exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he be taine This statute reproduces the infamous wartime regulation 18B considered in the equally infamous decision of the majority of the House of Lords in Liversidge r Anderson. The only protection detainees had was that they could make representations to an advisory committee, whose chairman had to inform them of the grounds of their detentions, so that they could make a case to the committee. The Home Secretary could decline to follow the advice but had to report monthly to parlament about the orders he had made and about whether he had declined to follow advice In liversidge, the issue was whether a court could require particulars about the grounds of a detention in order to test its validity and the majority held it could not despite the fact that the phrase reasonable cause'had been substituted for the if satisfied that' of the original regulations in order to head off a revolt in Parliament. In the majority's view, if the minister produced an authenticated detention order, the detainee had the onus of 16(1942 AC 207, hereafter Liversidge. order to test the ministerial practice of responding to Habeas Corpus applications by swearing an adami i iversidge's lawyer, DN Pritt, recounts in his memoirs that he brought an action for which simply asserted that the minister had reasonable grounds for his belief. That is, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant has without justification imprisoned him and so the defendant bore the onus of justifying the detention Pritt says that the point was to get the minister to see that he could not 'slide out by an affidavit, and therefore he would have to 'face up to the case, give his reasons, and let the Court judge of their reasonability At worst,, the Court would clarify the matter by deciding that the words reasonable cause'did not carry the meaning they had hitherto carried. He confidently expected a decision in his favour. DN Pritt, Te Autobiograply of DN Pritt: Part One: From Right to Lefr (Lawrence Wishart, London, 1965)304-7 See further AWB Simpson, In the Higbest Degree Odious: Detention W ithout Trial in IV artime Britain( Clarendon Press, Oxford 994), chapter 1713 exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained.’ This statute reproduces the infamous wartime regulation 18B considered in the equally infamous decision of the majority of the House of Lords in Liversidge v Anderson. 16 The only protection detainees had was that they could make representations to an advisory committee, whose chairman had to inform them of the grounds of their detentions, so that they could make a case to the committee. The Home Secretary could decline to follow the advice but had to report monthly to Parliament about the orders he had made and about whether he had declined to follow advice. In Liversidge, the issue was whether a court could require particulars about the grounds of a detention in order to test its validity and the majority held it could not despite the fact that the phrase ‘reasonable cause’ had been substituted for the ‘if satisfied that’ of the original regulations in order to head off a revolt in Parliament.17 In the majority’s view, if the minister produced an authenticated detention order, the detainee had the onus of 16 [1942] AC 207, hereafter Liversidge. 17 Liversidge’s lawyer, DN Pritt, recounts in his memoirs that he brought an action for false imprisonment in order to test the ministerial practice of responding to Habeas Corpus applications by swearing an affidavit which simply asserted that the minister had reasonable grounds for his belief. That is, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant has without justification imprisoned him and so the defendant bore the onus of justifying the detention. Pritt says that the point was to get the minister to see that he could not ‘slide out’ by an affidavit, and therefore he would have to ‘face up to the case, give his reasons, and let the Court judge of their reasonability.’ ‘At worst’, the Court would clarify the matter by deciding that the words ‘reasonable cause’ did not ‘carry the meaning they had hitherto carried’. He confidently expected a decision in his favour. DN Pritt, The Autobiography of DN Pritt: Part One; From Right to Left (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1965) 304-7. See further AWB Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious: Detention Without Trial in Wartime Britain (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), chapter 17