72 Pacific Historical Review Leninist principle of the tactical zigzag,of moving one step back to gain two steps forward."As a warning to those Ameri- cans who would be negotiating at Geneva,the memorandum asserted:"It is clear that the Communist system with its ruthless use of deceit and bad faith makes it useless to expect that they will ever honor a contractual agreement which obstructs their basic aggressive aims."These aims included, of course,"the eventual absorption of all of Korea."2 Finally,in late April 1954,the Korea conference began. The American delegation soon found itself confronted with what appeared to be a nearly insurmountable problem:how to bridge the yawning gulf that separated Rhee,who consid- ered personal and national survival to be at stake at Geneva, from America's European allies,who were willing to make 21."War by Ceasefire,"March 19,1954,box 1,Jackson Records,Eisenhower Library.While Jackson was excoriating the Communists'use of"deceit and bad faith,"he was laying plans to try some of these tactics himself.In the early part of 1954,Jackson received a report from the Center for International Studies,a CIA- funded think-tank at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,on methods for dis- rupting Communist activities in Asia,especially in China.Various means of intro- ducing spurious information into China were described:the forging of letters intended for the eyes of censors;the insertion of"Delphic phrases"into speeches by American leaders,followed by speculation by"a tame columnist or two"regarding their meaning:the doctoring of radio broadcasts suspected of being monitored by Chinese officials.The substance of the rumors would be tailored to specific target groups.In each case,the purpose of the rumor technique was to make life difficult for the Chinese Communist government.Rumors planted behind enemy lines were designed to spring up as dissension,weakening the Chinese Communist govern- ment and limiting its ability to sustain its activities in Korea."Rumors,"Jan.8,1954, box 6,Jackson Records,Eisenhower Library.On the CIA-CENIS connection,see W.W.Rostow,Europe after Stalin (Austin,1982),35-36. At the same time,Jackson was devising various "handles"for describing the Geneva conference in propaganda channels like the CIA-sponsored Radio Free Eu- rope.Typical suggestions were"China Crimes Conference"and "Trial of Red China Conference."In addition,Jackson and his assistants were planning a propaganda blitz for the domestic front in America,with careful consideration given to how to leak information to the press for greatest psychological impact."Suggested Handles for the Geneva Conference,"March 2,1954,box 3,Jackson Records,Eisenhower Library."Proposed Exploitation Program for the Geneva Conference,"undated, ibid."Terms of Reference for OCB Support of the Geneva Conference,"March 1, 1954.bd. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions72 Pacific Historical Review Leninist principle of the tactical zigzag, of moving one step back to gain two steps forward." As a warning to those Ameri￾cans who would be negotiating at Geneva, the memorandum asserted: "It is clear that the Communist system with its ruthless use of deceit and bad faith makes it useless to expect that they will ever honor a contractual agreement which obstructs their basic aggressive aims." These aims included, of course, "the eventual absorption of all of Korea.""2 Finally, in late April 1954, the Korea conference began. The American delegation soon found itself confronted with what appeared to be a nearly insurmountable problem: how to bridge the yawning gulf that separated Rhee, who consid￾ered personal and national survival to be at stake at Geneva, from America's European allies, who were willing to make 21. "War by Ceasefire," March 19, 1954, box 1, Jackson Records, Eisenhower Library. While Jackson was excoriating the Communists' use of "deceit and bad faith," he was laying plans to try some of these tactics himself. In the early part of 1954, Jackson received a report from the Center for International Studies, a CIA￾funded think-tank at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, on methods for dis￾rupting Communist activities in Asia, especially in China. Various means of intro￾ducing spurious information into China were described: the forging of letters intended for the eyes of censors; the insertion of "Delphic phrases" into speeches by American leaders, followed by speculation by "a tame columnist or two" regarding their meaning; the doctoring of radio broadcasts suspected of being monitored by Chinese officials. The substance of the rumors would be tailored to specific target groups. In each case, the purpose of the rumor technique was to make life difficult for the Chinese Communist government. Rumors planted behind enemy lines were designed to spring up as dissension, weakening the Chinese Communist govern￾ment and limiting its ability to sustain its activities in Korea. "Rumors," Jan. 8, 1954, box 6, Jackson Records, Eisenhower Library. On the CIA-CENIS connection, see W. W. Rostow, Europe after Stalin (Austin, 1982), 35-36. At the same time, Jackson was devising various "handles" for describing the Geneva conference in propaganda channels like the CIA-sponsored Radio Free Eu￾rope. Typical suggestions were "China Crimes Conference" and "Trial of Red China Conference." In addition, Jackson and his assistants were planning a propaganda blitz for the domestic front in America, with careful consideration given to how to leak information to the press for greatest psychological impact. "Suggested Handles for the Geneva Conference," March 2, 1954, box 3, Jackson Records, Eisenhower Library. "Proposed Exploitation Program for the Geneva Conference," undated, ibid. "Terms of Reference for OCB Support of the Geneva Conference," March 1, 1954, ibid. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions