the island before 1895 and "mainlanders"whose families arrived between 1945 and 1950 was an ever-present component of political discourse in the early and mid-1990s before it was replaced by an inclusive concept of"New Taiwanese."Thomas Gold contends that the Taiwanese quest for identity has risen from below,reflecting the weakened capacity of the KMT state to impose its official Chinese identity over society.Other scholars attributed the dramatic decline of Chinese identity since 1992 to the occurrence of special political events in the 1990s that created a lasting effect on younger generations.Examples of this"event-driven socialization"are the Qiandao Lake Incident,Mainland missile exercises and the ensuing Strait crisis,Beijing's 1997 announcement of "one China"as a precondition for cross-strait dialogue and Lee Teng-hui's "two states theory"in 1999.2 As Taiwanese identity-oriented education,started in 1997,became effective on young adults beyond 2002,its impact on the change of national identity is reflected in the decrease of "double identifiers"and the continuing increase of Taiwanese identifiers over the past decade, rather than the decrease of solely-Chinese identifiers which has long become statistically insignificant.According to Daniel Lynch,Democratic Progressive Party(DPP)efforts at national identity construction through frequent use of indigenous dialects in public discourse,history textbook revision,curriculum reform and introduction of new street and park names and national holidays have significantly cultivated a spirit of "Taiwanese subjectivity"(Taiwan zhutixing)in the society.3 If people's self-identity could be regarded as a cultural/ethnic dimension of Taiwanese national identity (some people call it ethnic nationalism),their positions on the independence vs. unification matter would be its political/state dimension (or the so-called civic nationalism).which seems less formidable to Mainland China compared with the dramatic shift in cultural/ethnic identity on the island.Different measures are used to observe the shift of Taiwanese political/civil identity.According to ESC data,people who preferred instant independence or independence later increased from 11.1%in 1994 to 23.1%by 2008 and remained 23.9%by 2014,and those who preferred instant unification or unification later dropped precipitously from about 20%in 1994 to about 10%by 2008 and remains the same until now.Meanwhile,people preferred to maintain the status quo forever increased from 9.5%in 1994 to 21.5%by 2008 and 25.5%by 2014,and those preferred to maintain the status quo now and decide Taiwan's future later decreased slightly from 38.5%in1994to35.8%by2008and34.3%by2014. This often-used six-choices question for interviewees to pick up has one disadvantage:it is impossible to arrange them on the spectrum from favoring independence to favoring unification.It is unclear which option is closer to the independence or unification end:maintaining the status quo forever or deciding Taiwan's future later.In order to resolve this problem,in the survey conducted by SJTU Center for Taiwan Studies in October 2014,interviewees were asked to choose among seven rather than six options:1)instant independence,2)maintaining the status quo and getting independence later,3)maintaining the status quo and deciding whether or not to move to independence later,4)maintaining the status quo forever,5)maintaining the status quo and deciding whether or not move to unification later,6)maintaining the status quo and getting See Gang Lin,ed.,"The Evolution ofa Taiwanese National Identity",Asia Program Special Report (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars),No.114,August 2003. 2 Da-Chi Liao,Boyu Chen and Chi-chen Huang,"The Decline of"Chinese Identity"in Taiwan?!-An Analysis of Survey Data from 1992 to 2012,"East Asia(2013)30:279-280. 3 See Lowell Dittmer,"Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity,"Asia Survey,Vol.44(July/August 2004),Issue 4,479-480. 33 the island before 1895 and “mainlanders” whose families arrived between 1945 and 1950 was an ever-present component of political discourse in the early and mid-1990s before it was replaced by an inclusive concept of “New Taiwanese.” Thomas Gold contends that the Taiwanese quest for identity has risen from below, reflecting the weakened capacity of the KMT state to impose its official Chinese identity over society.1 Other scholars attributed the dramatic decline of Chinese identity since 1992 to the occurrence of special political events in the 1990s that created a lasting effect on younger generations. Examples of this “event-driven socialization” are the Qiandao Lake Incident, Mainland missile exercises and the ensuing Strait crisis, Beijing’s 1997 announcement of “one China” as a precondition for cross-strait dialogue and Lee Teng-hui’s “two states theory” in 1999.2 As Taiwanese identity-oriented education, started in 1997, became effective on young adults beyond 2002, its impact on the change of national identity is reflected in the decrease of “double identifiers” and the continuing increase of Taiwanese identifiers over the past decade, rather than the decrease of solely-Chinese identifiers which has long become statistically insignificant. According to Daniel Lynch, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) efforts at national identity construction through frequent use of indigenous dialects in public discourse, history textbook revision, curriculum reform and introduction of new street and park names and national holidays have significantly cultivated a spirit of “Taiwanese subjectivity” (Taiwan zhutixing) in the society.3 If people’s self-identity could be regarded as a cultural/ethnic dimension of Taiwanese national identity (some people call it ethnic nationalism), their positions on the independence vs. unification matter would be its political/state dimension (or the so-called civic nationalism), which seems less formidable to Mainland China compared with the dramatic shift in cultural/ethnic identity on the island. Different measures are used to observe the shift of Taiwanese political/civil identity. According to ESC data, people who preferred instant independence or independence later increased from 11.1% in 1994 to 23.1% by 2008 and remained 23.9% by 2014, and those who preferred instant unification or unification later dropped precipitously from about 20% in 1994 to about 10% by 2008 and remains the same until now. Meanwhile, people preferred to maintain the status quo forever increased from 9.5% in 1994 to 21.5% by 2008 and 25.5% by 2014, and those preferred to maintain the status quo now and decide Taiwan’s future later decreased slightly from 38.5% in 1994 to 35.8% by 2008 and 34.3% by 2014. This often-used six-choices question for interviewees to pick up has one disadvantage: it is impossible to arrange them on the spectrum from favoring independence to favoring unification. It is unclear which option is closer to the independence or unification end: maintaining the status quo forever or deciding Taiwan’s future later. In order to resolve this problem, in the survey conducted by SJTU Center for Taiwan Studies in October 2014, interviewees were asked to choose among seven rather than six options: 1) instant independence, 2) maintaining the status quo and getting independence later, 3) maintaining the status quo and deciding whether or not to move to independence later, 4) maintaining the status quo forever, 5) maintaining the status quo and deciding whether or not move to unification later, 6) maintaining the status quo and getting 1 See Gang Lin, ed., “The Evolution of a Taiwanese National Identity”, Asia Program Special Report (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), No. 114, August 2003. 2 Da-Chi Liao, Boyu Chen and Chi-chen Huang, “The Decline of “Chinese Identity” in Taiwan?!—An Analysis of Survey Data from 1992 to 2012,” East Asia (2013) 30: 279-280. 3 See Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity,” Asia Survey, Vol. 44 (July/August 2004), Issue 4, 479-480