Institutions,Forum Shopping,and Trade Disputes 739 Another key consideration would be differences in law.There clearly are differ- ences in law across the WTO and NAFTA,for example,but there is also a marked degree of convergence in many areas,not least because successive rounds of multi- lateral obligations have been ratified domestically.As a result,disputes are typi- cally "actionable"under either forum.Indeed,NAFTA directly incorporates various WTO provisions and has been called on to adjudicate these where the law over- laps.For example,in the safeguard dispute,Mexico not only argued that the main legal issues arose under both agreements,but that NAFTA"necessarily [had]juris- diction to dispose of all overlapping GATT issues involved in that dispute."5 A third factor would be the timeliness of proceedings.On this count there is little variation:both fora set out similar timelines,from the duration of consulta- tions to the issuance of an interim and final report.That said,if the timeliness of justice were a main determinant of the choice of forum,complainants might be expected to prefer arbitration to formal dispute settlement(that is,alternative dis- pute resolution mechanisms under NAFTA or DSU Article 25 arbitration under the WTO),and yet they almost never do.16 A fourth factor would be the adoption of panel reports,and appellate review.The FTA/NAFTA never permitted defendants to block panel reports,a feature that com- pared favorably to GATT,but has been woven into the WTO.Even under GATT, there was far less blocking of reports than of panel requests;but in any case,Can- ada and the United States had no history of denying the other a legal victory.Appel- late review is another feature that distinguishes the WTO from NAFTA,although the trade-off is that WTO verdicts are "binding,"whereas NAFTA rulings are not, such that this feature of the DSU is not as germane to regional dispute settlement. Following from this,a fifth factor would be the availability of remedies at the end of a dispute.The WTO and NAFTA outline similar procedures whereby a wronged complainant might seek redress,though NAFTA provisions,on occa- sion,allow for more direct compensation,notably the "cultural industries excep- tion"discussed in the case study on Canada-Periodicals.Otherwise,complainants at either forum must wait out the defendant's (prospective)compliance.If this is not forthcoming in a timely manner,the complainant can request authorization to suspend"equivalent"benefits to the defendant.Few such requests have been made at either the WTO or NAFTA,and fewer still have been acted upon,7 suggesting 15.NAFTA Doc.USA-97-2008-01,para.28.All NAFTA documents are available from the NAFTA Secretariat Web site:(http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org). 16.Three cases have gone for DSU 25 arbitration at the multilateral level,two under GATT and one under the WTO,although the latter was conducted as a DSU 22.6 proceeding on authorization to retaliate,such that it can hardly be counted as a case of arbitration,as per the spirit of this provision. Nonetheless,recourse to arbitration under NAFTA or DSU 25 still hinges on a prior decision to file regionally or multilaterally,bringing it within reach of my argument.Indeed,as in the case of DSU 25, these decisions are fully backed by DSU 21 (on compliance)and 22 (retaliation),such that concern for precedent should be no less pressing in these disputes. 17.Authorization to retaliate has been granted in only seven WTO disputes,and acted upon in four of these.Another key consideration would be differences in law+ There clearly are differ￾ences in law across the WTO and NAFTA, for example, but there is also a marked degree of convergence in many areas, not least because successive rounds of multi￾lateral obligations have been ratified domestically+ As a result, disputes are typi￾cally “actionable” under either forum+ Indeed, NAFTA directly incorporates various WTO provisions and has been called on to adjudicate these where the law over￾laps+ For example, in the safeguard dispute, Mexico not only argued that the main legal issues arose under both agreements, but that NAFTA “necessarily @had# juris￾diction to dispose of all overlapping GATT issues involved in that dispute+”15 A third factor would be the timeliness of proceedings+ On this count there is little variation: both fora set out similar timelines, from the duration of consulta￾tions to the issuance of an interim and final report+ That said, if the timeliness of justice were a main determinant of the choice of forum, complainants might be expected to prefer arbitration to formal dispute settlement ~that is, alternative dis￾pute resolution mechanisms under NAFTA or DSU Article 25 arbitration under the WTO!, and yet they almost never do+ 16 A fourth factor would be the adoption of panel reports, and appellate review+ The FTA0NAFTA never permitted defendants to block panel reports, a feature that com￾pared favorably to GATT, but has been woven into the WTO+ Even under GATT, there was far less blocking of reports than of panel requests; but in any case, Can￾ada and the United States had no history of denying the other a legal victory+ Appel￾late review is another feature that distinguishes the WTO from NAFTA, although the trade-off is that WTO verdicts are “binding,” whereas NAFTA rulings are not, such that this feature of the DSU is not as germane to regional dispute settlement+ Following from this, a fifth factor would be the availability of remedies at the end of a dispute+ The WTO and NAFTA outline similar procedures whereby a wronged complainant might seek redress, though NAFTA provisions, on occa￾sion, allow for more direct compensation, notably the “cultural industries excep￾tion” discussed in the case study on Canada—Periodicals+ Otherwise, complainants at either forum must wait out the defendant’s ~prospective! compliance+ If this is not forthcoming in a timely manner, the complainant can request authorization to suspend “equivalent” benefits to the defendant+ Few such requests have been made at either the WTO or NAFTA, and fewer still have been acted upon, 17 suggesting 15+ NAFTA Doc+ USA-97-2008-01, para+ 28+ All NAFTA documents are available from the NAFTA Secretariat Web site: ^http:00www+nafta-sec-alena+org&+ 16+ Three cases have gone for DSU 25 arbitration at the multilateral level, two under GATT and one under the WTO, although the latter was conducted as a DSU 22+6 proceeding on authorization to retaliate, such that it can hardly be counted as a case of arbitration, as per the spirit of this provision+ Nonetheless, recourse to arbitration under NAFTA or DSU 25 still hinges on a prior decision to file regionally or multilaterally, bringing it within reach of my argument+ Indeed, as in the case of DSU 25, these decisions are fully backed by DSU 21 ~on compliance! and 22 ~retaliation!, such that concern for precedent should be no less pressing in these disputes+ 17+ Authorization to retaliate has been granted in only seven WTO disputes, and acted upon in four of these+ Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Trade Disputes 739