Kenneth Lowande to be presidents or chief executives.Some designs rely Models of Oversight on agency cross-sections,which is problematic because of the numerous unobserved differences that may Who polices the administrative state?I assess a propo- drive interbranch contact.Others rely on the implicit sition found in numerous models of oversight:ideo- assumption that over-time changes in the preferences logical preference divergence between principal and of Congress is exogenous.This may not be warranted, agent should increase oversight.s Following McCub- since most of this variation is a function of elections. bins and Schwartz(1984),I define oversight as actions and elections bring about policy changes that plausibly to "detect and remedy executive-branch violations of influence interbranch contact. legislative goals"and consider the incentives of indi- Inquiries made directly by legislators differ from vidual legislators to police particular agencies (165).I public oversight in important respects.They are com- take as given that there is some opportunity cost to paratively unilateral.Until recently,there was little oversight,so that members have to make strategic de- question that individual legislators could make in- cisions about which agencies to allocate attention to. quiries without "clearance"from copartisans,commit- Broadly speaking,there are two conceptually distinct tee chairs,party leaders,or any other official.They are categories of oversight.Efforts to reveal violations are also comparatively private,and less likely to be in ser- typically thought of as "auditing,"whereas communi- vice of non-policy-related goals.This point warrants cating explicit demands is thought of as "lobbying. some discussion,because legislators do occasionally Congressional oversight includes both activities,and "claim credit"for inquiries by posting them on their under minimal assumptions,the divergence hypothesis 元 public web pages.One legislative assistant interviewed applies to both.9 indicated that recently,it was also more common for Members audit to reveal information about gover- congressional staff to forward inquiries to media out- nance tasks performed by agencies.This information is lets and interest groups:"Offices want to make sure valuable to members for a variety of reasons.It may im- their bosses are the one that gets the attribution in the prove their ability to make policy adjustments through press."5 However,an analysis of the universe of such legislation.It may reveal"drift"in policy implementa- correspondence is not subject to this selection issue. tion.It can also reveal potential wrongdoing or mal- The prevalence of informal contact suggests this administration.Benchmark models of delegation show is a critical institutional setting in which to evaluate that "drift"is more likely among ideologically distal questions about bureaucratic accountability.The mere agents.This result typically leads to the "ally princi- threat of legislation,investigations,hearings,and sub- ple,"which suggests that principals rely more heavily poenas is often used as leverage to compel the pro- on agents with proximate preferences.However,del- duction of documents and compliance with Congress's egation decisions are made by the legislative median. demands.5 Thus,as research on oversight has long- while decisions to audit an agency informally are made acknowledged,the absence of these events does not by the individual legislator.This means that the sever- imply that Congress is powerless-and might suggest ity of drift and the value of revealing wrongdoing vary the opposite.Informal inquiries,on the other hand,are by legislator.Put differently,even an agency strictly not neither“carrot'"nor“stick.”They are as close to loyal to the congressional median will make enemies sincere attempts at oversight as researchers are likely in Congress. 。101g to obtain This implies "enemies"will be more likely to over- Chuck Grassley (R-IA)highlighted this basic point see agencies for two reasons.First,the likelihood of in May 2017 after the release of an opinion from the policy drift is higher.That is,they are more likely to White House Office of Legal Counsel(Office of Legal disagree with agency choices.Moreover,their prefer- Council,White House 2012).The opinion claimed the ences tend to reflect those of constituents who are more Trump administration had the authority to restrict the likely to be injured by agency choices.Second,these individual oversight inquiries of members of Congress enemies have more to gain from revealing wrongdo- after months of reports that agencies had stopped re- ing.The logic here,again,is fairly straightforward.A sponding to letters from Democrats (Elliot 2017).In a conservative legislator like Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) letter addressed to the President,Senator Grassley's benefits from portraying the Environmental Protec- response was pointed:"This is nonsense."7 He went tion Agency (EPA)as corrupt or incompetent-and on to write that such inquiries were included among preferably,both.10 Moreover,there is anecdotal evi- "mechanisms that support the legislative check and dence that the mere act of auditing can tap agency balance of the executive power.All members partic- ipate in deciding whether,when,and how Congress I refer to this as the "divergence"hypothesis. will exercise these authorities."This makes them ideal MacDonald and McGrath(2016)find systematic increases in hear- for testing long-held notions about Congress and the ings under unified government after changes in party control of the presidency and argue that lobbying of ideological allies accounts for bureaucracy. this trend-counter to the divergence hypothesis.I argue this finding is driven,in part,by majority party control of the hearing calendar Informal oversight,by contrast,is most often unilateral and does not 5 Interview with current congressional staffer,June 23,2017 require the consent of other legislators.I code contacts that qualify 6 As one former staffer noted:"There are various ways to put pres- sure on these people and get answers out of them"(interview with author.June 26.2017). ally reveal information.It might be the case,for example,that Sen- Charles Grassley to Donald J.Trump,June 72017 ator Cruz benefits from the mere act of auditing the EPA-similar 876Kenneth Lowande to be presidents or chief executives. Some designs rely on agency cross-sections, which is problematic because of the numerous unobserved differences that may drive interbranch contact. Others rely on the implicit assumption that over-time changes in the preferences of Congress is exogenous. This may not be warranted, since most of this variation is a function of elections, and elections bring about policy changes that plausibly influence interbranch contact. Inquiries made directly by legislators differ from public oversight in important respects. They are com￾paratively unilateral. Until recently, there was little question that individual legislators could make in￾quiries without “clearance” from copartisans, commit￾tee chairs, party leaders, or any other official. They are also comparatively private, and less likely to be in ser￾vice of non-policy-related goals. This point warrants some discussion, because legislators do occasionally “claim credit” for inquiries by posting them on their public web pages. One legislative assistant interviewed indicated that recently, it was also more common for congressional staff to forward inquiries to media out￾lets and interest groups: “Offices want to make sure their bosses are the one that gets the attribution in the press.”5 However, an analysis of the universe of such correspondence is not subject to this selection issue. The prevalence of informal contact suggests this is a critical institutional setting in which to evaluate questions about bureaucratic accountability. The mere threat of legislation, investigations, hearings, and sub￾poenas is often used as leverage to compel the pro￾duction of documents and compliance with Congress’s demands.6 Thus, as research on oversight has long￾acknowledged, the absence of these events does not imply that Congress is powerless—and might suggest the opposite. Informal inquiries, on the other hand, are not neither “carrot” nor “stick.” They are as close to sincere attempts at oversight as researchers are likely to obtain. Chuck Grassley (R-IA) highlighted this basic point in May 2017, after the release of an opinion from the White House Office of Legal Counsel (Office of Legal Council, White House 2012). The opinion claimed the Trump administration had the authority to restrict the individual oversight inquiries of members of Congress after months of reports that agencies had stopped re￾sponding to letters from Democrats (Elliot 2017). In a letter addressed to the President, Senator Grassley’s response was pointed: “This is nonsense.”7 He went on to write that such inquiries were included among “mechanisms that support the legislative check and balance of the executive power. All members partic￾ipate in deciding whether, when, and how Congress will exercise these authorities.” This makes them ideal for testing long-held notions about Congress and the bureaucracy. 5 Interview with current congressional staffer, June 23, 2017. 6 As one former staffer noted: “There are various ways to put pres￾sure on these people and get answers out of them” (interview with author, June 26, 2017). 7 Charles Grassley to Donald J. Trump, June 7, 2017. Models of Oversight Who polices the administrative state? I assess a propo￾sition found in numerous models of oversight: ideo￾logical preference divergence between principal and agent should increase oversight.8 Following McCub￾bins and Schwartz (1984), I define oversight as actions to “detect and remedy executive-branch violations of legislative goals” and consider the incentives of indi￾vidual legislators to police particular agencies (165). I take as given that there is some opportunity cost to oversight, so that members have to make strategic de￾cisions about which agencies to allocate attention to. Broadly speaking, there are two conceptually distinct categories of oversight. Efforts to reveal violations are typically thought of as “auditing,” whereas communi￾cating explicit demands is thought of as “lobbying.” Congressional oversight includes both activities, and under minimal assumptions, the divergence hypothesis applies to both.9 Members audit to reveal information about gover￾nance tasks performed by agencies. This information is valuable to members for a variety of reasons. It may im￾prove their ability to make policy adjustments through legislation. It may reveal “drift” in policy implementa￾tion. It can also reveal potential wrongdoing or mal￾administration. Benchmark models of delegation show that “drift” is more likely among ideologically distal agents. This result typically leads to the “ally princi￾ple,” which suggests that principals rely more heavily on agents with proximate preferences. However, del￾egation decisions are made by the legislative median, while decisions to audit an agency informally are made by the individual legislator. This means that the sever￾ity of drift and the value of revealing wrongdoing vary by legislator. Put differently, even an agency strictly loyal to the congressional median will make enemies in Congress. This implies “enemies” will be more likely to over￾see agencies for two reasons. First, the likelihood of policy drift is higher. That is, they are more likely to disagree with agency choices. Moreover, their prefer￾ences tend to reflect those of constituents who are more likely to be injured by agency choices. Second, these enemies have more to gain from revealing wrongdo￾ing. The logic here, again, is fairly straightforward. A conservative legislator like Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) benefits from portraying the Environmental Protec￾tion Agency (EPA) as corrupt or incompetent—and preferably, both.10 Moreover, there is anecdotal evi￾dence that the mere act of auditing can tap agency 8 I refer to this as the “divergence” hypothesis. 9 MacDonald and McGrath (2016) find systematic increases in hear￾ings under unified government after changes in party control of the presidency and argue that lobbying of ideological allies accounts for this trend—counter to the divergence hypothesis. I argue this finding is driven, in part, by majority party control of the hearing calendar. Informal oversight, by contrast, is most often unilateral and does not require the consent of other legislators. I code contacts that qualify as lobbying to assess this empirically. 10 It is worth noting that this logic does not require that audits actu￾ally reveal information. It might be the case, for example, that Sen￾ator Cruz benefits from the mere act of auditing the EPA—similar 876 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000497