briefly.How much would you pay to be given the option of announcing either first or second? If you first,you woul announce ano that your ompetitor woul announ an output of 7.5.Note:This is th Stackelberg equilibrium.) R-60-e+eg=0g,-g-e(1s-g)=15e,-g Therefore,setting MR=MC=0implies: 15-Q1=0.or Q=15 and Q=7.5. At that output,your competitor is maximizing profits,given that you are producing 15.At these outputs,price isequal to 30.15.7.5=$7.5 Your profit would be (157.5)=$112.5 Your competitor's profit would be (7.57.5)=$56.25. Announcing first is an advantage in this game.The difference in profits between announcing first and announcing second is $56.25.You would be willing to pay up to this difference for the optionofannouncing first. Suppose instead that you are to play the first round of a rounds (with the same competitor In each round,you and your competito announce your outputs at the same time.You want to maximize the sun of your profits over the 10 rounds.How much will you produce in the first round?How much do you expect to produce in the tenth round?In the ninth round?Explain briefly competitor has also read this book,you can ass rationally sume that he actin You should begi with the Co and continue with the Cournotoutput in each round,including the ninth and tenth rounds.Any deviation from this output will reduce the sum of your profits over the ten rounds. Once again you will play a series of 10 rounds.This time,however,in each round your competitor will announce its output before you announce vours How will your answers to(c)change in this case? If your competitor always announces first it might be more profitable to behave by reacting"rrationally"in a single period.For example,in th first round your competitor will announce an output of 15,as in Exercise (7.b).Rationally,you would respond with an output of 7.5.If you behave briefly. How much would you pay to be given the option of announcing either first or second? If you must announce first, you would announce an output of 15, knowing that your competitor would announce an output of 7.5. (Note: This is the Stackelberg equilibrium.) TR1 = 30 − Q1 + Q2 ( ( ))Q1 = 30Q1 − Q1 2 − Q1 15 − Q1 2     =15Q1 − Q1 2 2 . Therefore, setting MR = MC = 0 implies: 15 - Q1 = 0, or Q1 = 15 and Q2 = 7.5. At that output, your competitor is maximizing profits, given that you are producing 15. At these outputs, price is equal to 30 - 15 - 7.5 = $7.5. Your profit would be (15)(7.5) = $112.5. Your competitor’s profit would be (7.5)(7.5) = $56.25. Announcing first is an advantage in this game. The difference in profits between announcing first and announcing second is $56.25. You would be willing to pay up to this difference for the option of announcing first. c. Suppose instead that you are to play the first round of a series of 10 rounds (with the same competitor). In each round, you and your competitor announce your outputs at the same time. You want to maximize the sum of your profits over the 10 rounds. How much will you produce in the first round? How much do you expect to produce in the tenth round? In the ninth round? Explain briefly. Given that your competitor has also read this book, you can assume that he or she will be acting rationally. You should begin with the Cournot output and continue with the Cournot output in each round, including the ninth and tenth rounds. Any deviation from this output will reduce the sum of your profits over the ten rounds. d. Once again you will play a series of 10 rounds. This time, however, in each round your competitor will announce its output before you announce yours. How will your answers to (c) change in this case? If your competitor always announces first, it might be more profitable to behave by reacting “irrationally” in a single period. For example, in the first round your competitor will announce an output of 15, as in Exercise (7.b). Rationally, you would respond with an output of 7.5. If you behave