740 Power or Plenty? involvement in less developed areas of the world since the 1890s.Other histori- cal accounts of American foreign policy followed Williams'example,stressing the role of economic interests in spurring the overseas activity of the American state (e.g.,LaFeber 1963;McCormick 1967).This group of historians-also commonly referred to as "revisionists,"although few discussed American involvement in World War I-were also skeptical of the Cold War security concerns offered to justify most postwar interventions (e.g.,Kolko and Kolko 1972;LaFeber1967). Many other historians objected to interpretations stressing economic interests, offering accounts that emphasized security concerns over the spread of Soviet power.They held that the revisionists were unduly critical of American policy makers'motives,and that the security concerns these policy makers had cited were not mere window-dressing for underlying economic interests (e.g.,Gaddis 1972;Tucker 1971).As had been the case with interpretations of American inter- vention in World War I,the scholarly debate's resonance with contemporary policy issues-in this case,the Vietnam War-politicized it.Historiographical controversy over the role of economic and security concerns in Cold War foreign policy did not entirely lose its political edge even after the Cold War came to an end (e.g.,Cumings 1993;Gaddis 1996;Schrecker 2004). Political scientists are typically more interested in theoretical generalization than are historians,so it is somewhat surprising that the relative importance of economic and security concerns in American intervention has received less atten- tion from them.Case study research that most resembles (and often relies upon) the work of historians has paid the most attention to the issue.The divergent conclusions about the role of economic interests mirror those found among historians.While some have presented evidence that these interests have played a crucial role in some intervention decisions (e.g.,Cox 1994;Gibbs 1990; McKeown 2000),others accord greater importance to security concerns derived from state decision makers'conceptions of the national interest (e.g.,Krasner 1978;Lake1988). The relative importance of economic and security interests in American for- eign policy has received much less attention from quantitative researchers.What there is tends to support the importance of security concerns relative to eco- nomic interests.Some early studies found evidence that economic interests influ- enced decisions about intervention (e.g.,Odell 1974;Rosen 1974).However, subsequent work has generally found greater support for security concerns than for economic interests (e.g.,Meernik 1994;Pearson and Baumann 1977;Yoon 1997).Perhaps reflecting these findings,the considerable body of recent research on civil war intervention has set economic concerns aside and focused on other explanations for intervention,such as the nature of the conflict or stra- tegic interaction among potential interveners (e.g.,Findley and Teo 2006;Regan 1998,2000).Indeed,most recent quantitative analyses of intervention do not include economic variables at all. The neglect of the question of economic and security interests in quantitative research on intervention is unfortunate.This approach is especially well suited for answering questions about the relative importance of these concerns across large numbers of historical cases.These are precisely the kinds of generalizations that have sparked so much controversy among historians of American foreign relations.Even though most scholars engaged in quantitative empirical research understandably prefer to study theoretical arguments that apply to more than just the U.S.case,patterns confined to smaller slices of space and time still deserve attention.Given the nation's enormous role in the contemporary world, understanding the sources of American behavior is not simply a parochial con- cern.A more general explanation also accounting for the behavior of many other states might be preferable,but is not available.In its absence,testing moreinvolvement in less developed areas of the world since the 1890s. Other histori￾cal accounts of American foreign policy followed Williams’ example, stressing the role of economic interests in spurring the overseas activity of the American state (e.g., LaFeber 1963; McCormick 1967). This group of historians—also commonly referred to as ‘‘revisionists,’’ although few discussed American involvement in World War I—were also skeptical of the Cold War security concerns offered to justify most postwar interventions (e.g., Kolko and Kolko 1972; LaFeber 1967). Many other historians objected to interpretations stressing economic interests, offering accounts that emphasized security concerns over the spread of Soviet power. They held that the revisionists were unduly critical of American policy makers’ motives, and that the security concerns these policy makers had cited were not mere window-dressing for underlying economic interests (e.g., Gaddis 1972; Tucker 1971). As had been the case with interpretations of American inter￾vention in World War I, the scholarly debate’s resonance with contemporary policy issues—in this case, the Vietnam War—politicized it. Historiographical controversy over the role of economic and security concerns in Cold War foreign policy did not entirely lose its political edge even after the Cold War came to an end (e.g., Cumings 1993; Gaddis 1996; Schrecker 2004). Political scientists are typically more interested in theoretical generalization than are historians, so it is somewhat surprising that the relative importance of economic and security concerns in American intervention has received less atten￾tion from them. Case study research that most resembles (and often relies upon) the work of historians has paid the most attention to the issue. The divergent conclusions about the role of economic interests mirror those found among historians. While some have presented evidence that these interests have played a crucial role in some intervention decisions (e.g., Cox 1994; Gibbs 1990; McKeown 2000), others accord greater importance to security concerns derived from state decision makers’ conceptions of the national interest (e.g., Krasner 1978; Lake 1988). The relative importance of economic and security interests in American for￾eign policy has received much less attention from quantitative researchers. What there is tends to support the importance of security concerns relative to eco￾nomic interests. Some early studies found evidence that economic interests influ￾enced decisions about intervention (e.g., Odell 1974; Rosen 1974). However, subsequent work has generally found greater support for security concerns than for economic interests (e.g., Meernik 1994; Pearson and Baumann 1977; Yoon 1997). Perhaps reflecting these findings, the considerable body of recent research on civil war intervention has set economic concerns aside and focused on other explanations for intervention, such as the nature of the conflict or stra￾tegic interaction among potential interveners (e.g., Findley and Teo 2006; Regan 1998, 2000). Indeed, most recent quantitative analyses of intervention do not include economic variables at all. The neglect of the question of economic and security interests in quantitative research on intervention is unfortunate. This approach is especially well suited for answering questions about the relative importance of these concerns across large numbers of historical cases. These are precisely the kinds of generalizations that have sparked so much controversy among historians of American foreign relations. Even though most scholars engaged in quantitative empirical research understandably prefer to study theoretical arguments that apply to more than just the U.S. case, patterns confined to smaller slices of space and time still deserve attention. Given the nation’s enormous role in the contemporary world, understanding the sources of American behavior is not simply a parochial con￾cern. A more general explanation also accounting for the behavior of many other states might be preferable, but is not available. In its absence, testing more 740 Power or Plenty?