FIDELITY TO LAW 633 without any inquiry into the actual workings of whatever re- mained of a legal system under the Nazis, Professor Hart assumes nat something must have persisted that still deserved the name of law in a sense that would make meaningful the ideal of fidelity to law Not that Professor hart believes the Nazis laws should have been obeyed. Rather he considers that a decision to disobey them presented not a mere question of prudence or courage, but a genuine moral dilemma in which the ideal of fidelity to law had to be sacrificed in favor of more fundamental goals. I should have thought it unwise to pass such a judgment without first in- firing with more particularity what"law "itself meant under the azl regime. I shall present later my reasons for thinking that Professor Hart is profoundly mistaken in his estimate of the Nazi situation and that he gravely misinterprets the thought of Professor Rad bruch. But first I shall turn to some preliminary definitional prob- lems in whic lich what I regard as the central defect in Professor Hart's thesis seems immediately apparent I. THE DEFINITION OF LAW o Throughout his essay Professor Hart aligns himself with a gen- al position which he associates with the names of Bentham Austin, Gray, and Holmes. He recognizes, of course, that the conceptions of these men as to "what law is"vary considerably but this diversity he apparently considers irrelevant in his defense of general school of thought. If the only issue were that of stipulating a meaning for the word"law"that would be conducive to intellectual clarity, there might be much justification for treating all of these men as work ng in the same direction. Austin, for example, defines law as the command of the highest legislative power, called the sovereign For gray, on the other hand, law consists in the rules laid down by judges. A statute is, for Gray, not a law, but only a source of law, which becomes law only after it has been interpreted and applied by a court. Now if our only object were to obtain that clarity which comes from making our definitions explicit and then adhering strictly to those definitions, one could argue plausi bly that either conception of the meaning of "law will do. Both conceptions appear to avoid a confusion of morals and law, andFIDELITY TO LAW Without any inquiry into the actual workings of whatever re￾mained of a legal system under the Nazis, Professor Hart assumes that something must have persisted that still deserved the name of law in a sense that would make meaningful the ideal of fidelity to law. Not that Professor Hart believes the Nazis' laws should have been obeyed. Rather he considers that a decision to disobey them presented not a mere question of prudence or courage, but a genuine moral dilemma in which the ideal of fidelity to law had to be sacrificed in favor of more fundamental goals. I should have thought it unwise to pass such a judgment without first in￾quiring with more particularity what "law" itself meant under the Nazi regime. I shall present later my reasons for thinking that Professor Hart is profoundly mistaken in his estimate of the Nazi situation and that he gravely misinterprets the thought of Professor Rad￾bruch. But first I shall turn to some preliminary definitional prob￾lems in which what I regard as the central defect in Professor Hart's thesis seems immediately apparent. I. THE DEFINITION OF LAW Throughout his essay Professor Hart aligns himself with a gen￾eral position which he associates with the names of Bentham, Austin, Gray, and Holmes. He recognizes, of course, that the conceptions of these men as to "what law is" vary considerably, but this diversity he apparently considers irrelevant in his defense of their general school of thought. If the only issue were that of stipulating a meaning for the word "law" that would be conducive to intellectual clarity, there might be much justification for treating all of these men as work￾ing in the same direction. Austin, for example, defines law as the command of the highest legislative power, called the sovereign. For Gray, on the other hand, law consists in the rules laid down by judges. A statute is, for Gray, not a law, but only a source of law, which becomes law only after it has been interpreted and applied by a court. Now if our only object were to obtain that clarity which comes from making our definitions explicit and then adhering strictly to those definitions, one could argue plausi￾bly that either conception of the meaning of "law" will do. Both conceptions appear to avoid a confusion of morals and law, and I958] 633