American Political Science Review Vol.87,No.3 countries that have reached the highest level of form a governing junta.We have seen that autocracy economic development and have enjoyed good eco- is a most profitable occupation and that the authors of nomic performance across generations are all stable most coups and upheavals have appointed them- democracies.Democracies have also been about twice selves dictators.So the theory here predicts that as likely to win wars as have dictatorships (Lake 1992). democracy would be most likely to emerge sponta- neously when the individual or individuals or group leaders who orchestrated the overthrow of an autoc- THE IMPROBABLE TRANSITION racy could not establish another autocracy,much as they would gain from doing so.We can deduce from How do democracies emerge out of autocracies?It is the theory offered here that autocracy is prevented relatively easy to see how autocratic government and democracy permitted by the accidents of history emerges and why it has been the predominant form that leave a balance of power or stalemate-a disper- of government since the development of settled ag- sion of force and resources that makes it impossible riculture:there is never a shortage of strong men who for any one leader or group to overpower all of the enjoy getting a fortune from tax receipts.It is much others. harder to see how democratic government can But this deduction does not give us any original emerge out of autocracy. conclusion:rather,it points directly toward one of the It is a logical mistake to suppose that because the major inductive findings in some of the literature in subjects of an autocrat suffer from his exactions,they history and in political science on the emergence of will overthrow him.The same logic of collective democracy.If the theory here is right,there must be action that ensures the absence of social contracts in a considerable element of truth in the famous"Whig the historical record whereby large groups agreed to interpretation"of British history and in the explana- obtain the advantages of government also implies tions of democracy offered by political scientists such that the masses will not overthrow an autocrat simply as Robert Dahl(1971)and,especially,Tatu Vanhanen because they would be better off if they did so. (1989).If the theory offered here is right,the literature Historical evidence from at least the first pharaohs that argues that the emergence of democracy is due to through Saddam Hussein indicates that resolute au- historical conditions and dispersions of resources that tocrats can survive even when they impose heinous make it impossible for any one leader or group to amounts of suffering upon their peoples.When they assume all power is also right. are replaced,it is for other reasons (e.g.succession Yet it is also necessary to go back again to the crises)and often by another stationary bandit.11 What theory for a crucial detail.Even when there is a special circumstances explain the cases where a more balance of power that keeps any one leader or group or less democratic12 or at least pluralistic government from assuming total control of a large area or juris- emerges out of an autocracy? diction,the leader of each group may be able to One obvious special circumstance is that,partly for establish himself as an autocrat of a small domain.A the reasons just set out,the richest countries are dispersion of power and resources over a large area democracies,and democracies have usually prevailed can result in a set of small-scale autocracies but no in the competitions with their major autocratic com- democracy.If,however,the different contending petitors,whether fascist or communist.The trium- groups are scrambled together over a wide and phant democracies have sometimes encouraged or well-delineated domain,then small autocracies are subsidized transitions to democracy in other coun- not feasible.They may not be feasible also if each of tries.In some cases,such as Germany,Japan,and the leaders capable of forming a small-scale autocracy Italy after World War II,the victorious democracies believes that a domain of that small scale would not more or less demanded democratic institutions as a be viable,whether because of aggression by other price for giving independence to the vanquished autocrats or for any reason. nations.The theoretical challenge is to explain not If scrambled constituencies or any other reason these transitions but rather those that are entirely rules out division of a domain into miniautocracies, internal and spontaneous. then the best attainable option for the leader of each Easy as it would be to argue that the initially or group when there is a balance of power is power spontaneously democratic countries were blessed sharing.If no one leader can subdue the others or with democratic cultures or selfless leaders,this segregate his followers into a separate domain,then would be an ad hoc evasion.The obligation here is to the alternative is either to engage in fruitless fighting explain the spontaneous transitions to democracy or to work out a truce with mutual toleration.The from the same parsimonious theory that has been provision of a peaceful order and other public goods used in the rest of this essay. will,in these circumstances,be advantageous for all The theory suggests that the key to an explanation of the groups;thus,the leaders of the different of the spontaneous emergence of democracy is the groups have an incentive to work out mutually satis- absence of the commonplace conditions that generate factory arrangements for the provision of such goods. autocracy.The task is to explain why a leader who Given peaceful conditions,there are great gains to organized the overthrow of an autocrat would not leaders and other individuals in each group from make himself the next dictator or why any group of being able to make mutually advantageous contracts conspirators who overthrew an autocrat would not with others and thereby a common interest in estab- 573 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun,19 Feb 2017 15:11:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/termsAmerican Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 3 countries that have reached the highest level of economic development and have enjoyed good eco- nomic performance across generations are all stable democracies. Democracies have also been about twice as likely to win wars as have dictatorships (Lake 1992). THE IMPROBABLE TRANSITION How do democracies emerge out of autocracies? It is relatively easy to see how autocratic government emerges and why it has been the predominant form of government since the development of settled ag- riculture: there is never a shortage of strong men who enjoy getting a fortune from tax receipts. It is much harder to see how democratic government can emerge out of autocracy. It is a logical mistake to suppose that because the subjects of an autocrat suffer from his exactions, they will overthrow him. The same logic of collective action that ensures the absence of social contracts in the historical record whereby large groups agreed to obtain the advantages of government also implies that the masses will not overthrow an autocrat simply because they would be better off if they did so. Historical evidence from at least the first pharaohs through Saddam Hussein indicates that resolute au- tocrats can survive even when they impose heinous amounts of suffering upon their peoples. When they are replaced, it is for other reasons (e.g. succession crises) and often by another stationary bandit.'1 What special circumstances explain the cases where a more or less democratic12 or at least pluralistic government emerges out of an autocracy? One obvious special circumstance is that, partly for the reasons just set out, the richest countries are democracies, and democracies have usually prevailed in the competitions with their major autocratic com- petitors, whether fascist or communist. The trium- phant democracies have sometimes encouraged or subsidized transitions to democracy in other coun- tries. In some cases, such as Germany, Japan, and Italy after World War II, the victorious democracies more or less demanded democratic institutions as a price for giving independence to the vanquished nations. The theoretical challenge is to explain not these transitions but rather those that are entirely internal and spontaneous. Easy as it would be to argue that the initially or spontaneously democratic countries were blessed with democratic cultures or selfless leaders, this would be an ad hoc evasion. The obligation here is to explain the spontaneous transitions to democracy from the same parsimonious theory that has been used in the rest of this essay. The theory suggests that the key to an explanation of the spontaneous emergence of democracy is the absence of the commonplace conditions that generate autocracy. The task is to explain why a leader who organized the overthrow of an autocrat would not make himself the next dictator or why any group of conspirators who overthrew an autocrat would not form a governing junta. We have seen that autocracy is a most profitable occupation and that the authors of most coups and upheavals have appointed them- selves dictators. So the theory here predicts that democracy would be most likely to emerge sponta- neously when the' individual or individuals or group leaders who orchestrated the overthrow of an autoc- racy could not establish another autocracy, much as they would gain from doing so. We can deduce from the theory offered here that autocracy is prevented and democracy permitted by the accidents of history that leave a balance of power or stalemate-a disper- sion of force and resources that makes it impossible for any one leader or group to overpower all of the others. But this deduction does not give us any original conclusion: rather, it points directly toward one of the major inductive findings in some of the literature in history and in political science on the emergence of democracy. If the theory here is right, there must be a considerable element of truth in the famous "Whig interpretation" of British history and in the explana- tions of democracy offered by political scientists such as Robert Dahl (1971) and, especially, Tatu Vanhanen (1989). If the theory offered here is right, the literature that argues that the emergence of democracy is due to historical conditions and dispersions of resources that make it impossible for any one leader or group to assume all power is also right. Yet it is also necessary to go back again to the theory for a crucial detail. Even when there is a balance of power that keeps any one leader or group from assuming total control of a large area or juris- diction, the leader of each group may be able to establish himself as an autocrat of a small domain. A dispersion of power and resources over a large area can result in a set of small-scale autocracies but no democracy. If, however, the different contending groups are scrambled together over a wide and well-delineated domain, then' small autocracies are not feasible. They may not be feasible also if each of the leaders capable of forming a small-scale autocracy believes that a domain of that small scale would not be viable, whether because of aggression by other autocrats or for any reason. If scrambled constituencies or any other reason rules out division of a domain into miniautocracies, then the best attainable option for the leader of each group when there is a balance of power is power sharing. If no one leader can subdue the others or segregate his followers into a separate domain, then the alternative is either to engage in fruitless fighting or to work out a truce with mutual toleration. The provision of a peaceful order and other public goods will, in these circumstances, be advantageous for all of the groups; thus, the leaders of the different groups have an incentive to work out mutually satis- factory arrangements for the provision of such goods. Given peaceful conditions, there are great gains to leaders and other individuals in each group from being able to make mutually advantageous contracts with others and thereby a common interest in estab- 573 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun, 19 Feb 2017 15:11:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms