88:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY revolutionary ideal and toward bureaucratism,he threw the nation into the Great Leap Forward.When that failed to revitalize the revolution and punctured the ideological zeal of most of his comrades,Mao then threw China into the cataclysm of the Cultural Revolution.Millions died,but Mao remained convinced that such costs were necessary for the creation of a better future.After the setbacks of the Great Leap Forward,most of Mao's comrades modified their ideological zeal,moving the attainment of commu- nism into the indefinite future.Not Mao.To his dying days he exercised his immense power to keep China on his imagined track to the future. The impact of individual personality depends on the political system in which that particular individual functions.In a system in which power is effectively shared or in which there are effective institutional checks on the power of individual leaders,the impact of individual personality may be limited.Where power is highly concentrated and unchecked,individual idiosyncrasies may have a direct and substantial effect on national policy. This was the case in the early PRC.At the Seventh CCP Congress in 1945. that party was"Bolshevized"with Mao Zedong serving as China's"Stalin." Factions were finally suppressed,and a cult of personality was fostered around Mao.The CCP would not retreat from this ultra-centralization of power until the mid-1950s.As the CCP marched to victory in 1949,Mao's prestige grew further.His thought had been proved correct by the test of history.On issues of broad orientation,Mao's power was absolute in the early years of the PRC.The extent of Mao's power was demonstrated by the October 1950 decision to intervene in the Korean War.This was a decision of huge import for the PRC.Moreover,according to one recent authoritative investigation of that decision,Mao initally stood virtually alone in favoring intervention.Only Peng Dehuai-then the commander of the relatively unimportant First Field Army-supported Mao on this issue. Apparently all the CCP's other top leaders feared the difficulties and costs of war with the United States.Yet Mao's view prevailed. Ideology is not like a coat that is easily changed with a changing environ- ment.At least when beliefs are deeply rooted in the personality structures of individuals-as with Mao-they may be altered only painfully and with difficulty.Recognition that fundamental precepts for which immense sacri- fices have been made are wrong is very difficult.When confronted with discrepant evidence contradicting core beliefs,it is much easier for people to reinterpret the evidence than to alter their core beliefs,which typically prove remarkably resistant to change in the face of discordant data.Viewed from this perspective,the cognitive precondition for Mao's late 1960s choice of comity with the United States was his belief that the USSR was no longer socialist.Confronted with evidence that the USSR under Khru- shchev wanted to keep China weak and dependent-just as the imperialist powers did-Mao did not drop the basic Leninist belief about the link between capitalism and imperialism.Instead,he reinterpreted the evidence and concluded that the Soviet Union was no longer socialist!Once he had88 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y revolutionary ideal and toward bureaucratism, he threw the nation into the Great Leap Forward. When that failed to revitalize the revolution and punctured the ideological zeal of most of his comrades, Mao then threw China into the cataclysm of the Cultural Revolution. Millions died, but Mao remained convinced that such costs were necessary for the creation of a better future. After the setbacks of the Great Leap Forward, most of Mao’s comrades modified their ideological zeal, moving the attainment of commu￾nism into the indefinite future. Not Mao. To his dying days he exercised his immense power to keep China on his imagined track to the future. The impact of individual personality depends on the political system in which that particular individual functions. In a system in which power is effectively shared or in which there are effective institutional checks on the power of individual leaders, the impact of individual personality may be limited. Where power is highly concentrated and unchecked, individual idiosyncrasies may have a direct and substantial effect on national policy. This was the case in the early PRC. At the Seventh CCP Congress in 1945, that party was “Bolshevized” with Mao Zedong serving as China’s “Stalin.” Factions were finally suppressed, and a cult of personality was fostered around Mao. The CCP would not retreat from this ultra-centralization of power until the mid-1950s. As the CCP marched to victory in 1949, Mao’s prestige grew further. His thought had been proved correct by the test of history. On issues of broad orientation, Mao’s power was absolute in the early years of the PRC. The extent of Mao’s power was demonstrated by the October 1950 decision to intervene in the Korean War. This was a decision of huge import for the PRC. Moreover, according to one recent authoritative investigation of that decision, Mao initally stood virtually alone in favoring intervention. Only Peng Dehuai – then the commander of the relatively unimportant First Field Army – supported Mao on this issue. Apparently all the CCP’s other top leaders feared the difficulties and costs of war with the United States. Yet Mao’s view prevailed. Ideology is not like a coat that is easily changed with a changing environ￾ment. At least when beliefs are deeply rooted in the personality structures of individuals – as with Mao – they may be altered only painfully and with difficulty. Recognition that fundamental precepts for which immense sacri- fices have been made are wrong is very difficult. When confronted with discrepant evidence contradicting core beliefs, it is much easier for people to reinterpret the evidence than to alter their core beliefs, which typically prove remarkably resistant to change in the face of discordant data. Viewed from this perspective, the cognitive precondition for Mao’s late 1960s choice of comity with the United States was his belief that the USSR was no longer socialist. Confronted with evidence that the USSR under Khru￾shchev wanted to keep China weak and dependent – just as the imperialist powers did – Mao did not drop the basic Leninist belief about the link between capitalism and imperialism. Instead, he reinterpreted the evidence and concluded that the Soviet Union was no longer socialist! Once he had