Daniel M.Butler and Hans J.G.Hassell priorities are reflected in governments'priorities icy success often relies on individuals'willingness to (Druckman and Jacobs 2015). take political action in support of the cause.Political In addition.numerous studies have shown that non- leadership requires successfully encouraging others to elected political actors,specifically the media and in- act on a specific agenda.For these reasons,we also terest groups,can affect citizens'priorities and increase look at the effect of officials'communication on con- the salience of issues on the public agenda (Iyengar and stituents'actions. Kinder 1987:King.Schneer.and White 2017:Kiousis A stated priority is not the same as a public action. and McCombs 2004;McComb and Shaw 1972) and opinions often do not conform with actions taken On the other hand,prior studies have focused on either privately (Berinsky 2004)or publicly (LaPiere political elites'ability to change the opinions of the 1934).Studies have shown that individuals are willing general public,rather than the politically active con- to lie or decline to respond when they know their views stituents that officials reach with their messaging. are not perceived as socially acceptable(Berinsky 1999, Although the general public is largely inattentive to po- 2004:Schuman and Presser 1980:Vogel and Ardoin litical affairs,and thus susceptible to persuasion,politi- 2008).It is possible that pressure from politicians may cally involved constituents are more likely to be knowl- change publicly stated priorities without changing un- edgeable about politics and to have priorities that are derlying motivations to participate and engage on an harder to move (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013:Kros- issue. nick 1990;Zaller 1992).While previous studies have Furthermore,communication from public officials shown that even the most informed voters are still in- might be self-undermining by encouraging compla- 元 fluenced by elite communication on single issues,the cency as constituents perceive that the issue is already effect "is swamped by the average absolute effect of being handled (Levine 2015).There is some evidence exposing subjects to details about...policy"(Bullock that descriptions of others taking action or past success 2011,500).The effect may be even further reduced reduces participation relative to information that com- when trying to change priorities (rather than opin- municates a lack of action on the issue (Hassell and ions)that are often already informed by a wealth of Wyler 2018;Levine and Kam 2017).7 knowledge.Thus,while there is evidence that political elites can change voters'opinions,these previous stud- ies have not examined constituents'priorities and have RESEARCH DESIGN not focused on those individuals that politicians typi- We test local officials'ability to affect issue salience and cally reach with their messaging. to encourage participation on an issue by conducting Moreover,there is evidence that attempts to per- embedded field experiments(Foos and John 2018;Foos suade knowledgeable individuals with well-formed and de Rooij 2017b)in collaboration with city officials opinions may prompt a negative backlash (Brehm from four cities across the United States.s The officials 1966;Brehm and Brehm 1981).5 This theory of psy- who worked with us on the study had earlier expressed chological reactance holds that individuals react nega- interest in helping with a research project after they tively to persuasive information when individuals per- had taken a survey administered by one of the authors.? ceive their self-determination about what priorities to Table 1 provides information about the officials and hold and what actions to take being threatened.This the cities they serve in.Two of the officials came from S5.501g perception of threat to self-determination is likely to relatively small towns(with populations under 20,000), be stronger among those with well-formulated opin- another from a mid-sized suburb with a population of ions and priorities.When others try to persuade these about 30,000,and the last a city of over 100,000 that is individuals,this theory holds that they often embrace a key part of a metropolitan area in the Midwest.The the attitude threatened by the attempt at persuasion officials also were diverse in other ways (see Table 1). (Brehm 1966).As such,attempts by public officials to For example,two of the officials were women.while encourage constituents with higher levels of knowl- edge to place more priority on certain issues may cause effects on opinion and behavior that are opposite to 7 Levine and Kam(2017)find that messages that hint at future ac- what was intended (Dillard and Shen 2005:Ringold tion,as opposed to retrospective action,are not self-undermining 2002) However,the messages they test imply the need for support to ac- complish those goals and they come from interest groups rather than elected officials.Elected officials,unlike interest groups,can directly CHANGING PRIORITIES AND take action to change policies.Because public officials are differ eys ENCOURAGING POLITICAL ACTION ent from other political elites,we might expect constituents to react differently to communication from officials than to communication Changing the political agenda alone does not remove rom other political actors many of the barriers to policy outcomes.Achieving pol- The field experiments were approved by the IRB at Washington University in St.Louis. 9 They were around 50 officials who had taken the earlier survey and 6 Recent work by Guess and Coppock (2016)finds that there is no expressed interest in helping with academic research generally (with. backlash among the general public when they are presented with fac- out expressing interest in a specific project).For this experiment,we tual information about a topic.However,their experiments (1)look invited all of them to collaborate with us.We first made the invita- at a general population rather than a sample of politically knowl- tions via email and talked by phone with those who expressed some edgeable and interested individuals and(2)present factual informa- initial interest.Ultimately,only these four officials could collaborate tion rather than information from a source that may have ulterior A few others were no longer serving and the majority who responded motives (such as a publicly elected official). said they were too busy to help at the time. 862Daniel M. Butler and Hans J.G. Hassell priorities are reflected in governments’ priorities (Druckman and Jacobs 2015). In addition, numerous studies have shown that non￾elected political actors, specifically the media and in￾terest groups, can affect citizens’ priorities and increase the salience of issues on the public agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; King, Schneer, and White 2017; Kiousis and McCombs 2004; McComb and Shaw 1972) On the other hand, prior studies have focused on political elites’ ability to change the opinions of the general public, rather than the politically active con￾stituents that officials reach with their messaging. Although the general public is largely inattentive to po￾litical affairs, and thus susceptible to persuasion, politi￾cally involved constituents are more likely to be knowl￾edgeable about politics and to have priorities that are harder to move (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; Kros￾nick 1990; Zaller 1992). While previous studies have shown that even the most informed voters are still in￾fluenced by elite communication on single issues, the effect “is swamped by the average absolute effect of exposing subjects to details about…policy” (Bullock 2011, 500). The effect may be even further reduced when trying to change priorities (rather than opin￾ions) that are often already informed by a wealth of knowledge. Thus, while there is evidence that political elites can change voters’ opinions, these previous stud￾ies have not examined constituents’ priorities and have not focused on those individuals that politicians typi￾cally reach with their messaging. Moreover, there is evidence that attempts to per￾suade knowledgeable individuals with well-formed opinions may prompt a negative backlash (Brehm 1966; Brehm and Brehm 1981).6 This theory of psy￾chological reactance holds that individuals react nega￾tively to persuasive information when individuals per￾ceive their self-determination about what priorities to hold and what actions to take being threatened. This perception of threat to self-determination is likely to be stronger among those with well-formulated opin￾ions and priorities. When others try to persuade these individuals, this theory holds that they often embrace the attitude threatened by the attempt at persuasion (Brehm 1966). As such, attempts by public officials to encourage constituents with higher levels of knowl￾edge to place more priority on certain issues may cause effects on opinion and behavior that are opposite to what was intended (Dillard and Shen 2005; Ringold 2002). CHANGING PRIORITIES AND ENCOURAGING POLITICAL ACTION Changing the political agenda alone does not remove many of the barriers to policy outcomes.Achieving pol- 6 Recent work by Guess and Coppock (2016) finds that there is no backlash among the general public when they are presented with fac￾tual information about a topic. However, their experiments (1) look at a general population rather than a sample of politically knowl￾edgeable and interested individuals and (2) present factual informa￾tion rather than information from a source that may have ulterior motives (such as a publicly elected official). icy success often relies on individuals’ willingness to take political action in support of the cause. Political leadership requires successfully encouraging others to act on a specific agenda. For these reasons, we also look at the effect of officials’ communication on con￾stituents’ actions. A stated priority is not the same as a public action, and opinions often do not conform with actions taken either privately (Berinsky 2004) or publicly (LaPiere 1934). Studies have shown that individuals are willing to lie or decline to respond when they know their views are not perceived as socially acceptable (Berinsky 1999, 2004; Schuman and Presser 1980; Vogel and Ardoin 2008). It is possible that pressure from politicians may change publicly stated priorities without changing un￾derlying motivations to participate and engage on an issue. Furthermore, communication from public officials might be self-undermining by encouraging compla￾cency as constituents perceive that the issue is already being handled (Levine 2015). There is some evidence that descriptions of others taking action or past success reduces participation relative to information that com￾municates a lack of action on the issue (Hassell and Wyler 2018; Levine and Kam 2017).7 RESEARCH DESIGN We test local officials’ ability to affect issue salience and to encourage participation on an issue by conducting embedded field experiments (Foos and John 2018;Foos and de Rooij 2017b) in collaboration with city officials from four cities across the United States.8 The officials who worked with us on the study had earlier expressed interest in helping with a research project after they had taken a survey administered by one of the authors.9 Table 1 provides information about the officials and the cities they serve in. Two of the officials came from relatively small towns (with populations under 20,000), another from a mid-sized suburb with a population of about 30,000, and the last a city of over 100,000 that is a key part of a metropolitan area in the Midwest. The officials also were diverse in other ways (see Table 1). For example, two of the officials were women, while 7 Levine and Kam (2017) find that messages that hint at future ac￾tion, as opposed to retrospective action, are not self-undermining. However, the messages they test imply the need for support to ac￾complish those goals and they come from interest groups rather than elected officials. Elected officials, unlike interest groups, can directly take action to change policies. Because public officials are differ￾ent from other political elites, we might expect constituents to react differently to communication from officials than to communication from other political actors. 8 The field experiments were approved by the IRB at Washington University in St. Louis. 9 They were around 50 officials who had taken the earlier survey and expressed interest in helping with academic research generally (with￾out expressing interest in a specific project). For this experiment, we invited all of them to collaborate with us. We first made the invita￾tions via email and talked by phone with those who expressed some initial interest. Ultimately, only these four officials could collaborate. A few others were no longer serving and the majority who responded said they were too busy to help at the time. 862 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000473