Who Polices the Administrative State? presidential administration from George W.Bush to creates collective actions problems that reduce over- Barack Obama.What is sacrificed in scope is compen sight (Gailmard 2009:Clinton.Lewis.and Selin 2014) sated for in internal credibility.Presidential transitions this study suggests that private communications may provide critical variation in agency preferences driven pose additional obstacles and lead to coordination fail. by turnover in both appointed and career personnel ures.Thus,evidence that informal oversight is compar (Chen and Johnson 2014;Bolton,de Figueiredo,and atively free of ideological and partisan considerations Lewis 2017:Dahlstrom and Holmgren 2017).whereas is not sufficient to guarantee that legislatures effec- the preferences of legislators within that narrow win- tively police shared goals in policy implementation dow are likely to be stable.It also provides an im- portant secondary contribution,since agency ideology is often thought of as a function of both an agency's CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND "mission"and personnel.Thus,whereas past work is BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY unclear about the source of interbranch disagreement. This study attempts to build on some common limi- this design isolates ideological variation driven by per- tations of past work on oversight.Researchers most sons rather than statutes. often treat Congress as a unitary actor because they Contrary to the intuitive notion that ideological dis- are typically interested in questions about political con- agreement increases oversight.I find robust evidence trol of the bureaucracy meant to analyze whether pol- that it has a negligible effect.Across a variety of icy will deviate from the congressional median.4 This measurement specifications,the substantive effect of means that past work does not generally address the re- disagreement is near zero with high precision.The es- search question of who in Congress performs oversight. timates'95%confidence intervals never include an ef- The exception is,studies tend to argue,generally,that fect size greater in magnitude than a two percentage oversight is conducted by-in-large in committee (e.g., point difference in the probability of oversight-and Weingast and Moran 1983;Ogul and Rockman 1990), more plausible counterfactual scenarios suggest effects with more recent work investigating the consequences 4r元 that are much smaller.In analyses of the number of of overlapping jurisdictions (Gailmard 2009;Clinton. oversight contacts,the interval never includes an ef- Lewis,and Selin 2014:Rezaee.Wood,and Gailmard fect greater than a tenth of a contact.These effects 2015). contrast those of district characteristics and committee In general,most empirical research investigates pat- roles,which have strong and substantively significant terns of legislative oversight hearings.But there are associations with the likelihood of oversight. numerous reasons to suggest that hearings and inves- These results offer initial evidence that legislative tigations may exhibit unique oversight patterns.First, oversight is driven by policy valence,rather than ide- they are subject to congressional gatekeepers or of- ological disagreement.While existing studies analyze ten require some degree of coalition-building.In addi- the valence dimension of bureaucratic policymaking tion.norms of bipartisanship and committee rules vary (e.g.,Ting 2011),this study provides rare evidence of across committees and time.So,investigating theories its relative prominence vis-a-vis ideology.I argue this based on the individual-level incentives of legislators oversight is not systematically driven by ideological or to police the bureaucracy in this institutional context partisan forces because it is informal and most often is a conceptual mismatch.Second,public hearings and unobserved by reelection audiences.Without the op- investigations often involve goals beyond policy and portunity to publicly discredit ideologically divergent ideological disagreement.A common example is the 33 agents,legislators'oversight may instead be motivated 8 hearings held by the House Select Committee on Beng by the quality of administration.This implies that ex. hazi,which Democrats widely criticized as an attempt isting research may over-emphasize the importance of to discredit Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential cam- ideological disagreement for legislative-executive in- paign (Lillis 2015).Studies of investigations suggest teractions since this broader universe of cases may that the public signal they generate may drive over- be driven by policy quality or valence.I present case sight patterns,so it is difficult to isolate the theoretical studies of the Department of Veterans Affairs and the motivations behind public "police patrols"(Kriner and DOE that suggest these concerns are operative. Schwartz 2008:Kriner and Schickler 2014:Lowande The results also suggest other important implications and Peck 2017) for future research on congressional oversight and the Research confined to public oversight hearings is separation of powers,more broadly.First,the ubiquity also typically unclear about what variation drives the 四 of informal requests suggests that theoretical models results it presents.The key "treatment"is often inter- of oversight which treat Congress as unitary would be branch ideological disagreement.Measures of agency misapplied to most oversight observed in practice.In preferences in these studies are either static or taken addition,evidence from this study suggests that past concerns about the overall efficacy of congressional oversight are well warranted.Whereas existing schol- Examples of such questions include,"Does the absence of overt L arship suggests the multiplicity of legislative principals oversight imply a runaway bureaucracy?"(Weingast and Moran 1983)and "Do 'fire-alarms'communicate credible information to legislators?"(Lupia and McCubbins 1994).Even work that empha- sizes bureaucracies have multiple principals often takes Congress to For a more recent review on the (in)stability of congressional pref- be unitary-the other principals are the President,interest groups erences,see Kousser,Lewis,and Masket(2007). and the judiciary (e.g.,Hammond and Knott 1996). 875Who Polices the Administrative State? presidential administration from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. What is sacrificed in scope is compen￾sated for in internal credibility. Presidential transitions provide critical variation in agency preferences driven by turnover in both appointed and career personnel (Chen and Johnson 2014; Bolton, de Figueiredo, and Lewis 2017; Dahlström and Holmgren 2017), whereas the preferences of legislators within that narrow win￾dow are likely to be stable.3 It also provides an im￾portant secondary contribution, since agency ideology is often thought of as a function of both an agency’s “mission” and personnel. Thus, whereas past work is unclear about the source of interbranch disagreement, this design isolates ideological variation driven by per￾sons rather than statutes. Contrary to the intuitive notion that ideological dis￾agreement increases oversight, I find robust evidence that it has a negligible effect. Across a variety of measurement specifications, the substantive effect of disagreement is near zero with high precision. The es￾timates’ 95% confidence intervals never include an ef￾fect size greater in magnitude than a two percentage point difference in the probability of oversight—and more plausible counterfactual scenarios suggest effects that are much smaller. In analyses of the number of oversight contacts, the interval never includes an ef￾fect greater than a tenth of a contact. These effects contrast those of district characteristics and committee roles, which have strong and substantively significant associations with the likelihood of oversight. These results offer initial evidence that legislative oversight is driven by policy valence, rather than ide￾ological disagreement. While existing studies analyze the valence dimension of bureaucratic policymaking (e.g., Ting 2011), this study provides rare evidence of its relative prominence vis-à-vis ideology. I argue this oversight is not systematically driven by ideological or partisan forces because it is informal and most often unobserved by reelection audiences. Without the op￾portunity to publicly discredit ideologically divergent agents, legislators’ oversight may instead be motivated by the quality of administration. This implies that ex￾isting research may over-emphasize the importance of ideological disagreement for legislative-executive in￾teractions since this broader universe of cases may be driven by policy quality or valence. I present case studies of the Department of Veterans Affairs and the DOE that suggest these concerns are operative. The results also suggest other important implications for future research on congressional oversight and the separation of powers, more broadly. First, the ubiquity of informal requests suggests that theoretical models of oversight which treat Congress as unitary would be misapplied to most oversight observed in practice. In addition, evidence from this study suggests that past concerns about the overall efficacy of congressional oversight are well warranted. Whereas existing schol￾arship suggests the multiplicity of legislative principals 3 For a more recent review on the (in)stability of congressional pref￾erences, see Kousser, Lewis, and Masket (2007). creates collective actions problems that reduce over￾sight (Gailmard 2009; Clinton, Lewis, and Selin 2014), this study suggests that private communications may pose additional obstacles and lead to coordination fail￾ures. Thus, evidence that informal oversight is compar￾atively free of ideological and partisan considerations is not sufficient to guarantee that legislatures effec￾tively police shared goals in policy implementation. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY This study attempts to build on some common limi￾tations of past work on oversight. Researchers most often treat Congress as a unitary actor because they are typically interested in questions about political con￾trol of the bureaucracy meant to analyze whether pol￾icy will deviate from the congressional median.4 This means that past work does not generally address the re￾search question of who in Congress performs oversight. The exception is, studies tend to argue, generally, that oversight is conducted by-in-large in committee (e.g., Weingast and Moran 1983; Ogul and Rockman 1990), with more recent work investigating the consequences of overlapping jurisdictions (Gailmard 2009; Clinton, Lewis, and Selin 2014; Rezaee, Wood, and Gailmard 2015). In general, most empirical research investigates pat￾terns of legislative oversight hearings. But there are numerous reasons to suggest that hearings and inves￾tigations may exhibit unique oversight patterns. First, they are subject to congressional gatekeepers or of￾ten require some degree of coalition-building. In addi￾tion, norms of bipartisanship and committee rules vary across committees and time. So, investigating theories based on the individual-level incentives of legislators to police the bureaucracy in this institutional context is a conceptual mismatch. Second, public hearings and investigations often involve goals beyond policy and ideological disagreement.A common example is the 33 hearings held by the House Select Committee on Beng￾hazi, which Democrats widely criticized as an attempt to discredit Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential cam￾paign (Lillis 2015). Studies of investigations suggest that the public signal they generate may drive over￾sight patterns, so it is difficult to isolate the theoretical motivations behind public “police patrols” (Kriner and Schwartz 2008; Kriner and Schickler 2014; Lowande and Peck 2017). Research confined to public oversight hearings is also typically unclear about what variation drives the results it presents. The key “treatment” is often inter￾branch ideological disagreement. Measures of agency preferences in these studies are either static or taken 4 Examples of such questions include, “Does the absence of overt oversight imply a runaway bureaucracy?” (Weingast and Moran 1983) and “Do ‘fire-alarms’ communicate credible information to legislators?” (Lupia and McCubbins 1994). Even work that empha￾sizes bureaucracies have multiple principals often takes Congress to be unitary—the other principals are the President, interest groups, and the judiciary (e.g., Hammond and Knott 1996). 875 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000497