Who Polices the Administrative State? resources.Responding to congressional inquiries often of models of delegation.with some studies even assum- requires time-consuming document production unre ing congressional oversight helps set the boundaries of lated to an agency's core mission.This logic underlies agency discretion.12 studies that see investigations as efforts to discredit the There is also no shortage of reasons this notion opposition and reap electoral gains. should apply to informal congressional inquiries.As re- In other attempts at oversight,members lobby to cent work by Wiseman and Wright (2015)highlights, communicate preferences.Work on lobbying typically the time elapsed between delegation decisions and sees legislators as the target of such communications agency policymaking is sometimes decades.This may In this case,statutory discretion and unforeseen cir- coincide with turnover in both principal(via elections) cumstances guarantee that agencies make decisions af- and agent(via career decisions).In the narrower period ter enactment that are politically important to legisla- of concern for this study.the basic fact is that legislators tors and warrant explicit communication (Ritchie and inherit the delegation contracts of prior congresses and You 2018).Lobbying can be valuable for two reasons. observe changes in agency preferences.This presents 4 First,it may influence policy outcomes.In a review the risk of deviation identified in past work.It is of major congressional investigations from 1947-2002 also consistent with McCubbins and Schwartz's model Kriner and Schickler(2016)find that about 80%pro- since changes in agency ideology may result in changes duced "tangible policy change"(171).Moreover,a re- in policy behavior that-in turn-result in more com- cent study by Ritchie and You (2018)suggests that plaints from constituents. informal contacts are associated with the approval of Nonetheless,there are key features of informal over- trade adjustment assistance applications at the Depart- sight which suggest that these conventional arguments ment of Labor.In an analysis of the Federal Avia may not generalize.First,they are typically unob- tion Administration,however,Mills,Kalaf-Hughes,and served by reelection audiences.Informal contacts al- MacDonald (2016)find such oversight may have lit- low members to seek the redress of grievances with a tle to no impact.So it is important to note that lob- more limited audience.News coverage of these con- 4r元 bying can be valuable if it has no impact on policy.In tacts have been historically muted.They lack the ap- some cases,oversight attempts offer the opportunity to parent"grandstanding"opportunity that allows mem- "credit claim"(Mayhew 1974).Exerting effort on be- bers to distinguish themselves from the opposition, half of a constituent may be enough to win their sup- which is often cited as a key driver of the patterns of port.This differs from the "grandstanding"opportuni- oversight under divided and unified government (e.g.. ties found in congressional hearings because of its focus Kriner and Schwartz 2008:Lowande and Peck 2017) on serving an individual constituent. Moreover,unlike congressional hearings and subpoe- The logic behind lobbying divergent agents follows nas.these contacts are almost entirely unregulated by from these goals.Again,delegation decisions are made legislative and executive branch rules.This gives agen- collectively,whereas informal oversight is performed cies a freer hand in responding and may limit the effi- by individual legislators.This means there will always cacy of ideologically charged inquiries.Requests with be some subset of overseers who would benefit from a implications for the ideological orientation of policy shift.From the legislator's perspective,distal agents are are zero-sum. more likely to"drift,"so swaying their choices is partic- This,naturally,raises the question of what the null ularly valuable.1 Likewise,if it is instead assumed that hypothesis implies about the broader universe of con- oversight is totally ineffectual,distal agents present gressional oversight.I present and begin to assess one the best opportunity to demonstrate to the individ- argument,that oversight is motivated by "valence"or 8 ual constituent that legislators are serving as faithful policy quality-related concerns that are largely orthog- advocates onal to ideological disagreement.Broadly speaking,va- Not surprisingly,the explicit notion that preference lence is often modeled as a dimension of policy over divergence increases oversight has been critical to stud- which all legislators agree.13 Studies that consider its ies of formal hearings (e.g.,Dodd and Schott 1979: analytical properties point to a variety of examples Kriner and Schwartz 2008;McGrath 2013;Fowler As Ting (2011)notes,determining the tax rate (10% 2015;Rezaee,Wood,and Gailmard 2015;Kriner and v.50%)is ideological,whereas whether the IRS ex- Schickler 2016).As McGrath writes,"congressional tracts the correct rate from all those it applies to is committees conduct oversight hearings primarily as a a question of capacity or implementation quality.In response to the extent to which agencies have differ- other words,uneven application of the rate would vio- 四 ent policy preferences"(McGrath 2013,349).More late a shared goal of avoiding arbitrary exceptions and broadly,attention to spatial disagreement is at the core policy uncertainty.Similarly,Hitt,Volden,and Wise- man(2017)argue that legislators have shared prefer- ences over the expected benefit-to-cost ratio of a policy high-profile oversight investigations like the Benghazi hearings or IRS targeting scandal 11 There are,of course.alternative models of lobbying which of fer divergent predictions.Notably,Austen-Smith and Wright(1994) 12 Epstein and O'Halloran(1999)use two components of congres- develop a model in which only distal players have an incentive to sional oversight (direct action,agency reporting)to measure con- lobby-until the introduction of an opposing player,which gener- ates their key "counter-active"lobbying result.In addition,Hall and For recet exampleof this conception of valence,see Callander Deardorff (2006)argue lobbying subsidizes allies with otherwise and Martin (2017),Callander and Raiha (2017),and Hitt,Volden, costly information. and Wiseman (2017). 877Who Polices the Administrative State? resources. Responding to congressional inquiries often requires time-consuming document production unre￾lated to an agency’s core mission. This logic underlies studies that see investigations as efforts to discredit the opposition and reap electoral gains. In other attempts at oversight, members lobby to communicate preferences. Work on lobbying typically sees legislators as the target of such communications. In this case, statutory discretion and unforeseen cir￾cumstances guarantee that agencies make decisions af￾ter enactment that are politically important to legisla￾tors and warrant explicit communication (Ritchie and You 2018). Lobbying can be valuable for two reasons. First, it may influence policy outcomes. In a review of major congressional investigations from 1947-2002, Kriner and Schickler (2016) find that about 80% pro￾duced “tangible policy change” (171). Moreover, a re￾cent study by Ritchie and You (2018) suggests that informal contacts are associated with the approval of trade adjustment assistance applications at the Depart￾ment of Labor. In an analysis of the Federal Avia￾tion Administration, however,Mills,Kalaf-Hughes, and MacDonald (2016) find such oversight may have lit￾tle to no impact. So it is important to note that lob￾bying can be valuable if it has no impact on policy. In some cases, oversight attempts offer the opportunity to “credit claim” (Mayhew 1974). Exerting effort on be￾half of a constituent may be enough to win their sup￾port. This differs from the “grandstanding” opportuni￾ties found in congressional hearings because of its focus on serving an individual constituent. The logic behind lobbying divergent agents follows from these goals. Again, delegation decisions are made collectively, whereas informal oversight is performed by individual legislators. This means there will always be some subset of overseers who would benefit from a shift. From the legislator’s perspective, distal agents are more likely to “drift,” so swaying their choices is partic￾ularly valuable.11 Likewise, if it is instead assumed that oversight is totally ineffectual, distal agents present the best opportunity to demonstrate to the individ￾ual constituent that legislators are serving as faithful advocates. Not surprisingly, the explicit notion that preference divergence increases oversight has been critical to stud￾ies of formal hearings (e.g., Dodd and Schott 1979; Kriner and Schwartz 2008; McGrath 2013; Fowler 2015; Rezaee, Wood, and Gailmard 2015; Kriner and Schickler 2016). As McGrath writes, “congressional committees conduct oversight hearings primarily as a response to the extent to which agencies have differ￾ent policy preferences” (McGrath 2013, 349). More broadly, attention to spatial disagreement is at the core high-profile oversight investigations like the Benghazi hearings or IRS targeting scandal. 11 There are, of course, alternative models of lobbying which of￾fer divergent predictions. Notably, Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) develop a model in which only distal players have an incentive to lobby—until the introduction of an opposing player, which gener￾ates their key “counter-active” lobbying result. In addition, Hall and Deardorff (2006) argue lobbying subsidizes allies with otherwise costly information. of models of delegation, with some studies even assum￾ing congressional oversight helps set the boundaries of agency discretion.12 There is also no shortage of reasons this notion should apply to informal congressional inquiries.As re￾cent work by Wiseman and Wright (2015) highlights, the time elapsed between delegation decisions and agency policymaking is sometimes decades. This may coincide with turnover in both principal (via elections) and agent (via career decisions). In the narrower period of concern for this study, the basic fact is that legislators inherit the delegation contracts of prior congresses and observe changes in agency preferences. This presents the risk of deviation identified in past work. It is also consistent with McCubbins and Schwartz’s model, since changes in agency ideology may result in changes in policy behavior that—in turn—result in more com￾plaints from constituents. Nonetheless, there are key features of informal over￾sight which suggest that these conventional arguments may not generalize. First, they are typically unob￾served by reelection audiences. Informal contacts al￾low members to seek the redress of grievances with a more limited audience. News coverage of these con￾tacts have been historically muted. They lack the ap￾parent “grandstanding” opportunity that allows mem￾bers to distinguish themselves from the opposition, which is often cited as a key driver of the patterns of oversight under divided and unified government (e.g., Kriner and Schwartz 2008; Lowande and Peck 2017). Moreover, unlike congressional hearings and subpoe￾nas, these contacts are almost entirely unregulated by legislative and executive branch rules. This gives agen￾cies a freer hand in responding and may limit the effi￾cacy of ideologically charged inquiries. Requests with implications for the ideological orientation of policy are zero-sum. This, naturally, raises the question of what the null hypothesis implies about the broader universe of con￾gressional oversight. I present and begin to assess one argument, that oversight is motivated by “valence” or policy quality-related concerns that are largely orthog￾onal to ideological disagreement. Broadly speaking, va￾lence is often modeled as a dimension of policy over which all legislators agree.13 Studies that consider its analytical properties point to a variety of examples. As Ting (2011) notes, determining the tax rate (10% v. 50%) is ideological, whereas whether the IRS ex￾tracts the correct rate from all those it applies to is a question of capacity or implementation quality. In other words, uneven application of the rate would vio￾late a shared goal of avoiding arbitrary exceptions and policy uncertainty. Similarly, Hitt, Volden, and Wise￾man (2017) argue that legislators have shared prefer￾ences over the expected benefit-to-cost ratio of a policy 12 Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) use two components of congres￾sional oversight (direct action, agency reporting) to measure con￾straints on agency policymaking. 13 For recent examples of this conception of valence, see Callander and Martin (2017), Callander and Raiha (2017), and Hitt, Volden, and Wiseman (2017). 877 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000497