FIDELITY TO LAW ideal, "that of fidelity to law. It is not clear, in other words whether in Professor Hart's own thinking the distinction between law and morality simply"is,” or is something that“ ought to be” and that we should join with him in helping to create and maintain. These were the perplexities I had about Professor Hart's argu- ment when i first encountered it. but on reflection i am sure any criticism of his essay as being self-contradictory would be oth unfair and unprofitable There is no reason why the argu ment for a strict separation of law and morality cannot be rested on the double ground that this separation serves both intellectual clarity and moral integrity. If there are certain difficulties in bringing these two lines of reasoning into proper relation to one another, these difficulties affect also the position of those who reject the views of Austin, Gray, and Holmes. For those of us who find the " positivist position unacceptable do ourselves rest our argument on the double ground that its intellectual clarity is specious and that its effects are, or may be, harmful. On the ne hand, we assert that Austins definition of law, for example violates the reality it purports to describe. Being false in fact it cannot serve effectively what Kelsen calls "an interest of cog nition On the other hand we assert that under some condi tions the same conception of law may become dangerous, since in human affairs what men mistakenly accept as real tends, by the very act of their acceptance, to become real. It is a cardinal virtue of Professor Hart's argument that for the first time it opens the way for a truly profitable exchange of views between those whose differences center on the distinction between law and morality. Hitherto there has been no real joinder of issue between the opposing camps. On the one side, we en counter a series of definitional fiats. a rule of law is -that is to it really and simply and always is - the command of a sov ereign,a rule laid down by a judge a prediction of the future incidence of state force, a pattern of official behavior, etc.When we ask what purpose these definitions serve we receive the an- swer,"Why, no purpose, except to describe accurately the social reality that corresponds to the word law. "7 When we reply, But it doesnt look like that to me, the answer comes back, <Well. it does to me. There the matter has to rest This state of affairs has been most unsatisfactory for those of that“ positivistic” theories have had a distorting effect on the aims of legal philosophy our dissatisfac-FIDELITY TO LAW ideal," that of fidelity to law. It is not clear, in other words, whether in Professor Hart's own thinking the distinction between law and morality simply "is," or is something that "ought to be" and that we should join with him in helping to create and maintain. These were the perplexities I had about Professor Hart's argu￾ment when I first encountered it. But on reflection I am sure any criticism of his essay as being self-contradictory would be both unfair and unprofitable. There is no reason why the argu￾ment for a strict separation of law and morality cannot be rested on the double ground that this separation serves both intellectual clarity and moral integrity. If there are certain difficulties in bringing these two lines of reasoning into proper relation to one another, these difficulties affect also the position of those who reject the views of Austin, Gray, and Holmes. For those of us who find the "positivist" position unacceptable do ourselves rest our argument on the double ground that its intellectual clarity is specious and that its effects are, or may be, harmful. On the one hand, we assert that Austin's definition of law, for example, violates the reality it purports to describe. Being false in fact, it cannot serve effectively what Kelsen calls "an interest of cog￾nition." On the other hand, we assert that under some condi￾tions the same conception of law may become dangerous, since in human affairs what men mistakenly accept as real tends, by the very act of their acceptance, to become real. It is a cardinal virtue of Professor Hart's argument that for the first time it opens the way for a truly profitable exchange of views between those whose differences center on the distinction between law and morality. Hitherto there has been no real joinder of issue between the opposing camps. On the one side, we en￾counter a series of definitional fiats. A rule of law is - that is to say, it really and simply and always is - the command of a sov￾ereign, a rule laid down by a judge, a prediction of the future incidence of state force, a pattern of official behavior, etc. When we ask what purpose these definitions serve, we receive the an￾swer, "Why, no purpose, except to describe accurately the social reality that corresponds to the word 'law.'" When we reply, "But it doesn't look like that to me," the answer comes back, "Well, it does to me." There the matter has to rest. This state of affairs has been most unsatisfactory for those of us who are convinced that "positivistic" theories have had a distorting effect on the aims of legal philosophy. Our dissatisfac￾I958] 631