Googling the WTO 637 Expectations:The Case of Trade Violations Treaty-making models in a range of issue areas,from international trade and human rights to the environment,rest on a common set of assumptions about individual behavior.I test these assumptions in the issue area of trade for three reasons.First, trade constitutes a harder test of the models'assumptions:it appears more plausi- ble that constituents will react forcefully to news of a government's violation of human rights agreements,or of an environmental treaty,than a trade agreement. This is because trade agreements tend to be more technical in nature,and because violations of trade agreements have a less immediate impact on the daily life of constituents than water pollution or a regime torturing members of the opposition. Second,trade is contained within a highly coherent regime,with a single multilat- eral organization,the WTO.As a result,the great majority of violation claims will come through a single institution,and there is less need to account for the relative importance of alternative forums.35 By comparison,there are dozens of multilat- eral human rights agreements,varying in their degree of success,membership, and exact issues covered;the environmental regime looks much the same.Finally, trade allows one to separate normative and material objections to noncompliance in a way that would be impractical in other issue areas. The WTO is a decentralized enforcement institution-it does not pursue viola- tions itself,but merely provides information about possible noncompliance,through devices such as Trade Policy Reviews(TPRs),and precise tariff schedules outlin- ing every member's commitments.36 It is up to other members to pursue pur- ported violations of the rules by filing for consultations with the member at issue, the necessary first step to any WTO dispute.Every such filing is immediately made public,to both the WTO membership and domestic audiences.Most cases are set- tled before reaching a verdict,usually with concessions by the defendant.37 Cases that do make it to a verdict exhibit a pro-complainant bias,owing to the selection effect both in the filing of cases and in the escalation to litigation.In other words, because of the costs involved in filing,and the resulting process of selection,a majority of cases filed ostensibly represent some form of actual rule violation. Taken together,this reasoning leads to the following expectations.My first hypothesis is also the simplest.If constituents truly react to signals from the WTO about possible violations by their government,as presumed by treaty-making models such as in Mansfield,Milner and Rosendorff,38 one should be able to observe an increase in the number of WTO-related web searches following such announcements: 35.There is a growing number of regional trade agreements,but for the most part,these delegate dispute settlement to the WTO. 36.Pelc2011b. 37.Busch and Reinhardt 2001. 38.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002.Expectations: The Case of Trade Violations Treaty-making models in a range of issue areas, from international trade and human rights to the environment, rest on a common set of assumptions about individual behavior+ I test these assumptions in the issue area of trade for three reasons+ First, trade constitutes a harder test of the models’ assumptions: it appears more plausi￾ble that constituents will react forcefully to news of a government’s violation of human rights agreements, or of an environmental treaty, than a trade agreement+ This is because trade agreements tend to be more technical in nature, and because violations of trade agreements have a less immediate impact on the daily life of constituents than water pollution or a regime torturing members of the opposition+ Second, trade is contained within a highly coherent regime, with a single multilat￾eral organization, the WTO+ As a result, the great majority of violation claims will come through a single institution, and there is less need to account for the relative importance of alternative forums+ 35 By comparison, there are dozens of multilat￾eral human rights agreements, varying in their degree of success, membership, and exact issues covered; the environmental regime looks much the same+ Finally, trade allows one to separate normative and material objections to noncompliance in a way that would be impractical in other issue areas+ The WTO is a decentralized enforcement institution—it does not pursue viola￾tions itself, but merely provides information about possible noncompliance, through devices such as Trade Policy Reviews ~TPRs!, and precise tariff schedules outlin￾ing every member’s commitments+ 36 It is up to other members to pursue pur￾ported violations of the rules by filing for consultations with the member at issue, the necessary first step to any WTO dispute+ Every such filing is immediately made public, to both the WTO membership and domestic audiences+ Most cases are set￾tled before reaching a verdict, usually with concessions by the defendant+ 37 Cases that do make it to a verdict exhibit a pro-complainant bias, owing to the selection effect both in the filing of cases and in the escalation to litigation+ In other words, because of the costs involved in filing, and the resulting process of selection, a majority of cases filed ostensibly represent some form of actual rule violation+ Taken together, this reasoning leads to the following expectations+ My first hypothesis is also the simplest+ If constituents truly react to signals from the WTO about possible violations by their government, as presumed by treaty-making models such as in Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 38 one should be able to observe an increase in the number of WTO-related web searches following such announcements: 35+ There is a growing number of regional trade agreements, but for the most part, these delegate dispute settlement to the WTO+ 36+ Pelc 2011b+ 37+ Busch and Reinhardt 2001+ 38+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ Googling the WTO 637