Threats,Assurances, Thomas J. and the Last Chance Christensen for Peace The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams In Cold War history few topics have received more attention than the 1950 Sino-American crisis over Korea.1 China's massive attack on UN troops in late November 1950 led to the longest retreat in American military history,an epic confrontation between the Truman administration and General Douglas MacArthur,and a polarizing domestic political debate about policy toward China.One major point of controversy was the question of how Mao might have been dis- suaded from escalating China's involvement in Korea.MacArthur supporters argued that Mao attacked out of adventurism because he was certain the Thomas I.Christensen is an Olin Fellow in National Security Studies at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs (CFIA)and a Ph.D.Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University.In July 1993 he will join the faculty of the Department of Government at Cornell University.This article was originally written in September 1991 under the auspices of Harvard's CFIA,and was first presented there in November 1991. For extensive critiques of earlier drafts I am indebted to Robert Jervis,Jonathan Mercer,Lucian Pye,and Stephen Van Evera.For helpful comments I also thank Thomas Bernstein,Hu Weixing, Michael Hunt,Samuel Huntington,Yuen Foong Khong,Timothy Naftali,Andrew Nathan,Ren Yue,Stephen P.Rosen,Robert Ross,David Rowe,Randall Schweller,Jack Snyder,Fareed Zakaria,and the members of the Olin National Security Group at Harvard's CFIA.For editing my translations,I am grateful to Ms.Irene Liu of Columbia University.I also thank the Olin Foundation and Harvard's Center for International Affairs for financial and institutional support. 1.For classic treatments of American policy during the crisis,see David Rees,Korea:The Limited War (London:Macmillan,1964),Parts I and II;John W.Spanier,The Truman-MacArthur Contro versy (Cambridge,Mass.:Belknap/Harvard University Press,1959);Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War:The Challenge to American Strategy(Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1957),ch. 8;Bernard Brodie,War and Politics (New York:Macmillan:1973),ch.3;Alexander L.George and Richard Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice (New York:Columbia University Press,1974),ch.7;Richard E.Neustadt,Presidential Power:The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York:Wiley,1980),ch.6.For a comprehensive military account of the first months of the war,see Roy Edgar Appleman,U.S.Army in the Korean War:Vol.1,South to the Naktong and North to the Yalu (Washington:Department of the Army,1961),chs.29-39.For the pioneering works on Chinese policy in the crisis,see Allen S.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu:The Decision to Enter the Korean War(Stanford,Calif.:Stanford University Press,1960);Tang Tsou,America's Failure in China:1941-50(Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1963),ch.13; and Jan Kalicki,The Pattern of Sino-American Crises (London:Cambridge University Press,1975), ch.3. International Security,Summer 1992 (Vol.17,No.1) 1992 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 122 sta02323201PwThreats, Assurances, Thomas J. and the Last Chance Christensen for Peace The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams In Cold War history few topics have received more attention than the 1950 Sino-American crisis over Korea.' China's massive attack on UN troops in late November 1950 led to the longest retreat in American military history, an epic confrontation between the Truman administration and General Douglas MacArthur, and a polarizing domestic political debate about policy toward China. One major point of controversy was the question of how Mao might have been dis￾suaded from escalating China's involvement in Korea. MacArthur supporters argued that Mao attacked out of adventurism because he was certain the Thomas J. Christensen is an Olin Fellow in National Security Studies at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs (CFIA) and a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University. In July 1993 he will join the faculty of the Department ofGovernment at Cornell University. This article was originally written in September 1991 under the auspices of Harvard's CFIA, and was first presented there in November 1991. For extensive critiques of earlier drafts I am indebted to Robert Jervis, Jonathan Mercer, Lucian Pye, and Stephen Van Evera. For helpful comments I also thank Thomas Bernstein, Hu Weixing, Michael Hunt, Samuel Huntington, Yuen Foong Khong, Timothy Naftali, Andrew Nathan, Ren Yue, Stephen P. Rosen, Robert Ross, David Rowe, Randall Schweller, Jack Snyder, Fareed Zakaria, and the members of the Olin National Security Group at Harvard's CFIA. For editing my translations, I am grateful to Ms. Irene Liu of Columbia University. I also thank the Olin Foundation and Harvard's Center for International Affairs for financial and institutional support. 1. For classic treatments of American policy during the crisis, see David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964), Parts I and II; John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Contro￾versy (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1959); Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), ch. 8; Bemard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan: 1973), ch. 3; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), ch. 7; Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: Wiley, 1980), ch. 6. For a comprehensive military account of the first months of the war, see Roy Edgar Appleman, U.S. Army in the Korean War: Vol. 1, South to the Naktong and North to the Yalu (Washington: Department of the Army, 1961), chs. 29-39. For the pioneering works on Chinese policy in the crisis, see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), ch. 13; and Jan Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 3. International Security, Summer 1992 (Vol. 17, No. 1) C 1992 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 122 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions