50 PART ONE THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK CHAPTER 3*LIMITED GOVERNMENT:PRESERVING LIBERTY 51 Finally,the Framers made it difficult for those in power to change the could enact laws ruinous to other interests.A better system of divided Constitution and thereby increase their lawful authority.An amendment can be government is one in which authority is allocated in such a way that no proposed only by a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress or in a institution can do much on its own.In this situation,political power can be national constitutional convention called by the legislatures of two-thirds of the exercised only when institutions cooperate.Since the probability is small that states.Such a proposal must then be ratified by three-fourths of the state any one faction can gain control over all institutions,factions have to work legislatures or by three-fourths of the states in a special national convention together,a process that requires each to moderate its demands and thus serves before it can become part of the Constitution. many interests rather than one or a few. USING POWER TO OFFSET POWER SEPARATED INSTITUTIONS SHARING POWER: The al powers. The Framers believed that political power could not be controlled if it were CHECKS AND BALANCES legislative,executive,and judiciar,i诉thesamehand感s, concentrated in one institution."The accumulation of all powers,legislative, The Framers'concept of divided powers has been described by Richard executive,and judiciary,in the same hands,whether of one,a few,or many,and 机y be justly promownced the Neustadt as the principle of separated institutions sharing power.The pery definition of fyranny. whether hereditary,self-appointed,or elective,"Madison claimed,"may be separate branches are interlocked in such a way that an elaborate system of James Madison,Federalist justly pronounced the very definition of tyranny.Locke,too,had wamed checks and balances is created(see Figure 3-1).No institution can act decisively No.47 against concentrated political power,arguing that those who make the laws without the support or acquiescence of the other institutions.Madison ex- should not also be allowed to enforce them.In 1748 the French theorist plained in Federlist No.48 that "unless these departments be so far connected Montesquieu enlarged this idea into a concept of separated powers,contending and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others,the that liberty depended on a precise division of executive and legislative degree of separation which the maxim requires,as essential to a free govern- authority. ment,can never in practice be duly maintained."Thus legislative,executive Montesquieu's principle was widely accepted in America,and when the states and judicial power in the American system came to be divided in such a way that drafted new constitutions after the start of the Revolutionary War,they built they overlap;each of the three branches of government checks the others' their governments around a separation of powers.Pennsylvania was an powers and balances those powers with powers of its own. exception,and its experience only seemed to prove the necessity of separated powers.Unrestrained by an independent judiciary or executive,Pennsylvania's all-powerful legislature systematically deprived minority groups of their basic Shared Legislative Powers rights and freedoms:Quakers were disenfranchised for their religious beliefs, Under the Constitution,Congress has legislative authority,but that power is conscientious objectors to the Revolutionary War were prosecuted,and the right partly shared with the other branches and thus checked by them.The president of trial by jury was eliminated. can veto acts of Congress,recommend legislation,and call special sessions of In Fedemlist No.10,Madison asked why popular goverments often act according to the interests of overbearing majorities rather than according to See Federallst Nos 47 and 48. principles of justice.He found the cause in"the mischiefs of faction."People,he argued,are divided into opposing religious,geographical,ethnic,economic, and other factions.These divisions are not only natural in society but also desirable,in that free people have a right to their personal opinions and interests.Yet factions can themselves be a source of oppressive goverment.The STATES道OMRs threat,Madison noted,arises from"a minority or majority,actuated by interest Checks and Balantes adverse to the rights of others or to the permanent or aggregate interests of the The U.S.c community.If such a majority or minority faction gains full power,it will use ework rests on an Sepsration of fudiciel government to advance itself at the expense of all others. elsborate system af checks Country Powers? and balances that is designed Out of concern for this possibility came the Framers'special contribution to to limit and coatrol the uses Beigium 00 No the doctrine of the separation of powers.They did not believe that it would be of polibical pover.The enough,as Montesquieu had suggested,to divide the government's authority system is based on a divisar strictly atong institutional lines,granting all legislative power to the legislature, 海南南 all judteial power to the courts,and all executive power to the presidency.This judidal beanches,but it also Tealy fofal separation would make if too easy for a single faction to exploit a particular 每 includes jadicial review-the Japan No kind of political power.A faction that controlled the legislature,for example, power of the courts to Merco In theary anly invalidate actions of the United States 专 Yes Federalis No.47. egislature or executive.These West Germany