r958] FIDELITY TO LAW 635 he seeks he will have to concern himself more closely with a definition of law that will make meaningful the obligation of fidelity to law II. THE DEFINITION OF MORALITY It is characteristic of those sharing the point of view of Pro- fessor Hart that their primary concern is to preserve the integrity of the concept of law. Accordingly, they have generally sought a precise definition of law, but have not been at pains to state just what it is they mean to exclude by their definitions. They are like men building a wall for the defense of a village, who must know what it is they wish to protect but who need not and indeed cannot, know what invading forces those walls may have to turn When Austin and Gray distinguish law from morality, the word"morality"stands indiscriminately for almost every con ceivable standard by which human conduct may be judged that is not itself law. The inner voice of conscience notions of right and wrong based on religious belief, common conceptions of de- cency and fair play, culturally conditioned prejudices-all of these are grouped together under the heading of "morality"and are excluded from the domain of law. For the most part Professor Hart follows in the tradition of his predecessors. When he speak of morality he seems generally to have in mind all sorts of extra- legal notions about "what ought to be, regardless of their sources pretensions, or intrinsic worth. This is particularly apparent in treatment of the problem of interpretation, where uncodified notions of what ought to be are viewed as affecting only the penumbra of law, leaving its hard core untouched Toward the end of the essay, however, Professor Hart's argu ment takes a turn that seems to depart from the prevailing tenor of his thought. This consists in reminding us that there is such a thing as an immoral morality and that there are many standards of "what ought to bethat can hardly be called moral. Let us grant, he says, that the judge may properly and inevitably leg late in the penumbra of a legal enactment, and that this legisla- tion(in default of any other standard)must be guided by the judge's notions of what ought to be. Still, this would be true even in a society devoted to the most evil ends, where the judge would 4 Hart, supra note 2, at 624.FIDELITY TO LAW he seeks he will have to concern himself more closely with a definition of law that will make meaningful the obligation of fidelity to law. II. THE DEFINITION OF MORALITY It is characteristic of those sharing the point of view of Pro￾fessor Hart that their primary concern is to preserve the integrity of the concept of law. Accordingly, they have generally sought a precise definition of law, but have not been at pains to state just what it is they mean to exclude by their definitions. They are like men building a wall for the defense of a village, who must know what it is they wish to protect, but who need not, and indeed cannot, know what invading forces those walls may have to turn back. When Austin and Gray distinguish law from morality, the word "morality" stands indiscriminately for almost every con￾ceivable standard by which human conduct may be judged that is not itself law. The inner voice of conscience, notions of right and wrong based on religious belief, common conceptions of de￾cency and fair play, culturally conditioned prejudices -all of these are grouped together under the heading of "morality" and are excluded from the domain of law. For the most part Professor Hart follows in the tradition of his predecessors. When he speaks of morality he seems generally to have in mind all sorts of extra￾legal notions about "what ought to be," regardless of their sources, pretensions, or intrinsic worth. This is particularly apparent in his treatment of the problem of interpretation, where uncodified notions of what ought to be are viewed as affecting only the penumbra of law, leaving its hard core untouched. Toward the end of the essay, however, Professor Hart's argu￾ment takes a turn that seems to depart from the prevailing tenor of his thought. This consists in reminding us that there is such a thing as an immoral morality and that there are many standards of "what ought to be" that can hardly be called moral.4 Let us grant, he says, that the judge may properly and inevitably legis￾late in the penumbra of a legal enactment, and that this legisla￾tion (in default of any other standard) must be guided by the judge's notions of what ought to be. Still, this would be true even in a society devoted to the most evil ends, where the judge would 4 Hart, supra note 2, at 624. 1958] 635