HARVARD LAW REVIEW TVol.7I tion arose not merely from the impasse we confronted, but be- cause this impasse seemed to us so unnecessary. All that was needed to surmount it was an acknowledgment on the other side that its definitions of what law really is" are not mere images of some datum of experience but direction posts for the application of human energies. Since this acknowledgment was not forthcom ing, the impasse and its frustrations continued. There is indeed no frustration greater than to be confronted by a theory which purports merely to describe, when it not only plainly prescribes but owes its special prescriptive powers precisely to the fact that disclaims prescriptive intentions. Into this murky debate, some shafts of light did occasionally break through, as in Kelsen's casual admission, apparently never repeated, that his whole system might well rest on an emotional preference for the ideal of order over that of justice. But I have to confess that in general the dispute that has been conducted during the last twenty years has not been very profitable. Now, with Professor Hart's paper, the discussion takes a new ind promising turn. It is now explicitly acknowledged on both sides that one of the chief issues is how we can best define and serve the ideal of fidelity to law. Law, as something deserving loyalty, must represent a human achievement; it cannot be a simple fiat of power or a repetitive pattern discernible in the be avior of state officials. The respect we owe to human laws must surely be something different from the respect we accord to the law of gravitation. If laws, even bad laws, have a claim to our respect, then law must represent some general direction of human effort that we can understand and describe, and that we can approve in principle even at the moment when it seems to us to miss its mark If. as i believe. it is a cardinal virtue of Professor Hart's argu- nent that it brings into the dispute the issue of fidelity to law, its chief defect, if I may say so, lies in a failure to perceive and accept the implications that this enlargement of the frame of argu- ment necessarily entails. This defect seems to me more or less to permeate the whole essay, but it comes most prominently to the fore in his discussion of Gustav Radbruch and the Nazi regime. 2 Die Idee des Naturrechtes, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT stria I927) Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 7I HARV. L. REv. 593,6r5-2x(r958)HARVARD LAW REVIEW tion arose not merely from the impasse we confronted, but be￾cause this impasse seemed to us so unnecessary. All that was needed to surmount it was an acknowledgment on the other side that its definitions of "what law really is" are not mere images of some datum of experience, but direction posts for the application of human energies. Since this acknowledgment was not forthcom￾ing, the impasse and its frustrations continued. There is indeed no frustration greater than to be confronted by a theory which purports merely to describe, when it not only plainly prescribes, but owes its special prescriptive powers precisely to the fact that it disclaims prescriptive intentions. Into this murky debate, some shafts of light did occasionally break through, as in Kelsen's casual admission, apparently never repeated, that his whole system might well rest on an emotional preference for the ideal of order over that of justice.l But I have to confess that in general the dispute that has been conducted during the last twenty years has not been very profitable. Now, with Professor Hart's paper, the discussion takes a new and promising turn. It is now explicitly acknowledged on both sides that one of the chief issues is how we can best define and serve the ideal of fidelity to law. Law, as something deserving loyalty, must represent a human achievement; it cannot be a simple fiat of power or a repetitive pattern discernible in the be￾havior of state officials. The respect we owe to human laws must surely be something different from the respect we accord to the law of gravitation. If laws, even bad laws, have a claim to our respect, then law must represent some general direction of human effort that we can understand and describe, and that we can approve in principle even at the moment when it seems to us to miss its mark. If, as I believe, it is a cardinal virtue of Professor Hart's argu￾ment that it brings into the dispute the issue of fidelity to law, its chief defect, if I may say so, lies in a failure to perceive and accept the implications that this enlargement of the frame of argu￾ment necessarily entails. This defect seems to me more or less to permeate the whole essay, but it comes most prominently to the fore in his discussion of Gustav Radbruch and the Nazi regime.2 1 Kelsen, Die Idee des Naturrechtes, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FiR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 221, 248 (Austria 1927). 2 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 6i5-21 (1958). 632 [Vol. 7