China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement Cultural Revolution in 1966,"Mao alone received Foreign Ministry options papers from Zhou Enlai for decision,with information copies to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping,and Peng Zhen."5 This procedure was temporarily inter- rupted during the early period of the Cultural Revolution,especially from May to August 1967.5 Mao and Zhou,however,were able to resume full con- trol of foreign policy decision-making after August 1967. Because interest groups,the media,and public opinion in China had no independent influence on foreign policy during the Maoist era(1949-1976), analysis of China's elite politics is crucial in understanding how policy was made during that time.The elite is a collectivity"having a separate identity, internal structure,and elevated status based upon its special role in the deci- sion-making and enforcing process.During the Maoist decades,China's po- litical elite consisted of the key CCB state,and military leaders,and China's foreign policy political elite included Mao,Lin,Zhou,and other Politburo members.This article analyses the positions and interactions of these key figures in the making of China's policy toward the United States from 1969 to 1972. Four Marshals'Study Group Since 1965,China and the Soviet Union had continually expanded their mili- tary forces along their shared border.Tensions between the two countries in- creased further during the Cultural Revolution,and by 1968-1969 each side had amassed several hundred thousand troops along the border.In early 1968,Sino-Soviet conflict erupted around Qilixin Island,on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri River,a prelude to large-scale armed 5.Carol Lee Hamrin,"Elite Politics and Foreign Relations,"in Thomas W.Robinson and David Shambaugh,eds.,Chinese Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice(Oxford,UK:Clarendon Press,1994), P.83. 6.From May to August 1967,the Foreign Ministry did not function normally because of the assault from the"rebel faction."All leading cadres,including Foreign Minister Chen Yi,were under fire and not allowed to work.China's relations with many countries deteriorated.The office of the British charge d'affaires in Beijing was set on fire by the "rebel faction"on 22 August 1967.After this inci- dent,Zhou Enlai,with Mao's support,regained control over foreign affairs.For a Chinese version of this period,see Jin Ge,"Zai waijiaobu 'duoquan'qianhou"[The Beginning and End of"Seizing Power"in the Foreign Ministry],in An Jianshe,ed.,Zhou Enlai de zuihou suiyue,1966-1976 [Zhou Enlai's Final Years,1966-1976](Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe,1995),pp.207-243. 7.Robert A.Scalapino,"Introduction,"in Robert A.Scalapino,ed.,Elites in the Peoples Republic of China(Seattle:University of Washington Press,1972),p.vi. 8.Avery Goldstein,"Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC,"China Quar- terly.No.139 (September 1994),p.714.Cultural Revolution in 1966, “Mao alone received Foreign Ministry options papers from Zhou Enlai for decision, with information copies to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen.”5 This procedure was temporarily inter￾rupted during the early period of the Cultural Revolution, especially from May to August 1967.6 Mao and Zhou, however, were able to resume full con￾trol of foreign policy decision-making after August 1967. Because interest groups, the media, and public opinion in China had no independent inºuence on foreign policy during the Maoist era (1949–1976), analysis of China’s elite politics is crucial in understanding how policy was made during that time. The elite is a collectivity “having a separate identity, internal structure, and elevated status based upon its special role in the deci￾sion-making and enforcing process.”7 During the Maoist decades, China’s po￾litical elite consisted of the key CCP, state, and military leaders,8 and China’s foreign policy political elite included Mao, Lin, Zhou, and other Politburo members. This article analyses the positions and interactions of these key ªgures in the making of China’s policy toward the United States from 1969 to 1972. Four Marshals’ Study Group Since 1965, China and the Soviet Union had continually expanded their mili￾tary forces along their shared border. Tensions between the two countries in￾creased further during the Cultural Revolution, and by 1968–1969 each side had amassed several hundred thousand troops along the border. In early 1968, Sino-Soviet conºict erupted around Qilixin Island, on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri River, a prelude to large-scale armed 5 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement 5. Carol Lee Hamrin, “Elite Politics and Foreign Relations,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 83. 6. From May to August 1967, the Foreign Ministry did not function normally because of the assault from the “rebel faction.” All leading cadres, including Foreign Minister Chen Yi, were under ªre and not allowed to work. China’s relations with many countries deteriorated. The ofªce of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing was set on ªre by the “rebel faction” on 22 August 1967. After this inci￾dent, Zhou Enlai, with Mao’s support, regained control over foreign affairs. For a Chinese version of this period, see Jin Ge, “Zai waijiaobu ‘duoquan’ qianhou” [The Beginning and End of “Seizing Power” in the Foreign Ministry], in An Jianshe, ed., Zhou Enlai de zuihou suiyue, 1966–1976 [Zhou Enlai’s Final Years, 1966–1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1995), pp. 207–243. 7. Robert A. Scalapino, “Introduction,” in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. vi. 8. Avery Goldstein, “Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC,” China Quar￾terly, No. 139 (September 1994), p. 714