738 Power or Plenty? The evidence considered here suggests that security concerns about the welfare of allies and the actions of rivals have a greater immediate impact on interven- tion decisions,but that economic interests also have important long-run indirect effects by shaping the things that get defined as security interests.The United States has been more likely to extend security guarantees to important trading partners than to less economically significant states.The process this evidence implies is one in which intervention decisions are made on the basis of security concerns rather than economic interests,just as decision makers typically claim they do.However,economic relationships shape these security interests over long periods of time in ways that may escape the attention of decision makers preoccu- pied with ongoing events. This article proceeds in four parts.The first reviews debates among historians and political scientists about the role of economic and security concerns in American foreign policy.The second sets out a research design for testing the influence of these two sources of explanation as well as the relationship between them.The third section presents the empirical results.A final section summa- rizes and concludes. Economic and Security Interests in Intervention Decisions What is the role of economic and security concerns in American decisions about intervention?Surprisingly,this question has received much greater attention from historians,who are typically less concerned about such broad patterns across space and time,than from political scientists,for whom such patterns are a central preoccupation.This section will first examine the way these two sets of researchers have addressed this question,then consider how each fits into the causal process leading to intervention. Historians,Political Scientists,and the Role of Economic and Security Concerns The relative importance of economic interests and security concerns has been a major bone of contention among historians of American foreign relations.Con- troversies among historians have generally focused on specific historical cases, but they also reflect broader theoretical differences about the forces that have shaped American foreign policy priorities.A political scientist (though probably not a historian)would say that these controversies concern competing models of the policymaking process.The debate over these models has often had an ideo- logical edge because of what they suggest about whose interests American for- eign policy has typically served.As the historian Emily Rosenberg(1993,37)has put it,"interpretations that stressed economics tended to be joined to radical critiques of American foreign policy and of America itself."Efforts to protect economic interests nearly always generate winners and losers in American society, while security is a public good that all Americans can enjoy. Models of the policy-making process play a different role in historical accounts of American foreign policy than in most political science research.Political scien- tists typically begin with an explicit model and then seek to test it empirically.By contrast,historians usually present a narrative account of the specific historical process that interests them without an explicit model.These narratives often incorporate material that is not relevant to a social-scientific test of the theoreti- cal model implicit in the work but that provides greater descriptive detail about what actually happened.The fact that historians'theoretical models of the for- eign policy process are implicit does not mean they are unimportant.Some theo- retical account of the underlying historical process is necessary to suggest relevant sources for research,to make connections among disparate pieces of evidence,and to fill in the gaps where the sources are silent.The evidence considered here suggests that security concerns about the welfare of allies and the actions of rivals have a greater immediate impact on interven￾tion decisions, but that economic interests also have important long-run indirect effects by shaping the things that get defined as security interests. The United States has been more likely to extend security guarantees to important trading partners than to less economically significant states. The process this evidence implies is one in which intervention decisions are made on the basis of security concerns rather than economic interests, just as decision makers typically claim they do. However, economic relationships shape these security interests over long periods of time in ways that may escape the attention of decision makers preoccu￾pied with ongoing events. This article proceeds in four parts. The first reviews debates among historians and political scientists about the role of economic and security concerns in American foreign policy. The second sets out a research design for testing the influence of these two sources of explanation as well as the relationship between them. The third section presents the empirical results. A final section summa￾rizes and concludes. Economic and Security Interests in Intervention Decisions What is the role of economic and security concerns in American decisions about intervention? Surprisingly, this question has received much greater attention from historians, who are typically less concerned about such broad patterns across space and time, than from political scientists, for whom such patterns are a central preoccupation. This section will first examine the way these two sets of researchers have addressed this question, then consider how each fits into the causal process leading to intervention. Historians, Political Scientists, and the Role of Economic and Security Concerns The relative importance of economic interests and security concerns has been a major bone of contention among historians of American foreign relations. Con￾troversies among historians have generally focused on specific historical cases, but they also reflect broader theoretical differences about the forces that have shaped American foreign policy priorities. A political scientist (though probably not a historian) would say that these controversies concern competing models of the policymaking process. The debate over these models has often had an ideo￾logical edge because of what they suggest about whose interests American for￾eign policy has typically served. As the historian Emily Rosenberg (1993, 37) has put it, ‘‘interpretations that stressed economics tended to be joined to radical critiques of American foreign policy and of America itself.’’ Efforts to protect economic interests nearly always generate winners and losers in American society, while security is a public good that all Americans can enjoy. Models of the policy-making process play a different role in historical accounts of American foreign policy than in most political science research. Political scien￾tists typically begin with an explicit model and then seek to test it empirically. By contrast, historians usually present a narrative account of the specific historical process that interests them without an explicit model. These narratives often incorporate material that is not relevant to a social-scientific test of the theoreti￾cal model implicit in the work but that provides greater descriptive detail about what actually happened. The fact that historians’ theoretical models of the for￾eign policy process are implicit does not mean they are unimportant. Some theo￾retical account of the underlying historical process is necessary to suggest relevant sources for research, to make connections among disparate pieces of evidence, and to fill in the gaps where the sources are silent. 738 Power or Plenty?