520 International Organization enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.15 As Arnold Wolfers,John Ruggie,and others have observed,the nature and intensity of national support for any state purpose-even apparently fundamental concerns like the defense of politi- cal and legal sovereignty,territorial integrity,national security,or economic welfare- varies decisively with the social context.16 It is not uncommon for states knowingly to surrender sovereignty,compromise security,or reduce aggregate economic wel- fare.In the liberal view,trade-offs among such goals,as well as cross-national differ- ences in their definition,are inevitable,highly varied,and causally consequential.7 Assumption 3:Interdependence and the International System The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior. For liberals,state behavior reflects varying patterns of state preferences.States require a"purpose,"a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand,in order to provoke conflict,propose cooperation,or take any other significant foreign policy action.The precise nature of these stakes drives policy.This is not to assert that each state simply pursues its ideal policy,oblivious of others;instead,each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the prefer- ences of other states.Thus liberal theory rejects not just the realist assumption that state preferences must be treated as if naturally conflictual,but equally the institution- alist assumption that they should be treated as if they were partially convergent, compromising a collective action problem.18 To the contrary,liberals causally privi- lege variation in the configuration of state preferences,while treating configurations of capabilities and information as if they were either fixed constraints or endogenous to state preferences. The critical theoretical link between state preferences,on the one hand,and the behavior of one or more states,on the other,is provided by the concept of policy interdependence.Policy interdependence is defined here as the set of costs and ben- efits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences,that is,the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes.Liberal theory assumes that the pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes a binding constraint on state behavior. Patterns of interdependence or externalities induced by efforts to realize state pref- erences can be divided into three broad categories,corresponding to the strategic situation (the pattern of policy externalities)that results.19 Where preferences are naturally compatible or harmonious,that is,where the externalities of unilateral poli- 15.Ruggie1983,265. 16.Ruggie1982,1983 17.On the contradictions within Waltz's effort to avoid these ambiguities,see Baldwin 1997,21-22. 18.Keohane 1984,10;1986,193.Note that these are all "as if"assumptions.The world must be consistent with them,but need not fulfill them precisely. 19.See Stein 1982:Snidal 1985;and Martin 1992.520 International Organization enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.15 As Arnold Wolfers, John Ruggie, and others have observed, the nature and intensity of national support for any state purpose--even apparently fundamental concerns like the defense of politi￾cal and legal sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, or economic welfare￾varies decisively with the social context.16 It is not uncommon for states knowingly to surrender sovereignty, compromise security, or reduce aggregate economic wel￾fare. In the liberal view, trade-offs among such goals, as well as cross-national differ￾ences in their definition, are inevitable, highly varied, and causally ~onsequential.'~ Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior: For liberals, state behavior reflects varying patterns of state preferences. States require a "purpose," a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand, in order to provoke conflict, propose cooperation, or take any other significant foreign policy action. The precise nature of these stakes drives policy. This is not to assert that each state simply pursues its ideal policy, oblivious of others; instead, each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the prefer￾ences of other states. Thus liberal theory rejects not just the realist assumption that state preferences must be treated as if naturally conflictual, but equally the institution￾alist assumption that they should be treated as if they were partially convergent, compromising a collective action problem.l8 To the contrary, liberals causally privi￾lege variation in the configuration of state preferences, while treating configurations of capabilities and information as if they were either fixed constraints or endogenous to state preferences. The critical theoretical link between state preferences, on the one hand, and the behavior of one or more states, on the other, is provided by the concept of policy interdependence. Policy interdependence is defined here as the set of costs and ben￾efits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences, that is, the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes. Liberal theory assumes that the pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes a binding constraint on state behavior. Patterns of interdependence or externalities induced by efforts to realize state pref￾erences can be divided into three broad categories, corresponding to the strategic situation (the pattern of policy externalities) that results.19 Where preferences are naturally compatible or harmonious, that is, where the externalities of unilateral poli- 15. Ruggie 1983,265. 16. Ruggie 1982, 1983. 17. On the contradictions within Waltz's effort to avoid these ambiguities, see Baldwin 1997, 21-22. 18. Keohane 1984, 10; 1986, 193. Note that these are all "as if" assumptions. The world must be consistent with them, but need not fulfill them precisely. 19. See Stein 1982;Snidal 1985; and Martin 1992