Dictatorship,Democracy,and Development September 1993 lishing a disinterested and independent judiciary. Though the emergence of a democratic national With several groups,it is not certain in advance how government in the United States(and in some other elections will turn out,yet each group can,by allying areas of British settlement,such as australia and with other groups,ensure that no one other group Canada)was partly due to the example or influence will continually dominate elections.Thus elections as of Great Britain,it also was due in part to the absence well as consensual agreements among the leaders of of any one group or colonial government that was the different groups can be consistent with the inter- capable of suppressing the others.The 13 colonies est of the leaders and members of each group. were different from one another even on such impor- Though there are a fair number of democracies, tant matters as slavery and religion,and none of there have not been many spontaneous and entirely them had the power to control the others.The autonomous transitions from autocracy to democ- separate colonies had,in general,experienced a con- racy.Most of the democracies in the English-speak- siderable degree of internal democracy under British ing world owed a good deal to the pluralism and rule,and many of the colonies were,because of the democracy that emerged in late seventeenth-century different religious and economic groups they con- Britain and thus they usually do not offer a com- tained,also internally diverse.Many of the authors of pletely independent test of the argument about the the U.S.Constitution were,of course,also pro- transition to democracy offered here. foundly aware of the importance of retaining a dis- Happily,the initial emergence of democracy with persion of power(checks and balances)that would the Glorious Revolution of 1689 in England(and its prevent autocracy. very gradual transition from a democracy with a highly restricted franchise to universal suffrage) nicely fits the logic of the democratic transition pre- dicted by the present theory.There were no lasting THE DIFFERENT SOURCES OF winners in the English civil wars.The different ten- PROGRESS IN AUTOCRACIES dencies in British Protestantism and the economic AND DEMOCRACIES and social forces with which they were linked were more or less evenly matched.There had been a lot of Since human nature is profoundly complex and indi- costly fighting and,certainly after Cromwell,no one viduals rarely act out of unmixed motives,the as- had the power to defeat all of the others.The restored sumption of rational self-interest that I have been Stuart kings might have been able to do this,but their using to develop this theory is obviously much too many mistakes and the choices that ultimately united simple to do justice to reality.But the caricature almost all of the normally conflicting Protestant and assumption that I have been using has not only other political tendencies against them finally led to simplified a forbiddingly complex reality but also their total defeat. introduced an element of impartiality:the same mo- None of the victorious leaders,groups,or tenden- tivation was assumed in all regimes.The results are cies was then strong enough to impose its will upon probably also robust enough to hold under richer and all of the others or to create a new autocracy.None more realistic behavioral assumptions. had any incentive to give William and Mary the The use of the same motivational assumption and power to establish one either.The best option avail- the same theory to treat both autocracy and democ- able to each of the leaders and groups with power racy also illuminates the main difference in the was to agree upon the ascendancy of a Parliament sources of economic growth and the obstacles to that included them all and to take out some insurance progress under autocracy and under democracy.In against the power of the others through an indepen- an autocracy,the source of order and other public dent judiciary and a Bill of Rights.(The spread of the goods and likewise the source of the social progress franchise is too long a story to tell here.But it is not that these public goods make possible is the encom- difficult to see how,once the society was definitely passing interest of the autocrat.The main obstacle to nonautocratic and safely pluralist,additional groups long-run progress in autocracies is that individual could parlay the profitable interactions that particular rights even to such relatively unpolitical or economic enfranchised interests had with them-and the costs matters as property and contracts can never be se- of suppression that they could force the enfranchised cure,at least over the long run. to bear-into a wider suffrage.) Although democracies can also obtain great advan- With a carefully constrained monarchy,an inde- tages from encompassing offices and political parties, pendent judiciary,and a Bill of Rights,people in this is by no means always understood (Olson 1982, England in due course came to have a relatively high. 1986);nor are the awesome difficulties in keeping degree of confidence that any contracts they entered narrow special interests from dominating economic into would be impartially enforced and that private policymaking in the long-stable democracy.On the property rights,even for critics of the government, other hand,democracies have the great advantage of were relatively secure.Individual rights to property preventing significant extraction of social surplus by and contract enforcement were probably more secure their leaders.They also have the extraordinary virtue in Britain after 1689 than anywhere else,and it was in that the same emphasis on individual rights that is Britain,not very long after the Glorious Revolution, necessary to lasting democracy is also necessary for that the Industrial Revolution began.13 secure rights to both property and the enforcement of 574 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun,19 Feb 2017 15:11:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/termsDictatorship, Democracy, and Development September 1993 fishing a disinterested and independent judiciary. With several groups, it is not certain in advance how elections will turn out, yet each group can, by allying with other groups, ensure that no one other group will continually dominate elections. Thus elections as well as consensual agreements among the leaders of the different groups can be consistent with the inter- est of the leaders and members of each group. Though there are a fair number of democracies, there have not been many spontaneous and entirely autonomous transitions from autocracy to democ- racy. Most of the democracies in the English-speak- ing world owed a good deal to the pluralism and democracy that emerged in late seventeenth-century Britain and thus they usually do not offer a com- pletely independent test of the argument about the transition to democracy offered here. Happily, the initial emergence of democracy with the Glorious Revolution of 1689 in England (and its very gradual transition from a democracy with a highly restricted franchise to universal suffrage) nicely fits the logic of the democratic transition pre- dicted by the present theory. There were no lasting winners in the English civil wars. The different ten- dencies in British Protestantism and the economic and social forces with which they were linked were more or less evenly matched. There had been a lot of costly fighting and, certainly after Cromwell, no one had the power to defeat all of the others. The restored Stuart kings might have been able to do this, but their many mistakes and the choices that ultimately united almost all of the normally conflicting Protestant and other political tendencies against them finally led to their total defeat. None of the victorious leaders, groups, or tenden- cies was then strong enough to impose its will upon all of the others or to create a new autocracy. None had any incentive to give William and Mary the power to establish one either. The best option avail- able to each of the leaders and groups with power was to agree upon the ascendancy of a Parliament that included them all and to take out some insurance against the power of the others through an indepen- dent judiciary and a Bill of Rights. (The spread of the franchise is too long a story to tell here. But it is not difficult to see how, once the society was definitely nonautocratic and safely pluralist, additional groups could parlay the profitable interactions that particular enfranchised interests had with them-and the costs of suppression that they could force the enfranchised to bear-into a wider suffrage.) With a carefully constrained monarchy, an inde- pendent judiciary, and a Bill of Rights, people in England in due course came to have a relatively high degree of confidence that any contracts they entered into would be impartially enforced and that private property rights, even for critics of the government, were relatively secure. Individual rights to property and contract enforcement were probably more secure in Britain after 1689 than anywhere else, and it was in Britain, not very long after the Glorious Revolution, that the Industrial Revolution began.13 Though the emergence of a democratic national government in the United States (and in some other areas of British settlement, such as Australia and Canada) was partly due to the example or influence of Great Britain, it also was due in part to the absence of any one group or colonial government that was capable of suppressing the others. The 13 colonies were different from one another even on such impor- tant matters as slavery and religion, and none of them had the power to control the others. The separate colonies had, in general, experienced a con- siderable degree of internal democracy under British rule, and many of the colonies were, because of the different religious and economic groups they con- tained, also internally diverse. Many of the authors of the U.S. Constitution were, of course, also pro- foundly aware of the importance of retaining a dis- persion of power (checks and balances) that would prevent autocracy. THE DIFFERENT SOURCES OF PROGRESS IN AUTOCRACIES AND DEMOCRACIES Since human nature is profoundly complex and indi- viduals rarely act out of unmixed motives, the as- sumption of rational self-interest that I have been using to develop this theory is obviously much too simple to do justice to reality. But the caricature assumption that I have been using has not only simplified a forbiddingly complex reality but also introduced an element of impartiality: the same mo- tivation was assumed in all regimes. The results are probably also robust enough to hold under richer and more realistic behavioral assumptions. The use of the same motivational assumption and the same theory to treat both autocracy and democ- racy also illuminates the main difference in the sources of economic growth and the obstacles to progress under autocracy and under democracy. In an autocracy, the source of order and other public goods and likewise the source of the social progress that these public goods make possible is the encom- passing interest of the autocrat. The main obstacle to long-run progress in autocracies is that individual rights even to such relatively unpolitical or economic matters as property and contracts can never be se- cure, at least over the long run. Although democracies can also obtain great advan- tages from encompassing offices and political parties, this is by no means always understood (Olson 1982, 1986); nor are the awesome difficulties in keeping narrow special interests from dominating economic policymaking in the long-stable democracy. On the other hand, democracies have the great advantage of preventing significant extraction of social surplus by their leaders. They also have the extraordinary virtue that the same emphasis on individual rights that is necessary to lasting democracy is also necessary for secure rights to both property and the enforcement of 574 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun, 19 Feb 2017 15:11:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms