2. What sort of language can we use to articulate appropriately and effectively the demands of the moral law in a religiously pluralistic society? Can we find some way to articulate the demands of the moral law in a way that can be understood across eligious traditions? 3. Does the use of religious language or a theological foundation for the moral law constitute an improper attempt to smuggle theological beliefs into the civil law of a uralistic society 4. Does the use of legal coercion as a means to shape culture improperly infringe on the right to freedom of conscience? Does such a reliance on legal coercion fail to observe with sufficient care the distinction between the sphere of culture and the political/juridical sphere? 5. Would a more consistent adherence to Thomistic legal theory -focusing on law as a tool to educate for virtue- afford a more fruitful way approach to the law in the context of American pluralism than the rights-based approach of evangelium vitae? Would a more thoroughgoing Thomistic approach better allow us to draft laws that honor the moral claims made by the inviolability of the most vulnerable in society while also respecting the moral limitations of those who must respect those claims under difficult circumstances? 59 S6 See J. Bryan Hehir, Get a(Culture of) Life: The Pope's Moral Vision, 122 COMMONWEAL 8-9 (May 19, 1995). Hehir draws a contrast between John XXlll's philosophical treatment of human rights in Pacem in Terris(which provides much of the immediate foundation for John Paul Irs discussion of the a tension here between this vision and secular pluralistic culture which the encyclical never oice a e relationship between civil law and moral law)and John Paul Ils use of biblical imagery and theological reflection in Evangelium Vitae: " Unlike John XXXlIr's moral appeal to civil society.., John Paul calls upon all to enter into the rich symbolic discourse of the Scriptures to find direction for moral See Leslie C Griffin, Evangelium Vitae: Abortion, in CHOOSING LIFE, supra note 8, at 159-73 By relying primarily on a theological rationale rather than a natural law argument, Griffin reads Evangelium Vitae to be asking Catholic lawmakers and jurists "to inscribe their religious beliefs into the law of the United States. "While the church may be entitled to impose its theological doctrine on the faithful, Griffin concludes that"theological doctrine should not be imposed on non-Catholics by the state and politicians, not even by Catholic politicians. Id at 171 See Hollenbach, supra note 55, at 42-43(arguing that Evangelium Vitae fails to address the question of the relationship between laws educative role in shaping culture and the right to freedom of conscience and fails to observe with sufficient care the distinction between the sphere of culture and the political/juridical sphere)."IT]he linkage between civil freedom and adherence to truth as a political/juridical question is quite different from the fulfillment of freedom through attainment of a full vision of the human good on the level of culture. Id at 43 See Kaveny, The Limits of ordinary Virtue, in CHOOSING LIFE, supra note 41, at 132-49 Kaveny summarizes her critique of the jurisprudence of Evangelium vitae in this way: The Pope emphasis on rights language and exceptionless moral norms has hindered his ability to address the fundamental jurisprudential question raised in implementing the culture of life within a legal system: in drafting law, how do we honor the moral claims made by the inviolability of the most vulnerable members of the human community, even while recognizing the moral limitations of those who must respect those claims in very difficult situations? Id at 14110 2. What sort of language can we use to articulate appropriately and effectively the demands of the moral law in a religiously pluralistic society?56 Can we find some way to articulate the demands of the moral law in a way that can be understood across religious traditions? 3. Does the use of religious language or a theological foundation for the moral law constitute an improper attempt to smuggle theological beliefs into the civil law of a pluralistic society?57 4. Does the use of legal coercion as a means to shape culture improperly infringe on the right to freedom of conscience? Does such a reliance on legal coercion fail to observe with sufficient care the distinction between the sphere of culture and the political/juridical sphere?58 5. Would a more consistent adherence to Thomistic legal theory – focusing on law as a tool to educate for virtue – afford a more fruitful way approach to the law in the context of American pluralism than the rights-based approach of Evangelium Vitae? Would a more thoroughgoing Thomistic approach better allow us to draft laws that honor the moral claims made by the inviolability of the most vulnerable in society while also respecting the moral limitations of those who must respect those claims under difficult circumstances?59 56 See J. Bryan Hehir, Get a (Culture of) Life: The Pope’s Moral Vision, 122 COMMONWEAL 8-9 (May 19, 1995). Hehir draws a contrast between John XXIII’s philosophical treatment of human rights in Pacem in Terris (which provides much of the immediate foundation for John Paul II’s discussion of the relationship between civil law and moral law) and John Paul II’s use of biblical imagery and theological reflection in Evangelium Vitae: “Unlike John XXXIII’s moral appeal to civil society . . . , John Paul calls upon all to enter into the rich symbolic discourse of the Scriptures to find direction for moral choice. There is a tension here between this vision and secular pluralistic culture which the encyclical never acknowledges.” Id. at 13. 57 See Leslie C. Griffin, Evangelium Vitae: Abortion, in CHOOSING LIFE, supra note 8, at 159-73. By relying primarily on a theological rationale rather than a natural law argument, Griffin reads Evangelium Vitae to be asking Catholic lawmakers and jurists “to inscribe their religious beliefs into the law of the United States.” While the church may be entitled to impose its theological doctrine on the faithful, Griffin concludes that “theological doctrine should not be imposed on non-Catholics by the state and politicians, not even by Catholic politicians.” Id. at 171. 58 See Hollenbach, supra note 55, at 42-43 (arguing that Evangelium Vitae fails to address the question of the relationship between law’s educative role in shaping culture and the right to freedom of conscience and fails to observe with sufficient care the distinction between the sphere of culture and the political/juridical sphere). “[T]he linkage between civil freedom and adherence to truth as a political/juridical question is quite different from the fulfillment of freedom through attainment of a full vision of the human good on the level of culture.” Id. at 43. 59 See Kaveny, The Limits of Ordinary Virtue, in CHOOSING LIFE, supra note 41, at 132-49. Kaveny summarizes her critique of the jurisprudence of Evangelium Vitae in this way: “The Pope’s emphasis on rights language and exceptionless moral norms has hindered his ability to address the fundamental jurisprudential question raised in implementing the culture of life within a legal system: in drafting law, how do we honor the moral claims made by the inviolability of the most vulnerable members of the human community, even while recognizing the moral limitations of those who must respect those claims in very difficult situations?” Id. at 141