Il.Indeed,the echo effect of domestic pressures may well United States reduces its defense expenditures, be the most likely pathway to geopolitical conflict between maintaining a robust presence in East Asia will remain a China and the United States.Today,even on issues where priority,especially as the conflicts in the Middle East wind the two parties hold differing positions-such as Taiwan down.Nonetheless,U.S.grand strategy is poised to grow and the value of the yuan-such differences are being less ambitious over the coming decade,perhaps relying effectively managed and contained.The most likely cause of more heavily on its allies in East Asia to hedge against change in this stable state of play is domestic pressure. China.That development,should it occur,would complicate the politics and strategy of regional adjustments Consider again the tensions that emerged in the to China's ascent. relationship during early 2010.President Obama was being pushed by Congress to step up pressure on Beijing to allow Managing Normative Change in the International an appreciation of the yuan;the House and Senate were System making protectionist soundings.On Taiwan and human Many analysts believe that although China's rise promises rights issues,the President was under pressure to show a to alter the international pecking order,it need not alter the firmer hand in order to rebut critics who claimed he was existing norms of the system.China benefits from the too accommodating toward autocracies.Beijing meanwhile current system,the argument runs,as made clear by its was under growing public pressure to resist Washington's exceptional growth rates.As long as the West reaches out to entreaties.Even though Chinese leaders had compelling China and gives Beijing a seat at the table,the norms of the reasons of self-interest to raise the value of the yuan,they Western system should long outlast the West's material could not follow through if doing so appeared to be primacy.29 capitulation to Washington.It is no accident that Beijing moved on the issue after the United States toned down its This view represents an illusory understanding of the rhetoric and agreed to work the issue multilaterally through dynamics of power transitions.Rising challengers seek not the G-20. only to alter the pecking order,but also to change the norms and rules of the system to their advantage.As Leaders in both China and the United States need to Wilhelmine Germany challenged Britain for hegemony in remain on guard against the dangers of blowback.Neither Europe,its aim was not merely geopolitical.Germany government can afford to stake out strategic ambitions and practiced a different brand of politics than did Britain;its propagate strategic visions that may come back to haunt it own norms and values would have affected the ordering of when conditions change.Reciprocal restraint and the international system had it prevailed.Needless to say, moderation are thus as important in mapping out strategic the same would have been true of Nazi Germany and aims for the future as they in conducting foreign policy in Imperial Japan-even more so. the present. Accordingly,the United States and its Western partners will Under-balancing against China of the sort that took place have to address not only the hierarchy that characterizes the during the 193os seems a remote prospect.However,the next international order,but also the norms and rules that wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,coupled with massive debt, inform its operation.On matters of,among others,human are likely to prompt a strategic retrenchment in the United rights,the nature of domestic governance,the relationship States.Europe has already demonstrated its lack of interest between state and society,and the definition and operation in investing in power projection capabilities;its members of sovereignty,the West may well have to make have been slashing their defense budgets.Even as the NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE I4new america foundation page 14 II. Indeed, the echo effect of domestic pressures may well be the most likely pathway to geopolitical conflict between China and the United States. Today, even on issues where the two parties hold differing positions – such as Taiwan and the value of the yuan – such differences are being effectively managed and contained. The most likely cause of change in this stable state of play is domestic pressure. Consider again the tensions that emerged in the relationship during early 2010. President Obama was being pushed by Congress to step up pressure on Beijing to allow an appreciation of the yuan; the House and Senate were making protectionist soundings. On Taiwan and human rights issues, the President was under pressure to show a firmer hand in order to rebut critics who claimed he was too accommodating toward autocracies. Beijing meanwhile was under growing public pressure to resist Washington’s entreaties. Even though Chinese leaders had compelling reasons of self-interest to raise the value of the yuan, they could not follow through if doing so appeared to be capitulation to Washington. It is no accident that Beijing moved on the issue after the United States toned down its rhetoric and agreed to work the issue multilaterally through the G-20. Leaders in both China and the United States need to remain on guard against the dangers of blowback. Neither government can afford to stake out strategic ambitions and propagate strategic visions that may come back to haunt it when conditions change. Reciprocal restraint and moderation are thus as important in mapping out strategic aims for the future as they in conducting foreign policy in the present. Under-balancing against China of the sort that took place during the 1930s seems a remote prospect. However, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with massive debt, are likely to prompt a strategic retrenchment in the United States. Europe has already demonstrated its lack of interest in investing in power projection capabilities; its members have been slashing their defense budgets. Even as the United States reduces its defense expenditures, maintaining a robust presence in East Asia will remain a priority, especially as the conflicts in the Middle East wind down. Nonetheless, U.S. grand strategy is poised to grow less ambitious over the coming decade, perhaps relying more heavily on its allies in East Asia to hedge against China. That development, should it occur, would complicate the politics and strategy of regional adjustments to China’s ascent. Managing Normative Change in the International System Many analysts believe that although China’s rise promises to alter the international pecking order, it need not alter the existing norms of the system. China benefits from the current system, the argument runs, as made clear by its exceptional growth rates. As long as the West reaches out to China and gives Beijing a seat at the table, the norms of the Western system should long outlast the West’s material primacy.29 This view represents an illusory understanding of the dynamics of power transitions. Rising challengers seek not only to alter the pecking order, but also to change the norms and rules of the system to their advantage. As Wilhelmine Germany challenged Britain for hegemony in Europe, its aim was not merely geopolitical. Germany practiced a different brand of politics than did Britain; its own norms and values would have affected the ordering of the international system had it prevailed. Needless to say, the same would have been true of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan – even more so. Accordingly, the United States and its Western partners will have to address not only the hierarchy that characterizes the next international order, but also the norms and rules that inform its operation. On matters of, among others, human rights, the nature of domestic governance, the relationship between state and society, and the definition and operation of sovereignty, the West may well have to make