American Political Science Review (2018)112.4.874-890 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000497 American Political Science Association 2018 6 Who Polices the Administrative State? KENNETH LOWANDE University of Michigan cholarship on oversight of the bureaucracy typically conceives of legislatures as unitary actors.But most oversight is conducted by individual legislators who contact agencies directly.I acquire the correspondence logs of 16 bureaucratic agencies and re-evaluate the conventional proposition that ideological disagreement drives oversight.I identify the effect of this disagreement by exploiting the tran- sition from George Bush to Barack Obama,which shifted the ideological orientation of agencies through turnover in agency personnel.Contrary to existing research,I find ideological conflict has a negligible ef- fect on oversight,whereas committee roles and narrow district interests are primary drivers.The findings may indicate that absent incentives induced by public auditing,legislator behavior is driven by policy valence concerns rather than ideology.The results further suggest collective action in Congress may pose greater obstacles to bureaucratic oversight than previously thought. "those kind of informal,[...official contacts-they go on study documents informal comments and inquiries almost incessantly." conducted by individual legislators. Former congressional aide This type of oversight is both more frequent than interview with author formalized hearings and concerns consequential public policy (Lowande,forthcoming).Prior to the 2014 Vet- onitoring unelected officials implementing erans Affairs(VA)wait-time scandal,legislators made public policy is a chief concern in demo- inquiries about VA health system record-keeping cratic government.By overseeing that procedures that prefigured the problems to come.Their 4号元 process, elected officials aim to prevent shirking, inquiries eventually led to a de facto nationwide review corruption,performance failures,and policy drift of these procedures.After the enactment of the Dodd- in bureaucracies.Not surprisingly,questions about Frank Act,legislators forwarded hundreds of concern the efficacy of this oversight has generated a vast letters to the financial regulators required to approve body of theoretical and empirical research.I ad- the controversial Volcker Rule.When amendments to vance this work by analyzing records of over 50,000 the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement oversight contacts between members of Congress between the US and Russia to dispose of 68 metric and bureaucratic agencies.These new data reveal tons of weapons-grade material were signed in 2010, activity long-theorized about,but rarely observed.In Congress did not weigh in with legislation.Instead,leg- an influential article on bureaucratic accountability, islators contacted the Department of Energy(DOE) 是 McCubbins and Schwartz (1984)argue members of to inquire about the construction of disposal facilities, Congress use administrative procedures to set up the implementation timeline,and verification proce- "fire alarms"for agency misbehavior,which allow dures.In a policymaking environment with executives them to avoid performing costly "police-patrols."2 increasingly at the center,legislative representatives While scholars have analyzed published oversight rely on contacts like these to police agency behavior. hearings(Aberbach 1990;McGrath 2013;MacDonald These data provide leverage to test a conventional and McGrath 2016:Kriner and Schickler 2016),this proposition in existing research:that ideological dis- agreement with agencies drives the oversight behavior of legislators.The assumption that agencies have pref- erences of their own that sometimes differ from those Kenneth Lowande is an Assistant Professor,Department of Political Science,University of Michigan,5700 Haven Hall,505 South State of their political principals hardly bears repeating in Street,Ann Arbor,MI 48109-1045 (lowande@umich.edu). political science research.It is central to studies of po- Previous versions were presented at the 2017 annual meeting of litical appointments,delegation,judicial review,rule- the Midwest Political Science Association,Chicago,IL,the 2017 making,and oversight.However,to test this proposi- Political Economy and Public Law Conference,and the 2017 an- nual meeting of the American Political Science Association.Randy tion,studies have focused almost exclusively on public Calvert,Andrew Clarke,Anthony Fowler,Justin Fox,Thomas Gray. auditing activities like committee hearings and investi- Jeff Jenkins,David Lewis,Jose Mendez,Jason Oh,Rachel Potter,and gations.Theories of oversight have long argued this be- Craig Volden provided helpful suggestions.Special thanks to Claire havior represents a fraction of all legislative oversight. Lowande and Michael Pomirchy for help with the project,as well as This study attempts to address this limitation by analyz- Russell Mills and Nikki Kalaf-Hughes for sharing their data.Sup- port for this research was provided by the Center for the Study of ing the oversight relationships of individual legislators Democratic Politics at Princeton University.Replication materials and executive agencies are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: Analyzing informal communication also presents an https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LFOZVU. opportunity to improve estimation of the effect of ide- Received:October 3,2017;revised:April 3,2018;accepted:July 6, ological disagreement,since the dyadic relationship be- 2018.First published online:September 17,2018. tween a congressional median and the bureaucracy /:sony For a review of this work,see Moe (2012) limits the variation explored by past empirical stud- 2 As of this writing.the study has been cited 3.278 times.Google ies.My strategy for estimating the causal effect of ide- Scholar URL:https://goo.gl/L6aKk4. ological disagreement is to leverage the transition in 874American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 874–890 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000497 © American Political Science Association 2018 Who Polices the Administrative State? KENNETH LOWANDE University of Michigan Scholarship on oversight of the bureaucracy typically conceives of legislatures as unitary actors. But most oversight is conducted by individual legislators who contact agencies directly. I acquire the correspondence logs of 16 bureaucratic agencies and re-evaluate the conventional proposition that ideological disagreement drives oversight. I identify the effect of this disagreement by exploiting the tran￾sition from George Bush to Barack Obama, which shifted the ideological orientation of agencies through turnover in agency personnel. Contrary to existing research, I find ideological conflict has a negligible ef￾fect on oversight, whereas committee roles and narrow district interests are primary drivers. The findings may indicate that absent incentives induced by public auditing, legislator behavior is driven by policy valence concerns rather than ideology. The results further suggest collective action in Congress may pose greater obstacles to bureaucratic oversight than previously thought. “...those kind of informal, [...] official contacts—they go on almost incessantly.” Former congressional aide, interview with author Monitoring unelected officials implementing public policy is a chief concern in demo￾cratic government. By overseeing that process, elected officials aim to prevent shirking, corruption, performance failures, and policy drift in bureaucracies. Not surprisingly, questions about the efficacy of this oversight has generated a vast body of theoretical and empirical research.1 I ad￾vance this work by analyzing records of over 50,000 oversight contacts between members of Congress and bureaucratic agencies. These new data reveal activity long-theorized about, but rarely observed. In an influential article on bureaucratic accountability, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) argue members of Congress use administrative procedures to set up “fire alarms” for agency misbehavior, which allow them to avoid performing costly “police-patrols.”2 While scholars have analyzed published oversight hearings (Aberbach 1990; McGrath 2013; MacDonald and McGrath 2016; Kriner and Schickler 2016), this Kenneth Lowande is an Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 5700 Haven Hall, 505 South State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045 (lowande@umich.edu). Previous versions were presented at the 2017 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, the 2017 Political Economy and Public Law Conference, and the 2017 an￾nual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Randy Calvert, Andrew Clarke, Anthony Fowler, Justin Fox, Thomas Gray, Jeff Jenkins, David Lewis, Jose Mendez, Jason Oh, Rachel Potter, and Craig Volden provided helpful suggestions. Special thanks to Claire Lowande and Michael Pomirchy for help with the project, as well as Russell Mills and Nikki Kalaf-Hughes for sharing their data. Sup￾port for this research was provided by the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University. Replication materials are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LFQZVU. Received: October 3, 2017; revised: April 3, 2018; accepted: July 6, 2018. First published online: September 17, 2018. 1 For a review of this work, see Moe (2012). 2 As of this writing, the study has been cited 3,278 times. Google Scholar URL: https://goo.gl/L6aKk4. study documents informal comments and inquiries conducted by individual legislators. This type of oversight is both more frequent than formalized hearings and concerns consequential public policy (Lowande, forthcoming). Prior to the 2014 Vet￾erans Affairs (VA) wait-time scandal, legislators made inquiries about VA health system record-keeping procedures that prefigured the problems to come.Their inquiries eventually led to a de facto nationwide review of these procedures. After the enactment of the Dodd￾Frank Act, legislators forwarded hundreds of concern letters to the financial regulators required to approve the controversial Volcker Rule. When amendments to the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement between the US and Russia to dispose of 68 metric tons of weapons-grade material were signed in 2010, Congress did not weigh in with legislation. Instead, leg￾islators contacted the Department of Energy (DOE) to inquire about the construction of disposal facilities, the implementation timeline, and verification proce￾dures. In a policymaking environment with executives increasingly at the center, legislative representatives rely on contacts like these to police agency behavior. These data provide leverage to test a conventional proposition in existing research: that ideological dis￾agreement with agencies drives the oversight behavior of legislators. The assumption that agencies have pref￾erences of their own that sometimes differ from those of their political principals hardly bears repeating in political science research. It is central to studies of po￾litical appointments, delegation, judicial review, rule￾making, and oversight. However, to test this proposi￾tion, studies have focused almost exclusively on public auditing activities like committee hearings and investi￾gations. Theories of oversight have long argued this be￾havior represents a fraction of all legislative oversight. This study attempts to address this limitation by analyz￾ing the oversight relationships of individual legislators and executive agencies. Analyzing informal communication also presents an opportunity to improve estimation of the effect of ide￾ological disagreement, since the dyadic relationship be￾tween a congressional median and the bureaucracy limits the variation explored by past empirical stud￾ies. My strategy for estimating the causal effect of ide￾ological disagreement is to leverage the transition in 874 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000497