632 HANS VAN DE VEN at this juncture'.It was not at all predictable that the Qing would survive the crisis of the Boxer Rebellion.If Britain favoured concerted international action in support of the Qing,not all other countries thought similarly.Russia was eager to absorb north China as the Siberian railroad is completed',while Japan,which had already seized Korea,was determined to resist Russian influence and extend its own in northern China.France was interested in securing regions in south China neighbouring Tongking,while Germany too sought to acquire a base in China.A collapse of the Qing,the partition of China,or even an Allied imposition of a new monarchical ruler were all real possibilities in the tense weeks that followed the Allied occupation of Beijing and the Qing court's flight first to Taiyuan in Shanxi Province and then to Xi'an in Shaanxi.Hart's determined efforts helped prevent these outcomes. In this examination of Robert Hart's role during the Boxer crisis,I seek to illustrate his significance as a man in the middle.It is limiting, I believe,to portray him as ultimately either a servant of British or general foreign interest in China,or as someone who represented the West at its best.Chinese historians such as Chen Hansheng, Fan Wenlan,and He Jiajun argued in the 195os that the Customs Service was a tool of imperialism that did great harm to China.6 More recently,Chen Shiqi,the author of the most exhaustive history of the Chinese Maritime Customs to date,'as well as Chen Xiafei and Han Rongfang,the editors of the correspondence between Hart and James Duncan Campbell,3 were less one-sided.They expressed admiration for the financial and personnel systems of the Customs Quoted in Stanley Wright,Hart and the Chinese Customs(Belfast:Wm.Mullan and Son,195o),737: 5 The China Problem',National Archives of the United Kingdom (formerly the Public Record Office),Kew,CAB $7/53/65. 6 Zhongguo Jindai Jingjishi Ziliao Congkan Bianji Weiyuanhui (Compilation Committee for Reseources for Modern Economic History of China),Diguozhuyi yu Zhongguo Haiguan(Imperialism and China's Maritime Customs)(Beijing:Zhonghua Shuju,1957-1970). 7 Chen Shiqi,Zhongguo Jindai Haiguan Shi (History of the Maritime Customs Service of Modern China)(Beijing:Renmin Chubanshe,2002). 8 Chen Xiafei and Han Rongfang,eds,The Archives of the China's Imperial Maritime Customs Service:The Confidential Correspondence between Robert Hart and James Duncan Campbell (Beijing:Foreign Languages Press,1990-1993).An earlier edition, providing only Hart's letters to Campbell,was John Fairbank,Katherine Bruner, Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson,eds,The I.G.in Peking:The Letters of Robert Hart,Chinese Maritime Customs of China,1868-1907(Cambridge,Mass,Harvard UP,1975).The Beijing edition also supplies the telegrams that Hart and Campbell exchanged,but632 HANS VAN DE VEN at this juncture’.4 It was not at all predictable that the Qing would survive the crisis of the Boxer Rebellion. If Britain favoured concerted international action in support of the Qing, not all other countries thought similarly. Russia was eager to ‘absorb north China as the Siberian railroad is completed’,5 while Japan, which had already seized Korea, was determined to resist Russian influence and extend its own in northern China. France was interested in securing regions in south China neighbouring Tongking, while Germany too sought to acquire a base in China. A collapse of the Qing, the partition of China, or even an Allied imposition of a new monarchical ruler were all real possibilities in the tense weeks that followed the Allied occupation of Beijing and the Qing court’s flight first to Taiyuan in Shanxi Province and then to Xi’an in Shaanxi. Hart’s determined efforts helped prevent these outcomes. In this examination of Robert Hart’s role during the Boxer crisis, I seek to illustrate his significance as a man in the middle. It is limiting, I believe, to portray him as ultimately either a servant of British or general foreign interest in China, or as someone who represented the West at its best. Chinese historians such as Chen Hansheng, Fan Wenlan, and He Jiajun argued in the 1950s that the Customs Service was a tool of imperialism that did great harm to China.6 More recently, Chen Shiqi, the author of the most exhaustive history of the Chinese Maritime Customs to date,7 as well as Chen Xiafei and Han Rongfang, the editors of the correspondence between Hart and James Duncan Campbell,8 were less one-sided. They expressed admiration for the financial and personnel systems of the Customs 4 Quoted in Stanley Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: Wm. Mullan and Son, 1950), 737. 5 ‘The China Problem’, National Archives of the United Kingdom (formerly the Public Record Office), Kew, CAB 37/53/65. 6 Zhongguo Jindai Jingjishi Ziliao Congkan Bianji Weiyuanhui (Compilation Committee for Reseources for Modern Economic History of China), Diguozhuyi yu Zhongguo Haiguan (Imperialism and China’s Maritime Customs) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1957–1970). 7 Chen Shiqi, Zhongguo Jindai Haiguan Shi(History of the Maritime Customs Service of Modern China) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2002). 8 Chen Xiafei and Han Rongfang, eds, The Archives of the China’s Imperial Maritime Customs Service: The Confidential Correspondence between Robert Hart and James Duncan Campbell (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1990–1993). An earlier edition, providing only Hart’s letters to Campbell, was John Fairbank, Katherine Bruner, Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson, eds, The I.G. in Peking: The Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs of China, 1868–1907 (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1975). The Beijing edition also supplies the telegrams that Hart and Campbell exchanged, but