1 In Samuel Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu,eds.,Li Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization LI HONGZHANG'S USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD,1862-1874 Richard J.Smith Rice University No high-ranking official in nineteenth century China had more direct and sustained contact with foreigners than Li Hongzhang.Even the most cursory glance at his memorials,letters,and telegraph messages for the period from 1862 to 1901 reveals that Americans and Europeans loomed large in Li's world of discourse,both official and private.In part,of course,Li's preoccupation with Westerners can be explained by the simple fact of imperialist expansion into Asia during the late Qing period;from the 1840s onward,Chinese officials found it increasingly difficult,if not impossible,to ignore the unsettling presence of foreigners in the Middle Kingdom.But not all Qing bureaucrats responded to the West in the same way,just as not all Westerners reponded to Qing officials in the same way.The salient feature of Li's approach was his Janus-like effort to build up China's wealth and power by using the scientific and technological skills of Westerners,yet all the while working to eliminate dependence upon them--or as he put it, to learn Western methods "without always having to use their men."[1]What were the origins of Li's strategy of "barbarian management?"How did his early experiences with foreigners affect his outlook?And how successful was he in the pursuit of his twin goals? The employment of foreigners was,of course,nothing new in Chinese history.By the mid-nineteenth century,Chinese policymakers could look back on more than two thousand years of precedent in the use of "barbarians"for civil and military purposes.In the early Qing period this tradition included the appointment of Jesuit missionaries as civil officials in the Imperial Board of Astronomy (Qintian jian),the incorporation of Russian soldiers into the dynasty's elite Banner forces,the employment of Dutch troops as "allies"against Zheng Chenggong(Koxinga),and the periodic use of individual Westerners as mercenaries and military technicians in the Opium War era.[2]But China's mid-nineteenth century circumstances were unique in at least two fundamental ways.First,imperialism gave Westerners political and economic power in China vastly disproportunate to their numbers;and secondly,Americans and Europeans had far more to offer China technologically,and perhaps even culturally,than any barbarians in the past. When Li Hongzhang became acting governor of Jiangsu province in April of 1862,it did not take him long to realize both things.The problem was what to do about the situation.In a sense,Li had few choices.The location and timing of his appointment placed him inescapably in the vortex of Sino-foreign relations at the provincial level.As the Taiping Rebellion raged seemingly out of control,the throne and local officials had already acted to secure Western assistance against the rebels.In 1860 the foreign powers defended Shanghai against the Taiping forces of Li Xiucheng,although they simultaneously conducted military operations against the Qing in order to secure compliance with the Treaty of Tianjin(1858).During 1860-1861,negotiations began for the purchase of Western ships and guns,as well as the formal and informal employment of foreign military and naval personnel.By early 1862,not only had the Qing central1 In Samuel Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., Li Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization LI HONGZHANG'S USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD, 1862-1874 Richard J. Smith Rice University No high-ranking official in nineteenth century China had more direct and sustained contact with foreigners than Li Hongzhang. Even the most cursory glance at his memorials, letters, and telegraph messages for the period from 1862 to 1901 reveals that Americans and Europeans loomed large in Li's world of discourse, both official and private. In part, of course, Li's preoccupation with Westerners can be explained by the simple fact of imperialist expansion into Asia during the late Qing period; from the 1840s onward, Chinese officials found it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to ignore the unsettling presence of foreigners in the Middle Kingdom. But not all Qing bureaucrats responded to the West in the same way, just as not all Westerners reponded to Qing officials in the same way. The salient feature of Li's approach was his Janus-like effort to build up China's wealth and power by using the scientific and technological skills of Westerners, yet all the while working to eliminate dependence upon them--or as he put it, to learn Western methods "without always having to use their men." [1] What were the origins of Li's strategy of "barbarian management?" How did his early experiences with foreigners affect his outlook? And how successful was he in the pursuit of his twin goals? The employment of foreigners was, of course, nothing new in Chinese history. By the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese policymakers could look back on more than two thousand years of precedent in the use of "barbarians" for civil and military purposes. In the early Qing period this tradition included the appointment of Jesuit missionaries as civil officials in the Imperial Board of Astronomy (Qintian jian), the incorporation of Russian soldiers into the dynasty's elite Banner forces, the employment of Dutch troops as "allies" against Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), and the periodic use of individual Westerners as mercenaries and military technicians in the Opium War era. [2] But China's mid-nineteenth century circumstances were unique in at least two fundamental ways. First, imperialism gave Westerners political and economic power in China vastly disproportunate to their numbers; and secondly, Americans and Europeans had far more to offer China technologically, and perhaps even culturally, than any barbarians in the past. When Li Hongzhang became acting governor of Jiangsu province in April of 1862, it did not take him long to realize both things. The problem was what to do about the situation. In a sense, Li had few choices. The location and timing of his appointment placed him inescapably in the vortex of Sino-foreign relations at the provincial level. As the Taiping Rebellion raged seemingly out of control, the throne and local officials had already acted to secure Western assistance against the rebels. In 1860 the foreign powers defended Shanghai against the Taiping forces of Li Xiucheng, although they simultaneously conducted military operations against the Qing in order to secure compliance with the Treaty of Tianjin (1858). During 1860-1861, negotiations began for the purchase of Western ships and guns, as well as the formal and informal employment of foreign military and naval personnel. By early 1862, not only had the Qing central