M.Soppe et aL/Journal of Transport Geography 17(2009)10-20 Gp3 self-handling 100% Fig.5.Distribution of weighted weekly containerised transport capacity over the main categories of handling providers (2006 data).Note:The lines inside the triangle indicate the average value for each of the three categories of terminal operators.Source:WWCTC database(2006).Soppe M..Parola F..Fremont A no relevant handling activity on their own.These carriers focus on investments in ports. the horizontal growth in their core business,liner shipping. In order to evaluate various carriers'behaviour in getting han- The last group(Gp4)is mainly composed of Asian carriers such as dling services,we split their WCTC in accordance to the different Cosco,APL and K-Line.Basically they have developed an interna- ways adopted to 'defend'their maritime assets: tional self-handling activity which is supplemented with ITOs'ser- vices.In this respect,the self-handling is essentially,though non Contract:simply signing a contract with an independent third- exclusively,on a regional basis and accounts for 10-20%of the party terminal operator (either international or local): respective carriers'capacity.The two major alliances,CKYH and Joint-venture (JV):entering in a joint-venture with local and/or Grand Alliance also belong to this cluster and the mutual resort to international partners (equity share <50%): the facilities of the partners produce advantages for all the members. Partially Owned Subsidiary (POS):establishing or acquiring a Predictably,the relations between carriers and ISLs of other mar- company acting as terminal operator(equity share 50%): itime groups are limited(Appendix 1).Rarely does the terminal divi- Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS):establishing or acquiring a sion(ISL)of a competing carrier appear as one of the major container company acting as terminal operator (equity share 100%). handling providers of a top carrier.However,two specific cases should be noted.Although originating from a carrier,APMT as"hybrid Except for the first option,all the others usually drive the carrier operator"is an exception to the above general rule,as it figures among to obtain dedicated or.at least prioritised,handling services for its the main suppliers of Evergreen,CMA-CGM,Cosco and APL Similarly. calling vessels.This points out how carriers differentiate their con- as mentioned above,within the CKYHand the Grand Alliance,a recipro- sumption of port services,either by adopting a self-handling strat- cal co-operation is evident in port operations,as the partners often re- egy,in its various forms,or resorting to third-party suppliers as sort to using facilities where other members have financial interests. shown in the previous section. The general situation shown by sampled carriers reveals the rel- 5.The carriers'dilemma:how to invest in ports to defend the evance of contracts,76%on average.The share of WCTC(11%)man- aged through owned subsidiaries(POS or WOS)is still low and the maritime assets? portion of capacity handled via JVs is slightly higher(13%).Fig.6 In this section,the approach of securing handling services by and Appendix 2 reveal significant differences in SLs'behaviour and identify four clusters of carriers. carriers goes beyond the self-handling versus third party option. The first group(Gp1)comprises Maersk and the CKYH Alliance. It analyses the intensity of direct financial involvement of carriers in terminal facilities.As mentioned earlier,carriers are increasingly The market leader and pioneer,Maersk Line,shows a quite atypical called on to defend the big maritime assets,which means that they and aggressive strategy,handling through its own port network over 45%of the WCTC.Almost half of it is through WOS.In some have to support their maritime investments through additional specific port facilities,this carrier has equity relationships with PSA,HPH,DPW and,regionally,with Eurogate. The CKYH Alliance also shows an equity involvement above the APM Terminals is probably the most interesting example of"hybrid operator" This term,coined by Drewry.refers to those ISLs having a relatively high share of average.It must be remembered that such an outcome refers to third-party traffic.Normally,in fact,most ISLs provide dedicated handling services to investments made by single members,as allied carriers appear reluc- their own vessels and very rarely become port suppliers of other shipping lines. tant to jointly invest in the same facility and prefer to pursue indepen-no relevant handling activity on their own. These carriers focus on the horizontal growth in their core business, liner shipping. The last group (Gp4) is mainly composed of Asian carriers such as Cosco, APL and K-Line. Basically they have developed an interna￾tional self-handling activity which is supplemented with ITOs’ ser￾vices. In this respect, the self-handling is essentially, though non exclusively, on a regional basis and accounts for 10–20% of the respective carriers’ capacity. The two major alliances, CKYH and Grand Alliance also belong to this cluster and the mutual resort to the facilities of the partners produce advantages for all the members. Predictably, the relations between carriers and ISLs of other mar￾itime groups are limited (Appendix 1). Rarely does the terminal divi￾sion (ISL) of a competing carrier appear as one of the major container handling providers of a top carrier. However, two specific cases should be noted. Although originating from a carrier, APMT as ‘‘hybrid operator”6 is an exception to the above general rule, as it figures among the main suppliers of Evergreen, CMA–CGM, Cosco and APL. Similarly, asmentioned above, within the CKYH and the Grand Alliance, a recipro￾cal co-operation is evident in port operations, as the partners often re￾sort to using facilities where other members have financial interests. 5. The carriers’ dilemma: how to invest in ports to defend the maritime assets? In this section, the approach of securing handling services by carriers goes beyond the self-handling versus third party option. It analyses the intensity of direct financial involvement of carriers in terminal facilities. As mentioned earlier, carriers are increasingly called on to defend the big maritime assets, which means that they have to support their maritime investments through additional investments in ports. In order to evaluate various carriers’ behaviour in getting han￾dling services, we split their WCTC in accordance to the different ways adopted to ‘defend’ their maritime assets: – Contract: simply signing a contract with an independent third￾party terminal operator (either international or local); – Joint-venture (JV): entering in a joint-venture with local and/or international partners (equity share 6 50%); – Partially Owned Subsidiary (POS): establishing or acquiring a company acting as terminal operator (equity share > 50%); – Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS): establishing or acquiring a company acting as terminal operator (equity share = 100%). Except for the first option, all the others usually drive the carrier to obtain dedicated or, at least prioritised, handling services for its calling vessels. This points out how carriers differentiate their con￾sumption of port services, either by adopting a self-handling strat￾egy, in its various forms, or resorting to third-party suppliers as shown in the previous section. The general situation shown by sampled carriers reveals the rel￾evance of contracts, 76% on average. The share of WCTC (11%) man￾aged through owned subsidiaries (POS or WOS) is still low and the portion of capacity handled via JVs is slightly higher (13%). Fig. 6 and Appendix 2 reveal significant differences in SLs’ behaviour and identify four clusters of carriers. The first group (Gp1) comprises Maersk and the CKYH Alliance. The market leader and pioneer, Maersk Line, shows a quite atypical and aggressive strategy, handling through its own port network over 45% of the WCTC. Almost half of it is through WOS. In some specific port facilities, this carrier has equity relationships with PSA, HPH, DPW and, regionally, with Eurogate. The CKYH Alliance also shows an equity involvement above the average. It must be remembered that such an outcome refers to investments made by single members, as allied carriers appear reluc￾tant to jointly invest in the same facility and prefer to pursue indepen￾Fig. 5. Distribution of weighted weekly containerised transport capacity over the main categories of handling providers (2006 data). Note: The lines inside the triangle indicate the average value for each of the three categories of terminal operators. Source: WWCTC database (2006), Soppé M., Parola F., Frémont A. 6 APM Terminals is probably the most interesting example of ‘‘hybrid operator”. This term, coined by Drewry, refers to those ISLs having a relatively high share of third-party traffic. Normally, in fact, most ISLs provide dedicated handling services to their own vessels and very rarely become port suppliers of other shipping lines. M. Soppé et al. / Journal of Transport Geography 17 (2009) 10–20 15