IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 693 Associative Processes Wilson et).implicit attitudes should generally be more The first t anticle is twofold.The first obie ciative ev e isto propose a new neoretical model for the study of ex tions tha maticall whe ters ative,exhaustive review of the ilable evidence regarding attitude change th ham.Ray .&Johnson.2004).The e,the first ever,s Tha a person ce egard these ocia in the sense that the 、not ne han This section spe ifies auses of implicit and explicit enc Instead,the prin de ange and ho changes in oral contiguity (Bassili&Brown.2005:Smith&DeCoster. discusse s the of our model to other the of ass s th nge,the re 1996).p related to the application of the proposed n (a)the in memory and (b)the parti cular set of e Associative and Propositional Processes in Evaluation include such as were parti othe G ald Bana but not" 1995.Rc ch on as the Imphcit Ass on the the semantic priming(Wittenbrink et 1997 the go Simon task (De Houwe s different a ive reactions depe paradigm (Payne.Cheng.Govorun.&S wart.2005) affective reactions are not purely ontext driven.a 2003b:Fazio Olson.2003: atter acti 5( on of of the extemal input stimuli. the organ ing frat work of this rev APE Propositional Processes Wad comes from prop e basis for what many research 2002-Sloman 1906:Smith Dec 2000:Sr For the view part of this article.we sed th eral inclus which can be described as a to evaluate APE view in that ay be nsidered as attitude shifts rathe this de se.Fo er.w ation wo kir their roots in long-term socialization experiences (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001; Petty et al., 2006; Rudman, 2004; Wilson et al., 2000), implicit attitudes should generally be more robust than explicit attitudes. The main goal of the present article is twofold. The first objec￾tive is to propose a new theoretical model for the study of explicit and implicit attitude change. The second objective is to provide an integrative, exhaustive review of the available evidence regarding implicit and explicit attitude change that is organized according to the implications of the proposed model (for a list of the reviewed studies, see the Appendix).1 For this purpose, the first section of this article outlines our theoretical conceptualization of implicit and explicit attitudes. In particular, we argue that implicit and explicit attitudes should be understood in terms of their underlying mental processes, which are associative and propositional pro￾cesses. The second section uses the proposed associative– propositional evaluation (APE) model as an organizing framework to review the available evidence on explicit and implicit attitude change. This section specifies causes of implicit and explicit attitude change and how changes in one kind of evaluation may or may not be associated with changes in the other. Finally, the last section discusses the relation of our model to other theories of attitude change, the relative stability of attitude changes, limits of a single-process approach, directions for future research, and some methodological issues related to the application of the proposed model. Associative and Propositional Processes in Evaluation The systematic investigation of implicit and explicit attitudes began with the development of measures that were particularly designed to assess individual differences in automatic evaluations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Research on implicit attitudes relies on a large variety of measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998), affective priming (Fazio et al., 1995), semantic priming (Wittenbrink et al., 1997), the go/no-go association task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the extrinsic affective Simon task (De Houwer, 2003a), and the affect misattribution paradigm (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). These mea￾sures have been reviewed extensively elsewhere (De Houwer, 2003b; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, in press), and thus we refrain from an elaborate discussion of them. Instead, we focus on a more detailed discussion of the proposed model that is used as the organizing framework of this review. The APE model builds on earlier dual-process theories of cognitive func￾tioning that distinguish between two qualitatively different kinds of mental processes (e.g., Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade￾Benzoni, 1998; Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In particular, we argue that implicit and explicit attitudes should be understood in terms of their underlying pro￾cesses, which can be described as associative processes for implicit attitudes and propositional processes for explicit attitudes. This conceptualization adopts the widespread definition of attitude as a psychological tendency to evaluate a given entity with some de￾gree of favor or disfavor (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). However, the APE model goes beyond this defi￾nition by arguing that such evaluative tendencies can be rooted in two kinds of mental processes. Associative Processes The first source of evaluative tendencies resides in associative processes, which build the basis for what many researchers call implicit attitudes. Associative evaluations are best characterized as automatic affective reactions resulting from the particular associ￾ations that are activated automatically when one encounters a relevant stimulus. Such activation processes do not require much cognitive capacity or an intention to evaluate an object (Cunning￾ham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004). The most important feature, how￾ever, is that associative evaluations are independent of the assign￾ment of truth values. That is, associative evaluations can be activated irrespective of whether a person considers these evalua￾tions as accurate or inaccurate. For example, the activation level of negative associations regarding African Americans may be high even though an individual may regard these associations as inad￾equate or false (Devine, 1989). Thus, associative evaluations are not personal in the sense that they are not necessarily personally endorsed (cf. Arkes & Tetlock, 2004). Instead, the primary deter￾minants of association activation are feature similarity and spatio￾temporal contiguity (Bassili & Brown, 2005; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Another important aspect of associative processes is the notion of pattern activation (see Smith, 1996). Pattern activation refers to the idea that the activation of particular associations in memory is determined by the relative fit between (a) the preexisting structure of associations in memory and (b) the particular set of external input stimuli. For example, the associative pattern activated by the stimuli basketball and gym may include concepts such as “bounc￾ing” but not concepts such as “floating.” However, the associative pattern activated by the stimuli basketball and water may include concepts such as “floating” but not “bouncing.” In other words, even though the concept “basketball” is associated with both “bouncing” and “floating” in memory, which of the two becomes activated depends on the particular context in which the stimulus basketball is encountered (see Barsalou, 1982). Thus, applied to attitudes, the same object may activate different associative pat￾terns and thus different automatic affective reactions depending on the particular context in which the object is encountered. Still, automatic affective reactions are not purely context driven, as pattern activation generally depends on both (a) the preexisting structure of associations in memory and (b) the particular set of external input stimuli. Propositional Processes The second source of evaluative tendencies comes from prop￾ositional processes, which build the basis for what many research- 1 For the review part of this article, we used three general inclusion criteria: (a) A study must include at least one implicit attitude measure, (b) the implicit measure must tap a general evaluation rather than a semantic association, and (c) the study must include at least one experimental manipulation. Thus, the present review covers not only evidence on atti￾tude change but also studies on attitude formation. In addition, the present review includes findings that may be considered as attitude shifts rather than attitude change. For the sake of simplicity, however, we generally use the term attitude change to refer to attitude formation, attitude change, and attitude shifts. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE CHANGE 693