BENJAMIN O.FORDHAM 739 The model implied by historians who stress security concerns strongly resem- bles the one commonly advanced by realists in the international relations litera- ture.It suggests a plausible narrative of the way American policy makers have made decisions about intervention.American leaders,like the leaders of all states,must ensure the physical safety of Americans from foreign attack as well as the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the American state in a condi- tion of international anarchy.This task has always been far easier than that con- fronting the leaders of states not fortunate enough to be surrounded by large oceans and weaker neighbors.For most of American history,these circumstances provided Americans with what Woodward(1960)aptly labeled "free security." As technology eroded the defensive value of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans dur- ing the 20th century,American policy makers were forced to adopt a more activ- ist foreign policy in order to provide the same level of security.Entanglement in war and conflict in Europe and Asia became more difficult to avoid,and eventu- ally the United States found itself playing a leading role in alliance systems and other security arrangements all over the globe.Narratives informed by this broad understanding of American foreign policy tend to focus on policy makers'evolv- ing perceptions of international conditions. Historians stressing the importance of economic interests in shaping American foreign policy begin with a different argument about the priorities of American leaders.They treat American leaders'claims about national security skeptically. The best policy for insuring American security has been unclear and highly con- tested in important historical cases.For this reason,security concerns provide a weak basis for explaining American choices about intervention.These historians focus instead on the interests of the political coalitions backing particular Ameri- can leaders,constructing an alternative explanation for the increasing global activism of the United States during the 20th century.Broadly summarized,the story is that the American economy led to increasing demands for the protection of important overseas trading partners and investment sites,and a concomitant increase in the capacity of the American state to satisfy these demands.Historical narratives arising from this perspective tend to explain policy in terms of politi- cal conflict among domestic factions with competing interests. Even though theoretical arguments about the role of economic and security concerns are rarely stated explicitly,their influence is not difficult to discern in the historiography of American foreign relations.During the 1920s and 1930s,the debate over the reasons for American intervention in World War I turned on the question of economic motives (Cohen 1967;Fordham 2007)."Revisionist''histori- ans rejected the Wilson administration's reasons for American entry,arguing instead that the large American stake in wartime exports to the Allied powers heav- ily influenced the decision to intervene on their side in 1917 (e.g.,Beard 1936; Grattan 1929;Tansill 1938).The economic importance of this trade led the Wilson administration to take a hard line on German submarine warfare.This hard line ultimately led to intervention.Many other historians rejected the revisionist claim about the role of economic interests.They argued instead that security considerations-including anger over American loss of life due to the sub- marine campaign,fears about the consequences of a German victory,and national prestige were largely independent of trade with the Allies and played a more important role in the decision to intervene (e.g.,May 1959;Seymour [1935]1967; Smith 1965).The approach of World War II politicized this debate.Advocates of non-intervention adopted many elements of the revisionist argument in their suc- cessful legislative effort to restrict trade and lending to belligerent states.Many prominent revisionist historians,such as Charles Beard,supported them. After World War II,a new,more general controversy arose over the role of economic interests in American intervention.William A.Williams (1959)influen- tially argued that the demands of commercial expansion had driven AmericanThe model implied by historians who stress security concerns strongly resem￾bles the one commonly advanced by realists in the international relations litera￾ture. It suggests a plausible narrative of the way American policy makers have made decisions about intervention. American leaders, like the leaders of all states, must ensure the physical safety of Americans from foreign attack as well as the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the American state in a condi￾tion of international anarchy. This task has always been far easier than that con￾fronting the leaders of states not fortunate enough to be surrounded by large oceans and weaker neighbors. For most of American history, these circumstances provided Americans with what Woodward (1960) aptly labeled ‘‘free security.’’ As technology eroded the defensive value of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans dur￾ing the 20th century, American policy makers were forced to adopt a more activ￾ist foreign policy in order to provide the same level of security. Entanglement in war and conflict in Europe and Asia became more difficult to avoid, and eventu￾ally the United States found itself playing a leading role in alliance systems and other security arrangements all over the globe. Narratives informed by this broad understanding of American foreign policy tend to focus on policy makers’ evolv￾ing perceptions of international conditions. Historians stressing the importance of economic interests in shaping American foreign policy begin with a different argument about the priorities of American leaders. They treat American leaders’ claims about national security skeptically. The best policy for insuring American security has been unclear and highly con￾tested in important historical cases. For this reason, security concerns provide a weak basis for explaining American choices about intervention. These historians focus instead on the interests of the political coalitions backing particular Ameri￾can leaders, constructing an alternative explanation for the increasing global activism of the United States during the 20th century. Broadly summarized, the story is that the American economy led to increasing demands for the protection of important overseas trading partners and investment sites, and a concomitant increase in the capacity of the American state to satisfy these demands. Historical narratives arising from this perspective tend to explain policy in terms of politi￾cal conflict among domestic factions with competing interests. Even though theoretical arguments about the role of economic and security concerns are rarely stated explicitly, their influence is not difficult to discern in the historiography of American foreign relations. During the 1920s and 1930s, the debate over the reasons for American intervention in World War I turned on the question of economic motives (Cohen 1967; Fordham 2007). ‘‘Revisionist’’ histori￾ans rejected the Wilson administration’s reasons for American entry, arguing instead that the large American stake in wartime exports to the Allied powers heav￾ily influenced the decision to intervene on their side in 1917 (e.g., Beard 1936; Grattan 1929; Tansill 1938). The economic importance of this trade led the Wilson administration to take a hard line on German submarine warfare. This hard line ultimately led to intervention. Many other historians rejected the revisionist claim about the role of economic interests. They argued instead that security considerations—including anger over American loss of life due to the sub￾marine campaign, fears about the consequences of a German victory, and national prestige were largely independent of trade with the Allies and played a more important role in the decision to intervene (e.g., May 1959; Seymour [1935] 1967; Smith 1965). The approach of World War II politicized this debate. Advocates of non-intervention adopted many elements of the revisionist argument in their suc￾cessful legislative effort to restrict trade and lending to belligerent states. Many prominent revisionist historians, such as Charles Beard, supported them. After World War II, a new, more general controversy arose over the role of economic interests in American intervention. William A. Williams (1959) influen￾tially argued that the demands of commercial expansion had driven American Benjamin O. Fordham 739