740 International Organization that remedies,per se,are doubtful to be the deciding issue in the complainant's choice of forum. This discussion suggests that there is ample opportunity for forum shopping: both NAFTA and the WTO recognize that this can (and will)occur,and their rules and procedures are rarely so different as to prejudge the complainant's choice of "court."This,in turn,begs the obvious question:why not file at both institutions? NAFTA,for one,explicitly discourages this:Article 2005,paragraph 6,says that "the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the other...."Still,some might argue that,in practice,multiple filings do happen,as in the most recent iteration of the Canada-U.S.softwood lumber dispute,and Canada-Agricultural Products.In fact,neither bears this out:in softwood,most of the disputes filed at NAFTA concerned antidumping and countervailing duties,which fall outside the institution's main dispute settlement mechanism (that is,the one comparable to the DSU):19 in Canada-Agricultural Products,the United States went to the WTO to challenge Canadian efforts to comply with NAFTA.20 While the article antici- pates the circumstances under which a complainant might prefer to file in multiple fora,the point is that,as Marceau explains,"s]tates do not pursue multiple dis- pute settlement proceedings needlessly,working instead towards ensuring that their grievances are brought before the most appropriately equipped fora for settling their disputes."2 How,then,does a complainant select the most appropriate forum? The Argument The complainant's choice of forum depends on whether it prefers to set a regional or multilateral precedent,or no precedent at all.By setting a precedent,I mean adding to an institution's body of case law that is followed by its judicial bodies when ruling on subsequent disputes.This definition is not controversial;observers widely subscribe to the view that,as Palmeter and Mavroidis explain,"parties will continue to cite prior reports to panels,and panels will continue to take them into account by adopting their reasoning-in effect,following precedent."22 18.The article further states that "unless a Party makes a request pursuant to paragraphs 3 or 4," which invoke the special claims of jurisdiction on the environment,sanitary and phytosanitary mea- sures,and standards,although these paragraphs also insist on pursuing the matter "solely under this Agreement." 19.At NAFTA,disputes over antidumping and countervailing duties are taken up under Chapter 19,which gives the complainant (including firms,who have private standing)"binational"tribunals as an alternative to seeking relief in domestic courts.In this sense,Chapter 19 is not considered compa- rable to WTO dispute settlement. 20.In other words,this was not an example of the same case being filed twice,but a second dispute arising over the outcome of the first dispute. 21.Marceau2001,1081. 22.Palmeter and Mavroidis 2004,56.See also Davey 1998,79;Jackson 1998,83;Komuro 1995, 37;Petersmann 1994,1175;Huntington 1993,435;and Van Bael 1988,69.that remedies, per se, are doubtful to be the deciding issue in the complainant’s choice of forum+ This discussion suggests that there is ample opportunity for forum shopping: both NAFTA and the WTO recognize that this can ~and will! occur, and their rules and procedures are rarely so different as to prejudge the complainant’s choice of “court+” This, in turn, begs the obvious question: why not file at both institutions? NAFTA, for one, explicitly discourages this: Article 2005, paragraph 6, says that “the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the other+++ +”18 Still, some might argue that, in practice, multiple filings do happen, as in the most recent iteration of the Canada–U+S+ softwood lumber dispute, and Canada—Agricultural Products+ In fact, neither bears this out: in softwood, most of the disputes filed at NAFTA concerned antidumping and countervailing duties, which fall outside the institution’s main dispute settlement mechanism ~that is, the one comparable to the DSU!; 19 in Canada—Agricultural Products, the United States went to the WTO to challenge Canadian efforts to comply with NAFTA+ 20 While the article antici￾pates the circumstances under which a complainant might prefer to file in multiple fora, the point is that, as Marceau explains, “@s#tates do not pursue multiple dis￾pute settlement proceedings needlessly, working instead towards ensuring that their grievances are brought before the most appropriately equipped fora for settling their disputes+”21 How, then, does a complainant select the most appropriate forum? The Argument The complainant’s choice of forum depends on whether it prefers to set a regional or multilateral precedent, or no precedent at all+ By setting a precedent, I mean adding to an institution’s body of case law that is followed by its judicial bodies when ruling on subsequent disputes+ This definition is not controversial; observers widely subscribe to the view that, as Palmeter and Mavroidis explain, “parties will continue to cite prior reports to panels, and panels will continue to take them into account by adopting their reasoning—in effect, following precedent+”22 18+ The article further states that “unless a Party makes a request pursuant to paragraphs 3 or 4,” which invoke the special claims of jurisdiction on the environment, sanitary and phytosanitary mea￾sures, and standards, although these paragraphs also insist on pursuing the matter “solely under this Agreement+” 19+ At NAFTA, disputes over antidumping and countervailing duties are taken up under Chapter 19, which gives the complainant ~including firms, who have private standing! “binational” tribunals as an alternative to seeking relief in domestic courts+ In this sense, Chapter 19 is not considered compa￾rable to WTO dispute settlement+ 20+ In other words, this was not an example of the same case being filed twice, but a second dispute arising over the outcome of the first dispute+ 21+ Marceau 2001, 1081+ 22+ Palmeter and Mavroidis 2004, 56+ See also Davey 1998, 79; Jackson 1998, 83; Komuro 1995, 37; Petersmann 1994, 1175; Huntington 1993, 435; and Van Bael 1988, 69+ 740 International Organization