Kenneth Lowande (e.g.,minimizing budgetary impact while maximizing of FOIA requests to 72 agencies in October 2014 the number of beneficiaries).This does not supplant (Mills,Kalaf-Hughes,and MacDonald 2016;Lowande, ideological concerns;it simply suggests that policy out- forthcoming).14 Though agencies are required by law comes vary both by ideological content and perceived to respond to these inquiries,their responses do not al- quality. ways provide information usable for analysis.For that In the context of informal oversight,this implies that reason,the sample of agencies and time series is con- legislators would be motivated primarily by concerns strained by data availability. over how well policies are implemented.Audits for in- This raises a key issue:the particular subsample of formation and lobbying for policy changes should be agencies included in the analysis.Broadly speaking,this driven by the potential for policy failures that nega- analysis over-samples more structurally independent tively impact constituents and could draw broad-based agencies.This is confirmed in Figure 7 presented later, criticism.The lack of public observation means mem- which plots the structural independence of the sample bers have far less to gain from lobbing ideologically and population as measured by Selin(2015).However, motivated attacks.Moreover,the lack of rules gov- the structural features that render agencies more or less erning the process gives agencies more discretion in likely to receive demands are invariant within agen- handling requests and induces members to conduct cies during the period analyzed.So the internal valid- oversight that is not zero-sum.Policy valence-based ex- ity of the results should not be biased by such struc- planations are featured in some accounts of high pro- tural features-given the modeling approach discussed file investigations(Mayhew 1991;Light 2014)and they in the next section.On the other hand,the broader gen- are the dominant subtext for studies of oversight in eralizability of the findings should be taken in careful public administration and public policy.For example. context.I discuss this issue at length during the discus- Wood and Lewis (2017)leverage a Freedom of In- sion of the results by characterizing the relative influ- formation Act(FOIA)program audit by Represen- ence of these agencies on the key findings. tative Darrell Issa(R-CA)to measure responsiveness Figure 1 provides an overview of the sample,as well to private inquiries.In this case,concerns over FOlA as a comparison with the oversight studied in past performance motivated the government-wide audit.In work.Specifically,the figure provides a side-by-side summary,standard models of oversight that emphasize look at the number of days agency officials spent tes- ideological cleavages may have less purchase absent in- tifying in oversight hearings and the number of infor- centives generated by public observation and formal- mal inquiries over the same period.Several descriptive ized communication. findings are worth noting.First,the number of requests Valence is orthogonal to ideology by definition,but dwarfs that of witness testimony.This,I argue,pro- the absence of evidence for the explanatory power vides important descriptive support of McCubbins and of ideology is not evidence of the explanatory power Schwartz's notion that most oversight is conducted out- of valence concerns.I defer a more complete discus- side formal hearings.Second,these measures of over- sion of measurement to the following section,but past sight are not highly correlated.Some reasons will be work has suggested a number of possible markers of obvious.A few agencies only contact with legislators is valence-related oversight.The most obvious is that fielding the complaints of the constituents they provide oversight would be conducted by-in-large by mem- services.But the differences also highlight some of the bers of jurisdictionally relevant committees(Ogul and arguments in the previous section.In general,informal Rockman 1990).The committee system allows mem- inquiries are not subject to the same institutional con- bers to acquire expertise that may make them more straints.So it is unsurprising to find diverging patterns effective at detecting the problems.Moreover,whistle- of oversight.I return to these differences in my discus- blowers informed of Congress's distribution of labor sion of the key findings may target committee members and leadership with Figure 1 also raises questions about the inquiries complaints.Generally,I also expect members to re- themselves.First,the variety of contact begs the ques- spond to external evaluations of quality that reveal is- tion of what does and does not constitute congressional sues.Many quality concerns are episodic-so that over- oversight.Many of these inquiries are mundane aspects sight would be associated with the idiosyncratic fea- of daily governance.That is,they are inquiries on behalf tures of particular congresses and legislative districts. of particular constituents with specific grievances- Thus,I conclude this study with several case studies il- what those in Congress often refer to as "casework." lustrative of valence concerns at work in congressional Others are not broad criticisms of programs-but oversight. instead,specific concerns about the details of im- plementation left to the discretion of agencies.This includes requesting federal funds be spent a particular MEASURING OVERSIGHT WITH way-a practice known as "letter-marking"(Mills. CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE Kalaf-Hughes,and MacDonald 2016).However,the L To reexamine the divergence hypothesis,I analyze records of correspondence between bureaucratic agen- 14 These were the agencies at the time of request who had dedicated cies and members of Congress.Since the vast ma- FOIA contact information on foia.gov.The initial request asked for records from January 1.2007 to the present,but some agencies pro jority of contact records are not publicly avail- vided records for different time series.A full description of these able,these records were collected through a series requests and outcomes can be found in Table Al. 878Kenneth Lowande (e.g., minimizing budgetary impact while maximizing the number of beneficiaries). This does not supplant ideological concerns; it simply suggests that policy out￾comes vary both by ideological content and perceived quality. In the context of informal oversight, this implies that legislators would be motivated primarily by concerns over how well policies are implemented. Audits for in￾formation and lobbying for policy changes should be driven by the potential for policy failures that nega￾tively impact constituents and could draw broad-based criticism. The lack of public observation means mem￾bers have far less to gain from lobbing ideologically motivated attacks. Moreover, the lack of rules gov￾erning the process gives agencies more discretion in handling requests and induces members to conduct oversight that is not zero-sum. Policy valence-based ex￾planations are featured in some accounts of high pro￾file investigations (Mayhew 1991; Light 2014) and they are the dominant subtext for studies of oversight in public administration and public policy. For example, Wood and Lewis (2017) leverage a Freedom of In￾formation Act (FOIA) program audit by Represen￾tative Darrell Issa (R-CA) to measure responsiveness to private inquiries. In this case, concerns over FOIA performance motivated the government-wide audit. In summary, standard models of oversight that emphasize ideological cleavages may have less purchase absent in￾centives generated by public observation and formal￾ized communication. Valence is orthogonal to ideology by definition, but the absence of evidence for the explanatory power of ideology is not evidence of the explanatory power of valence concerns. I defer a more complete discus￾sion of measurement to the following section, but past work has suggested a number of possible markers of valence-related oversight. The most obvious is that oversight would be conducted by-in-large by mem￾bers of jurisdictionally relevant committees (Ogul and Rockman 1990). The committee system allows mem￾bers to acquire expertise that may make them more effective at detecting the problems. Moreover, whistle￾blowers informed of Congress’s distribution of labor may target committee members and leadership with complaints. Generally, I also expect members to re￾spond to external evaluations of quality that reveal is￾sues.Many quality concerns are episodic—so that over￾sight would be associated with the idiosyncratic fea￾tures of particular congresses and legislative districts. Thus, I conclude this study with several case studies il￾lustrative of valence concerns at work in congressional oversight. MEASURING OVERSIGHT WITH CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE To reexamine the divergence hypothesis, I analyze records of correspondence between bureaucratic agen￾cies and members of Congress. Since the vast ma￾jority of contact records are not publicly avail￾able, these records were collected through a series of FOIA requests to 72 agencies in October 2014 (Mills, Kalaf-Hughes, and MacDonald 2016; Lowande, forthcoming).14 Though agencies are required by law to respond to these inquiries, their responses do not al￾ways provide information usable for analysis. For that reason, the sample of agencies and time series is con￾strained by data availability. This raises a key issue: the particular subsample of agencies included in the analysis.Broadly speaking, this analysis over-samples more structurally independent agencies. This is confirmed in Figure 7 presented later, which plots the structural independence of the sample and population as measured by Selin (2015). However, the structural features that render agencies more or less likely to receive demands are invariant within agen￾cies during the period analyzed. So the internal valid￾ity of the results should not be biased by such struc￾tural features—given the modeling approach discussed in the next section.On the other hand, the broader gen￾eralizability of the findings should be taken in careful context. I discuss this issue at length during the discus￾sion of the results by characterizing the relative influ￾ence of these agencies on the key findings. Figure 1 provides an overview of the sample, as well as a comparison with the oversight studied in past work. Specifically, the figure provides a side-by-side look at the number of days agency officials spent tes￾tifying in oversight hearings and the number of infor￾mal inquiries over the same period. Several descriptive findings are worth noting. First, the number of requests dwarfs that of witness testimony. This, I argue, pro￾vides important descriptive support of McCubbins and Schwartz’s notion that most oversight is conducted out￾side formal hearings. Second, these measures of over￾sight are not highly correlated. Some reasons will be obvious. A few agencies only contact with legislators is fielding the complaints of the constituents they provide services. But the differences also highlight some of the arguments in the previous section. In general, informal inquiries are not subject to the same institutional con￾straints. So it is unsurprising to find diverging patterns of oversight. I return to these differences in my discus￾sion of the key findings. Figure 1 also raises questions about the inquiries themselves. First, the variety of contact begs the ques￾tion of what does and does not constitute congressional oversight.Many of these inquiries are mundane aspects of daily governance.That is, they are inquiries on behalf of particular constituents with specific grievances— what those in Congress often refer to as “casework.” Others are not broad criticisms of programs—but instead, specific concerns about the details of im￾plementation left to the discretion of agencies. This includes requesting federal funds be spent a particular way—a practice known as “letter-marking”(Mills, Kalaf-Hughes, and MacDonald 2016). However, the 14 These were the agencies at the time of request who had dedicated FOIA contact information on foia.gov. The initial request asked for records from January 1, 2007 to the present, but some agencies pro￾vided records for different time series. A full description of these requests and outcomes can be found in Table A1. 878 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000497