THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 539 childcare,which provides places for at least three quarters children after separation(also usually the wife)can be of all toddlers and nearly all infants.Nevertheless,about characterized as the economically more dependent part- one quarter of all economically active women work ner.Thus,we assume that part-time,which in Sweden means about 30 hours a week.Part-time work is a female domain in Sweden. Hib:Women-compared to men-more often expe- rience more severe income losses. Furthermore,the Swedish system of individual taxation generally encourages women to enter the labour market Basically,two mechanisms contribute to these ine- and wage differences between men and women are qualities(Holden and Smock,1991).(i)Income sharing small.All in all,Sweden may be said to fit the dual earner during partnership allows women to participate in model of our typology. men's market incomes,which are on average higher than women's market incomes.Maintenance payments Hypotheses after separation,if they exist at all,hardly compensate for the loss of this economic support.(ii)If children It is no surprise that separation often leads to increased exist,economic needs are higher for the resident parent financial strain for the involved partners.On the one after separation and this in most cases is the mother.She hand,they lose the advantage of household sharing and has to care for more economically dependent household using common resources.Sorensen (1994:178)has members and because of this she is often restricted in estimated these losses of economies of scale between 27 her earnings capacities.Besides that,the risk that the res- and 36 per cent.On the other hand,both partners have ident parent does not receive half of the child mainte- to deal with new costs including,e.g.,expenses for legal nance costs from the non-resident liable parent is high. procedures or for setting up a new home.Furthermore, Apparently,the gender gap in post-separation incomes would not exist if women's employment were as high as economic inactivity of one partner can no longer be men's,if women would achieve the same level of income absorbed by the 'family-income'of the main earner. Correspondingly,most empirical research on separation as men,if childcare were no restriction for gainful and divorce shows that partnership dissolution is com- employment(or would otherwise be remunerated),and if bined with income changes for both genders.In line the costs of childcare were equally shared by both parents. with this research,we expect that In such a perfect world,women and men would be eco- nomically autonomous.However,from our theoretical .Hia:Separation or divorce causes income changes for discussion we learned that gender-specific roles in part- both partners. nerships exist in most European countries and therefore However,research on separation and divorce has also women often have fewer resources than men.Besides shown an unequal distribution of these income changes. that,the national context is more or less supportive for Especially the economically more dependent partner has women's economic autonomy.Table 2 presents some to deal with income losses rather than income gains. stylized facts about the amount of cash transfers to fami- Women in general or the partner who cares for the lies,the availability of public childcare,and the extent of Table 2 Women's economic autonomy (country ranking) Economic autonomy Sweden(3) Belgium(2) Germany (2) Great Britain(2) Italy(1) Cash transfers Family cash benefits ++ 0 0 Child benefits ++ Social assistance 0 0 Public childcare 0-to 3-year olds ++ 3-to 6-year olds 0 0 Women's employment Employment rate ++ 0 + Low part-time employment + 0 0 ++ Economic autonomy:3,high;2,middle:1,low. Rank compared to five-country mean:-,very low;low;0,average;high;++very high.THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION 539 childcare, which provides places for at least three quarters of all toddlers and nearly all infants. Nevertheless, about one quarter of all economically active women work part-time, which in Sweden means about 30 hours a week. Part-time work is a female domain in Sweden. Furthermore, the Swedish system of individual taxation generally encourages women to enter the labour market and wage differences between men and women are small. All in all, Sweden may be said to fit the dual earner model of our typology. Hypotheses It is no surprise that separation often leads to increased financial strain for the involved partners. On the one hand, they lose the advantage of household sharing and using common resources. Sørensen (1994: 178) has estimated these losses of economies of scale between 27 and 36 per cent. On the other hand, both partners have to deal with new costs including, e.g., expenses for legal procedures or for setting up a new home. Furthermore, economic inactivity of one partner can no longer be absorbed by the ‘family-income’ of the main earner. Correspondingly, most empirical research on separation and divorce shows that partnership dissolution is com￾bined with income changes for both genders. In line with this research, we expect that • H1a: Separation or divorce causes income changes for both partners. However, research on separation and divorce has also shown an unequal distribution of these income changes. Especially the economically more dependent partner has to deal with income losses rather than income gains. Women in general or the partner who cares for the children after separation (also usually the wife) can be characterized as the economically more dependent part￾ner. Thus, we assume that • H1b: Women – compared to men –more often expe￾rience more severe income losses. Basically, two mechanisms contribute to these ine￾qualities (Holden and Smock, 1991). (i) Income sharing during partnership allows women to participate in men’s market incomes, which are on average higher than women’s market incomes. Maintenance payments after separation, if they exist at all, hardly compensate for the loss of this economic support. (ii) If children exist, economic needs are higher for the resident parent after separation and this in most cases is the mother. She has to care for more economically dependent household members and because of this she is often restricted in her earnings capacities. Besides that, the risk that the res￾ident parent does not receive half of the child mainte￾nance costs from the non-resident liable parent is high. Apparently, the gender gap in post-separation incomes would not exist if women’s employment were as high as men’s, if women would achieve the same level of income as men, if childcare were no restriction for gainful employment (or would otherwise be remunerated), and if the costs of childcare were equally shared by both parents. In such a perfect world, women and men would be eco￾nomically autonomous. However, from our theoretical discussion we learned that gender-specific roles in part￾nerships exist in most European countries and therefore women often have fewer resources than men. Besides that, the national context is more or less supportive for women’s economic autonomy. Table 2 presents some stylized facts about the amount of cash transfers to fami￾lies, the availability of public childcare, and the extent of Table 2 Women’s economic autonomy (country ranking) Economic autonomy: 3, high; 2, middle; 1, low. Rank compared to five-country mean: --, very low; –, low; 0, average; + high; ++, very high. Economic autonomy Sweden (3) Belgium (2) Germany (2) Great Britain (2) Italy (1) Cash transfers Family cash benefits ++ 0 – 0 -- Child benefits 0 ++ – – -- Social assistance 0 + – 0 -- Public childcare 0- to 3-year olds ++ + -- -- -- 3- to 6-year olds 0 + 0 -- + Women’s employment Employment rate ++ – 0 + -- Low part-time employment + 0 0 -- ++