On the Limits of Officials'Ability to Change Citizens'Priorities On the other hand.there are also reasons to believe reduce the participation that public officials want from that public officials'communication with constituents constituents (Levine 2015). may not change their priorities.Agenda setting by We study how elected officials'messages influence elected officials may work differently than agenda set- constituents'priorities and actions by collaborating ting by other elites who are not necessarily in a position with elected officials in four different municipalities to to directly affect policy and whose messages reach a dif- conduct a field experiment.In the experiment,the part- ferent audience.One reason elite communication may nering officials sent out email messages to constituents not affect constituent priorities and action is that pub on their distribution lists.We had the partnering of- lic officials communicate most often with constituents ficials send messages to individuals who already sup- who likely already hold well formulated opinions.The ported the issue but who had indicated that the issue citizens that public officials can most easily reach often was lower on the political agenda.We surveyed these have intentionally opted to receive updates and infor- individuals one to two months before the message went mation from their representatives.They are likely to out and again the week after the official sent the mes- already be well-informed.People who have well formu- sage to test how these citizens responded to the mes- lated opinions and who traditionally follow politics are sage from their city official. less likely to be affected by the messages they receive The key aspect of the experiment is that half of the (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013:Krosnick 1990:Zaller residents received messages where the official advo- 1992).3 These individuals are also likely to be strong cated that a given issue should be placed higher on policy demanders whose principles and priorities are the political agenda,while the other half received a harder to change(Bawn et al.2012;Fenno 1978;Kros- placebo email (i.e.,an email that did not advocate for nick 1990:Masket 2009).In short,previous research the importance of an issue but was otherwise similar) showing that politicians can change constituents'opin- We included the placebo email (as opposed to a control ions may not extend to the influence of public officials group that received nothing)to carry out a placebo de- on the coalitions to which they have the most direct sign (Nickerson 2005).We could carry out a placebo 4r元 access. design because we tracked who opened the emails that In addition,even if public officials can change the the official sent.This allows us to compare the peo- political agendas of those they communicate with,we ple who were actually treated (because they opened have reason to doubt that these changes have any up the email)to the individuals in the placebo control meaningful influence on political actions.Holding group who also opened up their email.To be clear,our public opinions and using those public opinions in the sample is not representative of voters.We intentionally ballot booth are not the only way that citizens influence study the effect of officials'communication on those political outcomes(Bergan 2009:Kam and Zechmeis with whom they most frequently communicate. ter 2013).Politicians must often rely on the willingness Our experiment finds that public officials'messages of individuals or groups to become involved on a par- did not,on average,change the political agenda and ticular issue to achieve their policy goals (Schlozman priorities of the citizens they contacted.If anything. 1984).Given the reliance of political elites on the in the public officials'messaging decreased the likelihood volvement of other groups,can public officials'efforts that individuals thought the issue should be a priority to change priorities affect constituents'actions in sup- and caused citizens to be less likely to act when invited port of a policy priority? to sign a petition on the issue.5 In some cases,public officials'communication about their priorities may actually decrease the willingness THE EFFECTS OF ELECTED OFFICIAL of individuals to participate through self-undermining rhetoric(Levine 2015;Levine and Kline 2017).In gen- COMMUNICATION ON POLITICAL AGENDAS eral,actions motivated by purposive goals may actually There are competing expectations about elected of- be depressed by information about the actions that oth- ficials'ability to change their constituents'priorities. ers have taken(Hassell and Wyler 2018:Mutz 1995).In On one hand,many individuals'opinions appear to formation about officials'actions and priorities might be malleable.Rather than citizens using their policy be particularly impactful because officials are able to opinions to influence representatives,many analyses do something about the issue.If individuals recognize conclude that politicians,especially those who share that a public official with political influence is inter- a party identity,shape voters'opinions (Broockman ested in the agenda item,an individual may rational- and Butler 2016;Bullock 2011).Previous research on 四 ize that his or her action is not necessary because the politicians'ability to shape opinion has largely focused issue will be handled by the government.Thus,com on the constituent's positions,yet the quality of rep- munication from public officials about their issue pri- resentation also depends on how well constituents' orities may contain self-undermining components that While,as we note below,our study is slightly underpowered,it pro- These individuals may actually be more likely to have a negative vides strong evidence against the idea that public officials can change reaction to persuasive information and to be more likely to engage their constituents'priorities.While the lack of power reduces our in motivated reasoning (Brehm and Brehm 1981;Redlawsk 2002) ability to draw stronger conclusions about the backlash,our findings 士 Moreover,political outcomes,especially outcomes at the local are consistent with other research that has found a self-undermining level,are not determined solely on the basis of public opinion(Anzia effect of certain types of communication from political elites (Levine and Meeks 2016;Oliver 2012;Peterson 1981). 2015). 861On the Limits of Officials’ Ability to Change Citizens’ Priorities On the other hand, there are also reasons to believe that public officials’ communication with constituents may not change their priorities. Agenda setting by elected officials may work differently than agenda set￾ting by other elites who are not necessarily in a position to directly affect policy and whose messages reach a dif￾ferent audience. One reason elite communication may not affect constituent priorities and action is that pub￾lic officials communicate most often with constituents who likely already hold well formulated opinions. The citizens that public officials can most easily reach often have intentionally opted to receive updates and infor￾mation from their representatives. They are likely to already be well-informed.People who have well formu￾lated opinions and who traditionally follow politics are less likely to be affected by the messages they receive (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; Krosnick 1990; Zaller 1992).3 These individuals are also likely to be strong policy demanders whose principles and priorities are harder to change (Bawn et al. 2012; Fenno 1978; Kros￾nick 1990; Masket 2009). In short, previous research showing that politicians can change constituents’ opin￾ions may not extend to the influence of public officials on the coalitions to which they have the most direct access. In addition, even if public officials can change the political agendas of those they communicate with, we have reason to doubt that these changes have any meaningful influence on political actions.4 Holding public opinions and using those public opinions in the ballot booth are not the only way that citizens influence political outcomes (Bergan 2009; Kam and Zechmeis￾ter 2013). Politicians must often rely on the willingness of individuals or groups to become involved on a par￾ticular issue to achieve their policy goals (Schlozman 1984). Given the reliance of political elites on the in￾volvement of other groups, can public officials’ efforts to change priorities affect constituents’ actions in sup￾port of a policy priority? In some cases, public officials’ communication about their priorities may actually decrease the willingness of individuals to participate through self-undermining rhetoric (Levine 2015; Levine and Kline 2017). In gen￾eral, actions motivated by purposive goals may actually be depressed by information about the actions that oth￾ers have taken (Hassell and Wyler 2018;Mutz 1995). In￾formation about officials’ actions and priorities might be particularly impactful because officials are able to do something about the issue. If individuals recognize that a public official with political influence is inter￾ested in the agenda item, an individual may rational￾ize that his or her action is not necessary because the issue will be handled by the government. Thus, com￾munication from public officials about their issue pri￾orities may contain self-undermining components that 3 These individuals may actually be more likely to have a negative reaction to persuasive information and to be more likely to engage in motivated reasoning (Brehm and Brehm 1981; Redlawsk 2002) 4 Moreover, political outcomes, especially outcomes at the local level, are not determined solely on the basis of public opinion (Anzia and Meeks 2016; Oliver 2012; Peterson 1981). reduce the participation that public officials want from constituents (Levine 2015). We study how elected officials’ messages influence constituents’ priorities and actions by collaborating with elected officials in four different municipalities to conduct a field experiment. In the experiment, the part￾nering officials sent out email messages to constituents on their distribution lists. We had the partnering of￾ficials send messages to individuals who already sup￾ported the issue but who had indicated that the issue was lower on the political agenda. We surveyed these individuals one to two months before the message went out and again the week after the official sent the mes￾sage to test how these citizens responded to the mes￾sage from their city official. The key aspect of the experiment is that half of the residents received messages where the official advo￾cated that a given issue should be placed higher on the political agenda, while the other half received a placebo email (i.e., an email that did not advocate for the importance of an issue but was otherwise similar). We included the placebo email (as opposed to a control group that received nothing) to carry out a placebo de￾sign (Nickerson 2005). We could carry out a placebo design because we tracked who opened the emails that the official sent. This allows us to compare the peo￾ple who were actually treated (because they opened up the email) to the individuals in the placebo control group who also opened up their email. To be clear, our sample is not representative of voters.We intentionally study the effect of officials’ communication on those with whom they most frequently communicate. Our experiment finds that public officials’ messages did not, on average, change the political agenda and priorities of the citizens they contacted. If anything, the public officials’ messaging decreased the likelihood that individuals thought the issue should be a priority and caused citizens to be less likely to act when invited to sign a petition on the issue.5 THE EFFECTS OF ELECTED OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION ON POLITICAL AGENDAS There are competing expectations about elected of￾ficials’ ability to change their constituents’ priorities. On one hand, many individuals’ opinions appear to be malleable. Rather than citizens using their policy opinions to influence representatives, many analyses conclude that politicians, especially those who share a party identity, shape voters’ opinions (Broockman and Butler 2016; Bullock 2011). Previous research on politicians’ ability to shape opinion has largely focused on the constituent’s positions, yet the quality of rep￾resentation also depends on how well constituents’ 5 While, as we note below, our study is slightly underpowered, it pro￾vides strong evidence against the idea that public officials can change their constituents’ priorities. While the lack of power reduces our ability to draw stronger conclusions about the backlash, our findings are consistent with other research that has found a self-undermining effect of certain types of communication from political elites (Levine 2015). 861 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000473