92:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM Earlier we raised the question of whether things might have been differ- ent had a far-sighted and dispassionate U.S.policy attempted to accommo- date the early PRC.When the lost chance hypothesis emerged in the 1970s, the internal documents of the U.S.government dealing with China policy circa 1949 had not yet been declassified.As other essays in this symposium will discuss,the declassification of these archives in the early 1980s led to a reinterpretation of U.S.policy.It now became apparent that U.S.policy,at least as defined by the Truman administration,was much more sophisti- cated than it had previously seemed.Between the end of 1948 and early 1950,the administration tried to minimize conflict with the emerging Communist-led China in order to draw it away from the USSR,thereby furthering the overriding U.S.objective of minimizing Soviet influence in the Far East.Throughout 1949 the administration agonized over Taiwan, but by the end of the year it had decided to sacrifice Taiwan too.In other words,the United States,it turned out,had followed essentially the policy the lost chance theorists would have had it follow. China's new leaders perceived the outlines of U.S.policy at this juncture and were not interested in the U.S.offer of accommodation.Throughout the latter half of 1949,the CCP's leaders worked to build cordial,coopera- tive relations with the USSR.One of the determining factors in that effort was Stalin's deep suspicions regarding the class character and political orien- tation of Mao Zedong's CCP.These suspicions can be traced back to dis- agreements over CCP policy between Mao and Stalin in the 1930s,were exacerbated by Tito's 1948 defection,and were fed throughout the post- 1945 period by the reports of Stalin's personal representative to Mao Zedong.I.V.Kovalev.Mao and his comrades were very sensitive to Stalin's suspicions and bent over backward to reassure him of the CCP's loyalty and political correctness.A key litmus test of this was the CCP/PRC's orienta- tion toward the United States and Great Britain.In order to reassure Stalin, Mao's representatives promised that the new China would be in no hurry to open relations with the imperialist powers. China's leaders in 1949 understood that they had the option of accommo- dation with the United States-that the Truman administration sought such an outcome.They deliberately rejected that path and decided instead to bring the PRC into a close and comprehensive alliance with the USSR in the global struggle well under way by 1949.As the PRC representative to the UN debates in 1950 Wu Xiuquan explained in his memoir,U.S.efforts to arrange an accommodation between the United States and the new China were simply an imperialist plot to divide the revolutionary camp.The CCP decided to throw China's full weight into the global balance on the side of the world's anti-imperialist forces. The way to secure the new proletarian state in China,Mao and his comrades concluded,was by full alliance with the USSR and other socialist92 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y T H E G L O B A L S T R U G G L E A G A I N S T I M P E R I A L I S M Earlier we raised the question of whether things might have been differ￾ent had a far-sighted and dispassionate U.S. policy attempted to accommo￾date the early PRC. When the lost chance hypothesis emerged in the 1970s, the internal documents of the U.S. government dealing with China policy circa 1949 had not yet been declassified. As other essays in this symposium will discuss, the declassification of these archives in the early 1980s led to a reinterpretation of U.S. policy. It now became apparent that U.S. policy, at least as defined by the Truman administration, was much more sophisti￾cated than it had previously seemed. Between the end of 1948 and early 1950, the administration tried to minimize conflict with the emerging Communist-led China in order to draw it away from the USSR, thereby furthering the overriding U.S. objective of minimizing Soviet influence in the Far East. Throughout 1949 the administration agonized over Taiwan, but by the end of the year it had decided to sacrifice Taiwan too. In other words, the United States, it turned out, had followed essentially the policy the lost chance theorists would have had it follow. China’s new leaders perceived the outlines of U.S. policy at this juncture and were not interested in the U.S. offer of accommodation. Throughout the latter half of 1949, the CCP’s leaders worked to build cordial, coopera￾tive relations with the USSR. One of the determining factors in that effort was Stalin’s deep suspicions regarding the class character and political orien￾tation of Mao Zedong’s CCP. These suspicions can be traced back to dis￾agreements over CCP policy between Mao and Stalin in the 1930s, were exacerbated by Tito’s 1948 defection, and were fed throughout the post- 1945 period by the reports of Stalin’s personal representative to Mao Zedong, I. V. Kovalev. Mao and his comrades were very sensitive to Stalin’s suspicions and bent over backward to reassure him of the CCP’s loyalty and political correctness. A key litmus test of this was the CCP/PRC’s orienta￾tion toward the United States and Great Britain. In order to reassure Stalin, Mao’s representatives promised that the new China would be in no hurry to open relations with the imperialist powers. China’s leaders in 1949 understood that they had the option of accommo￾dation with the United States – that the Truman administration sought such an outcome. They deliberately rejected that path and decided instead to bring the PRC into a close and comprehensive alliance with the USSR in the global struggle well under way by 1949. As the PRC representative to the UN debates in 1950 Wu Xiuquan explained in his memoir, U.S. efforts to arrange an accommodation between the United States and the new China were simply an imperialist plot to divide the revolutionary camp. The CCP decided to throw China’s full weight into the global balance on the side of the world’s anti-imperialist forces. The way to secure the new proletarian state in China, Mao and his comrades concluded, was by full alliance with the USSR and other socialist