process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document. The puzzle is then why these two judges find that in some cases that they are driven to constitutional bedrock, which they find to be full of values and principles, while in others they find that the constitution amounts only to a very formal understanding of the separation of powers One response to this puzzle would be to point out that in the cases where the principle of gality was articulated, the people affected by the decisions were citizens of the United Kingdom whose fundamental rights- liberty, freedom of expression, and access to the courts-were affected by the executive decisions. But as Lord Slynn recognized in rebman, Rehman's liberty was at stake and he had family in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the argument about national security cannot be confined to the situation of someone who has not yet received resident or citizen status Suppose that argument is right and legislation is enacted that says that ' If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origins or associations or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it is necessary to 1419993AIER400,at412. 15 Rebman h,131,"2212 process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document.’14 The puzzle is then why these two judges find that in some cases that they are driven to constitutional bedrock, which they find to be full of values and principles, while in others they find that the constitution amounts only to a very formal understanding of the separation of powers. One response to this puzzle would be to point out that in the cases where the principle of legality was articulated, the people affected by the decisions were citizens of the United Kingdom whose fundamental rights – liberty, freedom of expression, and access to the courts – were affected by the executive decisions. But as Lord Slynn recognized in Rehman, Rehman’s liberty was at stake and he had family in the United Kingdom.15 Moreover, the argument about national security cannot be confined to the situation of someone who has not yet received resident or citizen status. Suppose that argument is right and legislation is enacted that says that ‘If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origins or associations or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it is necessary to 14 [1999] 3 All ER 400, at 412. 15 Rehman HL, 131, ¶ 22