332 The China Quarterly weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power.The xin- zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modern" Chinese state:first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern- style ministries,and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs,throughout the Republican period,consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.'The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men,and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power,and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole;conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation.Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well,characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals.In the 1920s,a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re- mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity.Finally,in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6.The xinzheng era,important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state,remains crucially understudied.Some of the more important works on this period include:Mary C.Wright,China in Revolution:The First Phase,1900-11(New Haven: Yale University Press,1968);Ernest Young,The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,1977),chs.1-2;Esther Morrisson,"The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy,"unpublished dissertation,Radcliffe College,1959;and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking.salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China,1909-11," Modern China,Vol.17,No.3,pp.389-417. 7.There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear,and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization,an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century.The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy.Yuan Shikai,while hostile to any body that he could not directly control,toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival,and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious,allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly. and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government.On the xinzheng constitutional programme,see Morrisson,"The modernization of the Confucian bureauc- racy."On Yuan Shikai,see Ernest Young."Yuan Shikai as a conservative modernizer,"in Charlotte Furth,The Limits of Change:Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge.MA:Harvard University Press,1976),pp.171-190.332 The China Quarterly weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190. weakness and underdevelopment and into strength and power. The xin￾zheng programme set a new template for the evolution of a "modem" Chinese state: first by replacing the imperial Six Boards with modern￾style ministries, and secondly by systematically drawing up plans to project central government power much further than ever before into the provinces.6 Although the xinzheng and subsequent Republican-era centralizers claimed to adhere to the principle of mechanisms through which those at local levels could have input into the decision-making process or manage their own affairs, throughout the Republican period, consultative bodies, representative institutions and regularized channels of articulation from below were minor strains in the dominant theme of centrally ordained statism and national unity.7 The vast majority of those with executive power were socially conservative military men, and the socializing effects of a career in the military plus the structural predisposition of all executives to want more discretionary power made them even more consistent in their collective distaste for all forms of political participation and expression that they could not directly control. Virtually all executives in the Republican period also conflated their own personal reach with central government power, and in turn central government power with the good of the country as a whole; conversely, any identifiable group or interest that in any way acted as a brake on the executive's policies was excoriated as subversive of the greater good of the nation. Thus in the 1910s Yuan Shikai dissolved the National Assembly and for a time succeeded in abolishing provincial assemblies as well, characterizing them as the preserve of selfish individuals. In the 1920s, a long line of Beiyang warlords periodically packed what re￾mained of the National Assembly to draft constitutions that would legitimize their rule while they hurled epithets at each other as being detrimental to national unity. Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s Chiang 6. The xinzheng era, important as it is for the subsequent evolution of the 20th-century Chinese state, remains crucially understudied. Some of the more important works on this period include: Mary C. Wright, China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-11 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), chs. 1-2; Esther Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureaucracy," unpublished dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959; and Paul Hickey, "Fee taking, salary reform and the structure of state power in late Qing China, 1909-11," Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 389-417. 7. There was much about the xinzheng reform package that was either ambivalent or unclear, and this lack of clarity particularly stood out in the delicate issue of relative degrees of centralization and decentralization, an issue that continued to reverberate through the remainder of the 20th century. The late Qing xinzheng reforms allowed for the creation of provincial assemblies and even drew up a schedule for the gradual implementation of constitutional monarchy. Yuan Shikai, while hostile to any body that he could not directly control, toward the end of his life seemed quite desperate to make links with any source of popular support and launched a doomed monarchical revival, and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, while no less suspicious, allowed the existence of a Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and paid at least lip service to the idea of village self-government. On the xinzheng constitutional programme, see Morrisson, "The modernization of the Confucian bureauc￾racy." On Yuan Shikai, see Ernest Young, "Yuan Shikai as a conservative modemizer," in Charlotte Furth, The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservatism in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 171-190