Tradition and Modernity 1059 and urbanization,marriage remains nearly As England (2010,p.161)noted,women have universal and early in China to this day (Ji experienced tremendous upward mobility in Yeung,2014;Jones,2007;Jones Gubhaju, education and occupation in the public sphere; 2009;Yeung Hu,2013);indeed,Jones(2007) however.because of the "cultural and insti- remarked that this China"exception"challenges tutional devaluation"of women's work,men conventional marriage theory.On the basis of have not made parallel forays into increased 2000 and 2005 data,Jones and Gubhaju(2009) household work and female-dominated occu- showed that only 2%of women remain single pations.Traditional gender norms still regulate between ages 30 and 34 in China(compared gender relations and family life in the private to 10%for men)and that education contributes sphere.Thanks to this stalled and asymmet- only moderately to delayed marriage. rical gender revolution,the cultural norm of As the most populous country in the world, the male-breadwinner marriage is still widely China is not homogeneous in terms of economic accepted.In short,marriage remains a "gen- development and local traditions;likewise,mar- dered institution supported by cultural norms" riage patterns themselves vary by region.Ji and that enables men to adhere to a traditional Yeung (2014)reported that,in general,edu- gender role ideology despite women's growing cation delays marriage,urbanites marry later, preference for a more egalitarian relationship and individuals in the wealthy eastern region (Sayer,England,Allison,Kangas,2011,p. marry later than those in the remote and eco- 1985;Thornton Young-DeMarco,2001). nomically less developed central and westem The Chinese context is unique in that,prior regions.However,Ji and Yeung emphasized that to the late 1970s,the government disseminated marriage prevalence and timing are not linked a Marxist ideology that promoted egalitarian solely to educational level,urbanization,or eco- gender roles and modernized Chinese families nomic development in China.Local tradition within a Communist political economy (Davis is another important factor that contributes to Harrell,1993).In this Communist version of regional variations in marriage,which can be modernity,women's liberation is achieved pri- at odds with economic development levels.For marily through mass labor participation and,to example,Guangxi Zhuang ethnic autonomous a lesser degree,through mass education.As Mao district,a relatively poor province,has the lat- Zedong so famously put it,women can hold est average age at marriage entry for men.Ethnic up half of the sky.Unfortunately,the revolution traditions in the region that depart from the patri- stopped short of the private sphere of family, archal Han Confucian tradition might be part of and,in China,as in so many Western contexts, the reason.Furthermore,although college edu- traditional gender norms and a gendered divi- cation delays both men and women's marriage sion of labor remain largely unchanged(Parish timing,it is the least educated and most disad- Farrer,2000;Sun Chen,2014:Zuo,2003). vantaged men who face the greatest challenging It is interesting that,in the pre-reform socialist in finding a mate (Ji Yeung,2014).Ultimately, period,the work-unit system(Danwei)in which Ji and Yeung attributed China's "exception"to men and women conducted revolutionary pro- the resurgence of the patriarchal Confucian tra- duction provided comprehensive social services dition and the subsequent boosting of pro-family such as housing,dining,and child care (Stock- values,paired with institutional obstacles such man,1994).As a result,the incompleteness and as a weak social welfare system and the exclu- asymmetry of the gender revolution was perhaps sive legitimacy of childbirth within marriage. less noticeable among dual-income families in China,which have been the norm in both pre- The Uneven Gender Revolution and Marriage and post-reform times. In the three decades since the reformation, as a Traditional Institution however,as the government's focus has shifted Over the past 50 years,women have made to China's transition to Western capitalist remarkable progress in both public and private modernity and a market economy,the official realms.In recent decades.however,the gender propaganda of Marxist ideology,including its revolution has become increasingly uneven, egalitarian gender ideology,has lost momentum. even stalled,and is arguably moving in the In the meantime,traditional,patriarchal Confu- opposite direction for men and women in North cian norms have begun to reclaim ground(P.N. American/Western contexts (England,2010). Cohen Wang,2008;Davis Harrell,1993;Tradition and Modernity 1059 and urbanization, marriage remains nearly universal and early in China to this day (Ji & Yeung, 2014; Jones, 2007; Jones & Gubhaju, 2009; Yeung & Hu, 2013); indeed, Jones (2007) remarked that this China “exception” challenges conventional marriage theory. On the basis of 2000 and 2005 data, Jones and Gubhaju (2009) showed that only 2% of women remain single between ages 30 and 34 in China (compared to 10% for men) and that education contributes only moderately to delayed marriage. As the most populous country in the world, China is not homogeneous in terms of economic development and local traditions; likewise, mar￾riage patterns themselves vary by region. Ji and Yeung (2014) reported that, in general, edu￾cation delays marriage, urbanites marry later, and individuals in the wealthy eastern region marry later than those in the remote and eco￾nomically less developed central and western regions. However, Ji and Yeung emphasized that marriage prevalence and timing are not linked solely to educational level, urbanization, or eco￾nomic development in China. Local tradition is another important factor that contributes to regional variations in marriage, which can be at odds with economic development levels. For example, Guangxi Zhuang ethnic autonomous district, a relatively poor province, has the lat￾est average age at marriage entry for men. Ethnic traditions in the region that depart from the patri￾archal Han Confucian tradition might be part of the reason. Furthermore, although college edu￾cation delays both men and women’s marriage timing, it is the least educated and most disad￾vantaged men who face the greatest challenging in finding a mate (Ji & Yeung, 2014). Ultimately, Ji and Yeung attributed China’s “exception” to the resurgence of the patriarchal Confucian tra￾dition and the subsequent boosting of pro-family values, paired with institutional obstacles such as a weak social welfare system and the exclu￾sive legitimacy of childbirth within marriage. The Uneven Gender Revolution and Marriage as a Traditional Institution Over the past 50 years, women have made remarkable progress in both public and private realms. In recent decades, however, the gender revolution has become increasingly uneven, even stalled, and is arguably moving in the opposite direction for men and women in North American/Western contexts (England, 2010). As England (2010, p. 161) noted, women have experienced tremendous upward mobility in education and occupation in the public sphere; however, because of the “cultural and insti￾tutional devaluation” of women’s work, men have not made parallel forays into increased household work and female-dominated occu￾pations. Traditional gender norms still regulate gender relations and family life in the private sphere. Thanks to this stalled and asymmet￾rical gender revolution, the cultural norm of the male-breadwinner marriage is still widely accepted. In short, marriage remains a “gen￾dered institution supported by cultural norms” that enables men to adhere to a traditional gender role ideology despite women’s growing preference for a more egalitarian relationship (Sayer, England, Allison, & Kangas, 2011, p. 1985; Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). The Chinese context is unique in that, prior to the late 1970s, the government disseminated a Marxist ideology that promoted egalitarian gender roles and modernized Chinese families within a Communist political economy (Davis & Harrell, 1993). In this Communist version of modernity, women’s liberation is achieved pri￾marily through mass labor participation and, to a lesser degree, through mass education. As Mao Zedong so famously put it, women can hold up half of the sky. Unfortunately, the revolution stopped short of the private sphere of family, and, in China, as in so many Western contexts, traditional gender norms and a gendered divi￾sion of labor remain largely unchanged (Parish & Farrer, 2000; Sun & Chen, 2014; Zuo, 2003). It is interesting that, in the pre-reform socialist period, the work-unit system (Danwei) in which men and women conducted revolutionary pro￾duction provided comprehensive social services such as housing, dining, and child care (Stock￾man, 1994). As a result, the incompleteness and asymmetry of the gender revolution was perhaps less noticeable among dual-income families in China, which have been the norm in both pre￾and post-reform times. In the three decades since the reformation, however, as the government’s focus has shifted to China’s transition to Western capitalist modernity and a market economy, the official propaganda of Marxist ideology, including its egalitarian gender ideology, has lost momentum. In the meantime, traditional, patriarchal Confu￾cian norms have begun to reclaim ground (P. N. Cohen & Wang, 2008; Davis & Harrell, 1993;