terms of emotional disagreement two people can agree on all the facts but still disagree in their emotional response to the situation. This seems more plausible than other accounts of disagreement BUT i Is this really the best explanation we can give of ethical disagreement? Remember, the cognitivist can say that ethical disagreement occurs either when one party gets the moral facts wrong, or both parties do However, non-cognitivism faces some serious objections as wel i)Moral discourse has no deeper grounding than expressions of taste. There is no clear basis for saying that one who responses. There is no moral truth. And moral knowledge is not possible, since knowledge presupposes uthOnal prefers compassion is better than one who prefers torture; they just have different preferences, different emotio ii) Moral considerations are not ultimately subject to rational critique. A non-cognitivist can criticize another's emotional responses as based on misinformation, but the normative component of moral judgement is not subject to rational appraisal. (Though this may be questionable if one believes that emotions are subject to rational appraisal. iii) Non-cognitivism poses problems for an account of moral reasoning. Consider: D)Lying is wrongPermitting the production and sale of hate propaganda and violent pornography, BOO! (exclamation) So non-cognitivism avoids this (among other) objections to relativism. Moreover, non-cognitivism appears to have what many view as advantages over the other cognitivist (objectivist) accounts: i) Non-cognitivism explains why moral judgement is intrinsically motivating, i.e., why making a moral judgement motivates one to act in accordance with it. BUT: ï Is moral judgement intrinsically motivating? Isn't it possible to judge that keeping promises is right and still not be motivated to do it? ï In what sense do non-cognitivists make room for moral judgement? ii) Cognitivism postulates unnecessary "entities", viz., moral facts, beyond what we have any evidence for or need for. It is possible to explain everything that happens without reference to moral facts. Because non-cognitivism does not postulate moral facts, it is to be preferred. BUT: ï Can we explain everything without reference to moral facts? iii) Cognitivism is committed to "weird" or "odd" entities: what are moral facts supposed to be anyway? Non-cognitivism avoids this. BUT: ï Ethical naturalism provides a cognitivist account on which moral facts are kind of natural or physical fact, e.g., to say that x is right iff it maximizes pleasure plausibly treats the moral fact as a natural fact that can be verified. (But can ethical naturalism account for normativity?) ï Ethical non-naturalism denies that moral facts can be viewed as a kind of natural or physical fact--moral facts are irreducible--but can suggest different sources of knowledge than empirical observation or scientific inquiry. E.g., some ethical non-naturalists believe that we have a faculty of moral intuition that enables us to know what is right and wrong. iv) Non-cognitivism explains ethical disagreement in terms of emotional disagreement: two people can agree on all the facts but still disagree in their emotional response to the situation. This seems more plausible than other accounts of disagreement. BUT: ï Is this really the best explanation we can give of ethical disagreement? Remember, the cognitivist can say that ethical disagreement occurs either when one party gets the moral facts wrong, or both parties do. However, non-cognitivism faces some serious objections as well: i) Moral discourse has no deeper grounding than expressions of taste. There is no clear basis for saying that one who prefers compassion is better than one who prefers torture; they just have different preferences, different emotional responses. There is no moral truth. And moral knowledge is not possible, since knowledge presupposes truth. ii) Moral considerations are not ultimately subject to rational critique. A non-cognitivist can criticize another's emotional responses as based on misinformation, but the normative component of moral judgement is not subject to rational appraisal. (Though this may be questionable if one believes that emotions are subject to rational appraisal.) iii) Non-cognitivism poses problems for an account of moral reasoning. Consider: 1) Lying is wrong