382 International Organization eral.8 This is so precisely because it does not encompass the phenomeno- logical dimensions of international regimes. From this vantage point,I develop three theoretical arguments;each yields an interpretation of central features of the postwar international eco- nomic order that is distinct from the prevailing view. The first concerns the "generative grammar''or what I shall call the "structure''of the internationalization of political authority.Whatever its institutional manifestations,political authority represents a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose.The prevailing interpretation of international authority focuses on power only;it ignores the dimension of social purpose.9 The problem with this formulation is that power may predict the form of the international order,but not its content.For example,in the era of the third hegemon in the complex of modern state-system and capitalist-world- economy,the Dutch in the 17th century,the condition of hegemony coexisted with mercantilist behavior,10 and it would be straining credulity to attribute this difference solely or even mainly to differences in the relative economic supremacy of the three hegemons without discussing differences in social purpose.Moreover,had the Germans succeeded in their quest to establish a "'New International Order''after World War II,the designs Hjalmar Schacht would have instituted were the very mirror image of Bret- ton Woods11-obviously,differences in social purpose again provide the key.Lastly,the common tendency to equate the 19th century liberal inter- national economic order and its post-World War II counterpart itself obscures exceedingly important differences in their domestic and interna- tional organization,differences that stem from the fact that the one repre- sented laissez-faire liberalism and the other did not.In sum,to say anything sensible about the content of international economic orders and about the regimes that serve them,it is necessary to look at how power and legitimate social purpose become fused to project political authority into the interna- tional system.Applied to the post-World War II context,this argument leads me to characterize the international economic order by the term"'em- Nor should it be expected to.As Waltz makes clear,his is a theory intended to predict that certain conditioning and constraining forces will take effect within the international system as a whole depending upon variation in its structure,not to account for such"process-level''out- comes as international regimes.Some of the literature cited by Keohane attempts to do more than this,however,though Keohane himself reaches a conclusion that is not at variance with my own. More accurately,it either assumes social purpose (as in Waltz,Theory of International Politics),or seeks to deduce it from state power (as in Krasner,"State Power and the Structure of International Trade,"World Politics 28 [April 1976]). 10 To my knowledge,the case of Dutch supremacy in the world economy has not been ad- dressed in the "hegemonic stability''literature;but see Immanuel Wallerstein,The Modern World System,vol.2 (New York:Academic Press,1980),chap.2. 1 A brief description may be found in Armand Van Dormael,Bretton Woods:Birth of a Monetary System (London:Macmillan,1978),chap.1.The classic statement of how it actually worked remains Albert O.Hirschman,National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, expanded ed.(Berkeley:University of California Press,1980).382 International Organization eral.8 This is so precisely because it does not encompass the phenomeno￾logical dimensions of international regimes. From this vantage point, I develop three theoretical arguments; each yields an interpretation of central features of the postwar international eco￾nomic order that is distinct from the prevailing view. The first concerns the "generative grammar" or what I shall call the "structure" of the internationalization of political authority. Whatever its institutional manifestations, political authority represents a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose. The prevailing interpretation of international authority focuses on power only; it ignores the dimension of social purp~se.~ The problem with this formulation is that power may predict the form of the international order, but not its content. For example, in the era of the third hegemon in the complex of modem state-system and capitalist-world￾economy, the Dutch in the 17th century, the condition of hegemony coexisted with mercantilist behavior,1° and it would be straining credulity to attribute this difference solely or even mainly to differences in the relative economic supremacy of the three hegemons without discussing differences in social purpose. Moreover, had the Germans succeeded in their quest to establish a "New International Order" after World War 11, the designs Hjalmar Schacht would have instituted were the very mirror image of Bret￾ton Woodsll-obviously, differences in social purpose again provide the key. Lastly, the common tendency to equate the 19th century liberal inter￾national economic order and its post-World War I1 counterpart itself obscures exceedingly important differences in their domestic and interna￾tional organization, differences that stem from the fact that the one repre￾sented laissez-faire liberalism and the other did not. In sum, to say anything sensible about the content of international economic orders and about the regimes that serve them, it is necessary to look at how power and legitimate social purpose become fused to project political authority into the interna￾tional system. Applied to the post-World War I1 context, this argument leads me to characterize the international economic order by the term "em￾Nor should it be expected to. As Waltz makes clear, his is a theory intended to predict that certain conditioning and constraining forces will take effect within the international system as a whole depending upon variation in its structure, not to account for such "process-level'' out￾comes as international regimes. Some of the literature cited by Keohane attempts to do more than this, however, though Keohane himself reaches a conclusion that is not at variance with my own. More accurately, it either assumes social purpose (as in Waltz, Theory of International Politics), or seeks to deduce it from state power (as in Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 [April 19761). lo To my knowledge, the case of Dutch supremacy in the world economy has not been ad￾dressed in the "hegemonic stability" literature; but see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1980), chap. 2. l1 A brief description may be found in Armand Van Dormael, Brettoh Woods: Birth of a Monetary System (London: Macmillan, 1978), chap. 1. The classic statement of how it actually worked remains Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, expanded ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)