International Security 12:4 102 in his memoirs,"the time had come to draw the line"over what territories the United States would fight for.13 Dulles,on Eisenhower's instructions, confidentially informed Nationalist Foreign Minister George K.C.Yeh,who was visiting Washington,that the United States would publicly announce its intention to join in the defense of Jinmen,if the Nationalists withdrew from the Dachens.14 On the next day,January 20,1955,the NSC argued heatedly about the path Eisenhower and Dulles had chosen.On behalf of the president,Dulles reviewed U.S.policy:the United States had obscured its public stand to confuse the enemy.This policy,though,had begun to "backfire."The Com- munists now seemed convinced the United States would not fight for any of the offshore islands.Dulles recommended that,while continuing to seek a ceasefire through the UN,the administration should ask Congress to grant to the president the explicit power to commit U.S.forces to the defense of Taiwan and related areas not specifically mentioned in the mutual defense treaty.These "related areas"would include Jinmen,and probably Mazu,so long as the Communists professed an intention to attack Taiwan.The United States had to remove any ambiguity about what territories it would defend. Leaving the U.S.position unclear,according to Dulles,would now create "greater risk."15 Robert Cutler,the president's national security adviser,Treasury Secretary George Humphrey,and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson all vehemently objected to Dulles's view.They argued that the United States would be drawn directly into war with China over territory of minimal value.Wilson said the United States should hold just Taiwan and the Penghus,and "let the others go."The president,however,vigorously endorsed everything Dulles advo- 13.Dulles memorandum,meeting with Eisenhower and Radford,January 19,1955,FRUS:1955- 57,Vol.II,pp.41-44;Eisenhower,Mandate,p.466.Seven of the eight U.S.personnel were evacuated before Yijiang's capture.According to a historian in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who cites previously closed Chinese sources,Beijing employed limited military means as a political instrument to draw attention to the Taiwan question.Beijing wanted only to take Yijiang but not Jinmen or Mazu and did not want to confront the United States.After the Communists took Yijiang,in fact,Defense Minister Peng Dehuai and the Central Military Commission ordered Chinese forces to postpone their attack on the Dachens to avoid a clash with the United States.He Di,"The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the Offshore Islands,"unpublished paper,1987. 14.McConaughy memorandum,meeting of Dulles,Yeh and others,January 19,1955;Cutler memorandum,meeting of Dulles,Hoover and others,January 19,1955;both,FRUS:1955-57 Vol.L,Pp.46-48. 15.Memorandum of discussion at the 232nd meeting of the NSC,January 20,1955,Eisenhower Papers (AW)NSC Series,Box 6,NSC Summaries of Discussion. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Security 12:4 1 102 in his memoirs, "the time had come to draw the line" over what territories the United States would fight for.13 Dulles, on Eisenhower's instructions, confidentially informed Nationalist Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh, who was visiting Washington, that the United States would publicly announce its intention to join in the defense of Jinmen, if the Nationalists withdrew from the Dachens.14 On the next day, January 20, 1955, the NSC argued heatedly about the path Eisenhower and Dulles had chosen. On behalf of the president, Dulles reviewed U.S. policy: the United States had obscured its public stand to confuse the enemy. This policy, though, had begun to "backfire." The Com￾munists now seemed convinced the United States would not fight for any of the offshore islands. Dulles recommended that, while continuing to seek a ceasefire through the UN, the administration should ask Congress to grant to the president the explicit power to commit U.S. forces to the defense of Taiwan and related areas not specifically mentioned in the mutual defense treaty. These "related areas" would include Jinmen, and probably Mazu, so long as the Communists professed an intention to attack Taiwan. The United States had to remove any ambiguity about what territories it would defend. Leaving the U.S. position unclear, according to Dulles, would now create "greater risk."'15 Robert Cutler, the president's national security adviser, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson all vehemently objected to Dulles's view. They argued that the United States would be drawn directly into war with China over territory of minimal value. Wilson said the United States should hold just Taiwan and the Penghus, and "let the others go." The president, however, vigorously endorsed everything Dulles advo- 13. Dulles memorandum, meeting with Eisenhower and Radford, January 19, 1955, FRUS: 1955- 57, Vol. II, pp. 41-44; Eisenhower, Mandate, p. 466. Seven of the eight U.S. personnel were evacuated before Yijiang's capture. According to a historian in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who cites previously closed Chinese sources, Beijing employed limited military means as a political instrument to draw attention to the Taiwan question. Beijing wanted only to take Yijiang but not Jinmen or Mazu and did not want to confront the United States. After the Communists took Yijiang, in fact, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai and the Central Military Commission ordered Chinese forces to postpone their attack on the Dachens to avoid a clash with the United States. He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the Offshore Islands," unpublished paper, 1987. 14. McConaughy memorandum, meeting of Dulles, Yeh and others, January 19, 1955; Cutler memorandum, meeting of Dulles, Hoover and others, January 19, 1955; both, FRUS: 1955-57, Vol. II, pp. 46-48. 15. Memorandum of discussion at the 232nd meeting of the NSC, January 20, 1955, Eisenhower Papers (AW) NSC Series, Box 6, NSC Summaries of Discussion. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions