196 Eroneou Deion During the Korean War Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia 197 741742).Mao insisted on immediately launching a third campaign and cro the thrty parale MoaiednhisteeenmotDecembhcr29.TcsOcaledthin Ministry,13 January 1951,"cited in Cold War International History PnenoconcepnpeCPndAnerhw Project Bullerin 1995/1996.54).China reacted quickly by rebuffing lormakes ie rwhehrrep the UN proposal of"cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards."In rh of the thrty-ighh paralleYMZW his telegram to David Owen.the Acting Secretary-General of the UN on January 17.Zhou Enlai claimed that an initial cease-fire was sim- 733-735.741) hMaefotheCothe thrty- ply designed"o give the US forces a breathing space"and thus was a conspiracy.Zhou's counterproposal,however,consisted of calling parallemmainly fromhiswond for a seven-power conference to be held in China.The PRC,the per- rrrom Pyongyang.The Chinese nd North Kore manent members of the Security Council(the United States,Britain. oedhethird offensive campaign on the last day of 150. the Soviet Union,and France)except for the Republic of China on Theymarhed south across the thirty-eighth parallel and captured Taiwan,plus India and Egypt should participate in the conference, Seou r4.1951.Advanced Chinese and North Korean unts Zhou wrote.The subject matter should include the withdrawal of all ached the thirty-seventh parallel by January 8(Shen and Meng foreign forces from Korea,the removal of American protective power 1988.64Chen2001,92). from Taiwan,and other Far Eastern issues.The PRC's seat at the On the diplomatic front.on January 1.1951.the UN General United Nationsshould be restored on the first day of conference ("Ed- Assembly approved the principles drafted by the cease-fire group.It itorial Note,Chou Enlai to the Acting Secretary-General of the UN" called for ceas-fre throughout Korea,to be supervised by a UN 1951,in US Department of State 1983,91-92:Foot 1990.30:Pei and owith apromise that foreign troops would withdraw grad- Feng1993.25). ally from KoreaA supplementary repor provided that,after a cease On the same day.the Chinese foreign ministry delivered copies fire took effect,the General Assembly would organize a conference of Zhou's telegram to foreign envoys in Beijing,and Zhou received (among the Soviet Union,the United States,the United Kingdom. Indian ambassador Panikkar.The next day.Zhang Hanfu met with dthe PRC)to deal with the Korean War,Taiwan's status,PRC rep- John Hutchison,the British negotiation representative to Beijing.and resentaion a the UN.and other Far Eastern problems.The UN res. Alex Morch,the Danish minister at Beijing.Huan Xiang,director- olution was similar to what Zhou Enlai had proposed on December general of European and African affairs,met with Swedish ambassa- 22.1950.Warren Austin.the US permanent representative to the UN. dor Torsten Hammarstrom,briefing them on China's justification for voted in support of the proposal,which created a storm of outrage rejecting the UN cease-fire resolution.The minutes of these meetings both in the press and in Congress.It locked the Truman administra- further elaborated on China's position and strategies regarding tion in a political dilemma.As Secretary of State Dean Acheson ex- armistice negotiations.China insisted on the principle of"negotia- plained.the Truman administration would lose the Koreans and tions first and cease-fire afterwards."In his meeting with Zhou,Panik- provoke"the fury of the Congress and press"if it chose to support the kar revealed that"the U.S.agreed to the UN resolution,but very proposal,and lose"our majority and support in the United Nations" reluctantly.According to Indian government intelligence,the reason if it did the opposite.The administration made the painful decision to why the U.S.government consented to this resolution is because it support the resolution"in the fervent hope and belief that the Chinese expects that the Chinese government would turn it down."This fur- would reject it"(Acheson 1969,513;Leckie 1996,253-254). ther confirmed the US predicament in handling the UN resolution.It, In retrospect.this resolution should have offered Beijing a very fa- to some extent,allowed the Chinese to understand that the cease-fire vorable opportunity to end the war had it decided to do so.Advised and resolution was not instigated or initiated by the United States.Zhou instructed by Stalin("Ciphered Telegram,Roshchin to USSR Foreign seemed to realize it when he said."Things are not always in the U.S.'s favor'"(CFMA1950.no.113-00068.2645)