Power Transition and China-US Conflicts 41 disagreement with preferences,in coordination with parity,leads to war and peace.10 This leads us to the final unexpected implication of the graphic that informs our political strategy.At the bottom left corner,Figure I accounts for the process of integration.Integration is the most important new phenomenon emerging since World War II.A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that this process is most likely in a post-overtaking asymmetric period.Deutsch et al.independently observed such a pattern in 1957.They indicated that integration did not take place when nations were at parity. Rather,integration occurred around 'cores of strength'where a dominant nation provided the nucleus'for integration. A hierarchy dominated by a preponderant nation imposes high costs for conflict on smaller challengers and reduces costs for integration This produces a bias towards stability.The dominant power desires to maintain the status quo.As Keohane correctly infers,preponderant powers have the ability to absorb the costs of integration and allow smaller nations to 'free ride'because their actions are consistent with stable economic growth.2 In a uniform hierarchy(Figure 2),the probability of conflict and escalation to severe war increases,while prospects for integrations are reduced.No single party is willing to carry the burden of integration,and concurrently each member of the hierarchy is able to enhance individual growth by avoiding the costs of the collective good.Thus,rather than supporting trade opportunities that lead to expansion among all,large nations that can affect the market price of goods impose tariffs in a selfish attempt to advance their own growth.3 Policy Implications The internal mobilization of resources,and effective alliance formation or neutralization,can be manipulated in response to policy changes.A reliable strategic perspective is needed to make choices in world politics,particularly for the United States,as key decisions can sway the balance in favour of either global stability or instability. 10 John Mearsheimer.The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,(New York:W.Norton,2001). Karl Deutsch et al.,Political Community and the North Atlantic Area(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1957).pp.28-38.Such arguments are also constant with expectations of Black's median voter theorem where a dominant party should prompt smaller organizations to join a large winning coaltion. 12 Robert Keohane.After Hegemony (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1984). Feng Yi.Democracy.Governance,and Economic Performance:Theory.Data Analysis.and Case Studies (Boston:MIT Press,2003). Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55disagreement with preferences, in coordination with parity, leads to war and peace.10 This leads us to the final unexpected implication of the graphic that informs our political strategy. At the bottom left corner, Figure 1 accounts for the process of integration. Integration is the most important new phenomenon emerging since World War II. A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that this process is most likely in a post-overtaking asymmetric period. Deutsch et al. independently observed such a pattern in 1957. They indicated that integration did not take place when nations were at parity. Rather, integration occurred around ‘cores of strength’ where a dominant nation provided the ‘nucleus’ for integration.11 A hierarchy dominated by a preponderant nation imposes high costs for conflict on smaller challengers and reduces costs for integration. This produces a bias towards stability. The dominant power desires to maintain the status quo. As Keohane correctly infers, preponderant powers have the ability to absorb the costs of integration and allow smaller nations to ‘free ride’ because their actions are consistent with stable economic growth.12 In a uniform hierarchy (Figure 2), the probability of conflict and escalation to severe war increases, while prospects for integrations are reduced. No single party is willing to carry the burden of integration, and concurrently each member of the hierarchy is able to enhance individual growth by avoiding the costs of the collective good. Thus, rather than supporting trade opportunities that lead to expansion among all, large nations that can affect the market price of goods impose tariffs in a selfish attempt to advance their own growth.13 Policy Implications The internal mobilization of resources, and effective alliance formation or neutralization, can be manipulated in response to policy changes. A reliable strategic perspective is needed to make choices in world politics, particularly for the United States, as key decisions can sway the balance in favour of either global stability or instability. 10 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. Norton, 2001). 11 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 28–38. Such arguments are also constant with expectations of Black’s median voter theorem where a dominant party should prompt smaller organizations to join a large winning coaltion. 12 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 13 Feng Yi, Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: Theory, Data Analysis, and Case Studies (Boston: MIT Press, 2003). Power Transition and China–US Conflicts 41 Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55