HARVARD LAW REVIEW Vol. 7I both writers let the reader know what meaning they propose to attribute to the word law The matter assumes a very different aspect, however, if our interest lies in the ideal of fidelity to law, for then it may become a matter of capital importance what position is assigned to the judiciary in the general frame of government. Confirmation for this observation may be found in the slight rumbling of constitu tional crisis to be heard in this country today. during the past rear readers of newspapers have been writing to their editors urg ing solemnly, and even apparently with sincerity, that we should abolish the Supreme Court as a first step toward a restoration of the rule of law. It is unlikely that this remedy for our govern- mental ills derives from any deep study of Austin or Gray, but surely those who propose it could hardly be expected to with indifference the divergent definitions of law offered by those two jurists. If it be said that it is a perversion of Gray's mean- ing to extract from his writings any moral for present contro versies about the role of the Supreme Court, then it seems to me there is equal reason for treating what he wrote as irrelevant to the issue of fidelity to law generally Another difference of opinion among the writers defended by Professor Hart concerns Bentham and austin and their views on nstitutional limitations on the power of the sovereign. Bentham considered that a constitution might preclude the highest legisla tive power from issuing certain kinds of laws. For Austin,on the other hand, any legal limit on the highest lawmaking power was an absurdity and an impossibility. What guide to conscience would be offered by these two writers in a crisis that might some day arise out of the provision of our constitution to the effect that he amending power can never be used to deprive any state with- out its consent of its equal representation in the Senate? Surely it is not only in the affairs of everyday life that we need clarity about the obligation of fidelity to law, but most particularly and urgently in times of trouble. If all the positivist school has to offer in such times is the observation that, he hoose to define law, it is always something different from morals its teachings are not of much use to us. I suggest, then, that Professor Hart' s thesi it now stands is essentially incomplete and that before he can attain the goalsHARVARD LAW REVIEW both writers let the reader know what meaning they propose to attribute to the word "law." The matter assumes a very different aspect, however, if our interest lies in the ideal of fidelity to law, for then it may become a matter of capital importance what position is assigned to the judiciary in the general frame of government. Confirmation for this observation may be found in the slight rumbling of constitu￾tional crisis to be heard in this country today. During the past year readers of newspapers have been writing to their editors urg￾ing solemnly, and even apparently with sincerity, that we should abolish the Supreme Court as a first step toward a restoration of the rule of law. It is unlikely that this remedy for our govern￾mental ills derives from any deep study of Austin or Gray, but surely those who propose it could hardly be expected to view with indifference the divergent definitions of law offered by those two jurists. If it be said that it is a perversion of Gray's mean￾ing to extract from his writings any moral for present contro￾versies about the role of the Supreme Court, then it seems to me there is equal reason for treating what he wrote as irrelevant to the issue of fidelity to law generally. Another difference of opinion among the writers defended by Professor Hart concerns Bentham and Austin and their views on constitutional limitations on the power of the sovereign. Bentham considered that a constitution might preclude the highest legisla￾tive power from issuing certain kinds of laws. For Austin, on the other hand, any legal limit on the highest lawmaking power was an absurdity and an impossibility. What guide to conscience would be offered by these two writers in a crisis that might some day arise out of the provision of our constitution to the effect that the amending power can never be used to deprive any state with￾out its consent of its equal representation in the Senate? 3 Surely it is not only in the affairs of everyday life that we need clarity about the obligation of fidelity to law, but most particularly and urgently in times of trouble. If all the positivist school has to offer in such times is the observation that, however you may choose to define law, it is always something different from morals, its teachings are not of much use to us. I suggest, then, that Professor Hart's thesis as it now stands is essentially incomplete and that before he can attain the goals 3 U.S. CONST. art. V. 634 [Vol. 71